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The intention of this study is to provide an overview of demographic, labour market, income and housing situation of 
households in Europe with a special emphasis on presenting Hungarian data in cross national comparisons. The basic 
data source we use is the ‘Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions’ survey of the European Union (EU-
SILC) of 2005.1 This is the first time that survey data gathered using a standardized method have been available for the 
entire European Union, including the countries that joined in 2004 after EU expansion. 
The 2005 survey has been fielded in 26 countries (n = 196,686 households). Alongside the 15 old EU member states, 
the database covers all but one of the 10 countries that joined in 2004 (the one exception being Malta), as well as 
Iceland and Norway. The latter two countries are excluded from this analysis to leave just the members of the European 
Union as the focus of our inquiry. Our working database therefore includes data on 24 EU countries, since Malta did not 
take part in the survey and Romania and Bulgaria were not at the time EU members. The data cover private households; 
people living in institutions are not included in the sample. With the exception of the Scandinavian countries and 
Slovenia, the survey was conducted at household level, and most of our analyses take the household as their unit of 
analysis. The weighted dataset represents almost 190 million European households. The analysis in some of the 
following sections (such as those in the third chapter on labour markets) are, however, based on individual-level data. In 
an effort to obtain results that are as balanced and evidence-based as possible, in addition to the EU-SILC database our 
research makes use of other available data sources relevant to each topic of investigation.
As was noted above, our study exploits the unique opportunity offered by the availability of data to build a truly 
comparative analysis of the countries under consideration. Furthermore, the individual chapters introduce several 
methodological innovations. Most importantly, wherever the data allow it, we attempt to describe the population of 
the countries of the EU as if they were a single unified society. Wherever possible, the analyses do not simply juxtapose 
the societies of the EU, but also attempts to locate the people living in the individual countries within the context of the 
EU as a whole. This method allows us, for instance, to determine not only the magnitude of inequality in one or another 
of the countries, but also the relative position of a given individual or household within the ‘cross-European society’.
Secondly, our labour market analyses attempt to relate education inequalities within the individual countries to 
differences observed in employment levels. We are aware of no other such analysis that covers such a wide range of 
countries. 
Thirdly – as data now allows – we combine  demographic analyses with an examination of income distribution. This 
allows us to apply a uniform method in assessing the relative income positions of households that belong to different 
categories. 
Finally, the chapter on people’s financial position and their housing conditions introduces a new indicator – housing 
integration. This allows us to deepen our knowledge of the circumstances of households living in the different countries 
of the European Union to an extent that previous – sporadic – analyses could not hope to attain.
TÁRKI, with this report, launches a new series on social reporting, in addition to the Hungarian Social Reports, of 
which the 2008 edition is already 10th in a row since 1990.
1 This report is research output from the Tarki research project ‘Monitoring income distribution and poverty in an international 
context’. Data access was licensed to this project by the contract between TÁRKI Social Research Institute and Eurostat, signed 
on 31 January 2007 (Contract No. EU-SILC 2006/23). As stated in the above contract, the appropriateness of the statistical 
methods of analysis applied to the data and the conclusions drawn from the analyses are the sole responsibility of TÁRKI; 
Eurostat and the statistical authorities of individual member states cannot be held responsible. The analyses used the 27 June 
2007 version of the EU-SILC 2005/2 database (European Commission, Eurostat, EU-SILC UDB 2005/2 version 2007/06/27). For 
some key indicators, the March 2008 update contains somewhat modified values: this is taken into account in chapter 3.  
Details of regulatory framework and methods of EU-SILC can be found at  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1913,47567825,1913_58814988&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
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Demographic processes 
European societies are facing a hitherto unseen demographic challenge, featuring population ageing and an expected 
decline in the population. The continent’s share of the world’s population is decreasing and is predicted to fall further 
in both absolute and relative terms within the foreseeable future. The proportion of active-age cohorts is on the 
decline relative to inactive groups, especially the elderly. 
These processes are primarily determined by fertility, life expectancy and migration. The countries of Europe are 
characterized by low or, in some places, exceptionally low fertility. This is accompanied by a high and steadily rising 
life expectancy, while the migration balance of the continent is positive. Demographic estimates forecast that 
childbearing propensity will converge at a total fertility rate of about 1.6, that we will see an increase in health and 
life expectancy, and that there will be a larger scale of immigration flow. These processes are expected to lead to 
population decline, population ageing and a decrease in the proportion of the economically active population.
Hungary belongs in the group of countries with very low fertility and unfavourable mortality conditions; in addition, 
it was the first country in Europe to experience a population decline. Although we have little information on 
emigration, Hungary’s migration balance is estimated to be positive, though the figures are low. 
The ageing and the expected decline of the population of Europe will inevitably have certain economic and political 
consequences. Demographic processes have an impact on economic progress, the labour market and major welfare 
programmes (pension system, health insurance programme, long-term care services). As well as national strategies, 
this calls for strategic thinking on intervention policies at the level of the European Union. 
The number of households generally increases at a greater rate than the size of the population; the average size of 
households is steadily decreasing. The EU-15 average household size of 3.2 individuals typical in 1960 had fallen to 
2.4 by 2001. The average number of people living in a household continues to be higher in countries where fertility 
decline started relatively late (Ireland and the countries of Southern Europe). The typical age at which children leave 
the parental home varies from country to country, and there is variation in the living arrangements of elderly people 
left by themselves after the death of a spouse.
The increase in the share of single-person households is a dominant trend throughout the European Union: the ratio 
of such households in the EU-15 had risen from 16 per cent in 1960 to 28 per cent in 2001. In 2004, single-person 
households made up 16–43 per cent of households in the various EU countries. In Denmark and Sweden, more than 
four households in ten consist of just one member. At the other end of the spectrum come Cyprus, Spain and 
Portugal, where only around 16 per cent of households belong in this category. Single-person households constitute 
29 per cent (1,167,000 households) of all households in Hungary.
The proportion of households with a single generation ranged from about 40 to 70 per cent in 2004. There are 
pronounced differences between the old and the new EU member states with regard to the likelihood of one or 
more generations living in a household. In the new EU countries, the proportions of single-generation households 
do not substantially exceed 50 per cent and the ratios of multi-generation households approach 10 per cent. In the 
countries of the EU-15, there tend to be higher proportions of single-generation households, although there is 
considerable variation. Households with three or more generations, however, constitute less than 1 per cent of all 
households in the Northern regions of the continent.
Low fertility, the delayed age of childbearing and changes in cohabitation patterns bring about changes in the 
composition of households with children, and in their proportion of the population. Households with children occur 
with highest frequencies (40–45 per cent) in the new member states, in Portugal and Ireland, while the proportion 
of such households is lowest (25–30 per cent) in the United Kingdom, the countries of Northern Europe and Germany. 
Households with children have 1.5–2.0 children living in them on average.
Due to population ageing in Europe, the relative income position of the increasingly frequent single-person household 
type is below average in each of the countries under consideration. Within this type, households with 2–4 members, 
i.e. those where at most two generations live with a small number of children, are in the best position.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Men live in relatively better circumstances than women in every country. Among elderly people living alone, men are 
in a better income position than women almost everywhere. Women over the age of 65 clearly have the worst 
position within the group of single-person households.
The EU-SILC data show that lone-parent households do not even approach the average income level in any of the 
24 EU countries under consideration. Among nuclear family households, where children are raised by two parents, 
income position declines as the number of children increases. 
One-third of households in Hungary have children under 18 living in them. Their position is exceptional, in the sense 
that the income level of two adults living with one child still does not exceed the average. We also find, however, that 
there is very little difference between the relative positions of one- and two-child households. The educational 
attainment of the head of the household is a decisive factor in households with three or more children in Hungary 
as well, but this effect is not comparable to the effect observed among lone-parent households. 
Employment, inactivity and the labour market
Although economic activity and employment rates are on the increase in almost all the countries, the effects of 
regime change on the labour market can still be felt in the former socialist new member states. This is indicated by 
activity and employment rates that fall below the EU average in some of these countries, including Hungary. In terms 
of Europe overall, Hungary fares especially poorly: according to the Eurostat data, Hungary has the lowest activity 
rate (62 per cent) and the second lowest employment rate (57.3 per cent) – and has been left trailing by a dynamically 
developing Poland.
The expansion of the workforce follows similar patterns throughout Europe: wherever the overall activity rate 
increases, this is thanks to a growing level of activity among women and people aged 55–64 years. This pattern 
holds for the new member states as well, where the development is driven by an increase in the statutory age of 
retirement on the one hand, and on the other by a gradual process whereby the human capital that was rendered 
obsolete following regime change is replaced by more active generations.
Two of our findings may give pause for thought, however: the employment rate among men aged 25–54 (the most 
productive age) has declined in some of the countries, and rising unemployment among young people (15–24 years) 
is a serious concern in a number of countries.
The aggregate indicators of household labour activity, which are indicative of labour supply, reveal that around 20 
per cent of households in the European Union have no working members. This means that around 10 per cent of 
the population live in jobless households, most of which are households with elderly people and no children, or 
parents raising their children alone. In practice, barely 50 per cent of households devote their entire theoretical 
working months to work activities. Working-age people living in households with children work the longest hours. 
Two facts – that 50 per cent of households have some non-working members and that 20 per cent have no workers 
at all – suggest that there are labour reserves in the European economy.
The question of how employability affects labour supply is captured by examining educational attainment. Our 
results indicate that higher average levels of education and greater proportions of people with higher education are 
positively correlated with the employment rate; the same correlation holds true for inequalities and lower levels of 
education. Nevertheless, we can identify regimes (several of the new EU member states, including Hungary) where, 
owing to the nature of the education system, a lower employment rate (relative to the EU-24 average) is coupled 
with lower education inequality. These countries need to avoid shifting towards a pattern of low employment with 
high education inequality (the Mediterranean scenario) and should tend, instead, towards the developed pattern of 
high employment with low education inequality.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
TÁRKI EUROPEAN SOCIAL REPORT
11EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Income distribution
Our study compares the countries of the EU with regard to income inequality and poverty, and with respect to the 
individual elements that have the strongest effects on income differences: age, educational attainment and 
employment. Our analysis of income inequalities and poverty follows the methodology of the Laeken indicator 
system endorsed by the European Commission at its December 2001 meeting in Laeken.
Our results unequivocally show that inequalities are highest in Portugal, which has a Gini index value of 38 per cent, 
but the Ginis of Lithuania, Latvia and Poland also reach 35–36 per cent. The countries of Southern Europe (Spain, 
Greece and Italy), the Anglo-Saxon countries (the United Kingdom and Ireland) and Estonia cluster into a third group, 
characterized by relatively high levels of inequality. At the other end of the scale ranked according to the Gini 
indicator come Sweden, Denmark and Slovenia, with Ginis of below 25 per cent.
The highest rate of poverty in the EU is to be found in the countries of Eastern and Southern Europe. A fifth of the 
population of Poland, Lithuania, Spain, Portugal and Ireland live on an income of less than 60 per cent of the median. 
High poverty rates are to be found in other countries of Eastern and Southern Europe as well: 19 per cent of people 
live in poverty in Latvia, Greece and Italy, and 18 per cent in Estonia. At the other end of the scale we find the 
countries of Northern Europe with poverty rates of around 10 per cent. Countries characterized by relatively low 
rates of poverty further include the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, where a tenth of the population are poor. 
The remaining countries of Europe, including the majority of the Western European continental states, are classed as 
having moderate levels of poverty, with poverty rates of between 12 and 16 per cent.
There are substantial income differences between the EU countries; income inequalities among citizens of the 
European Union are, to a considerable extent, attributable to income differences between the states. Among the EU 
countries, Lithuania has the lowest standard of living and the former socialist countries generally belong in the group 
of states with the lowest average incomes. The people in the top decile in terms of income distribution in the former 
socialist countries have an average standard of living that corresponds to the living standards of the middle classes 
in the developed states of Western Europe (France and Germany). The highest average income is observed in 
Luxembourg, where the average income is over five times that of the country with the lowest standard of living.
Looking at the positions of households within the combined income distribution of the EU countries, we find that, 
with the exception of Slovenia and the Czech Republic, the majority of the inhabitants of the former socialist countries 
belong in the bottom quintile of the overall European income distribution. Around 70 per cent of the population of 
the Baltic states live on incomes of less than half the overall European median income; this also applies to 56 per cent 
of households in Hungary, for instance. In Luxembourg and Denmark, by contrast, the proportion of those with 
incomes of below half the overall European median is less than 2 per cent. 
Inequalities were broken down into individual factors to investigate the contribution of major personal traits to 
income inequality. Since labour income makes up the largest portion of household income, employment and the 
two most important determinants of earnings – education and age – were examined.
Inequalities follow a similar pattern in the Anglo-Saxon and the Baltic states: educational attainment and employment 
status play a significant role in shaping inequalities, while age does not. The countries of Northern Europe form 
another clearly distinguishable group, where, in addition to education and employment status, age also contributes 
to inequality patterns. Each of the three factors accounts for around a tenth of inequalities. The countries of Western 
Europe, Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region are similar, in that education is the factor that has 
the strongest effect on inequalities, although this effect is somewhat weaker in the Western European countries 
than in the states of the other two regions. While inequalities are also highly sensitive to employment status in the 
countries of Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe, this factor, like age, accounts for less than 5 per cent 
of inequalities in the Mediterranean countries. 
The greatest growth in inequality is observed in Italy and Ireland. In Italy, changes in income differences due to age 
and education had a significant effect on the development of inequality. The growth of income differentials 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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associated with level of education explains 28 per cent of the increase in inequality, while the widening gap between 
the incomes of different age groups accounts for 18 per cent of the increase in inequality. In Ireland, the factor where 
the development of income differences between population groups was found to have a significant effect was 
employment status: the increase in income differentials associated with employment status accounts for 49 per cent 
of the increase in inequality.
Housing and material conditions
Compared to Europe as a whole, Hungary has a high proportion of households living in family houses and households 
living in apartment buildings with over 10 apartments. Also, a relatively high proportion of people live in owner-
occupied accommodation.
Approximately a quarter of families in Hungary report that the cost of keeping up their home constitutes a major 
challenge. This figure does not appear to be especially high. 
The quality of dwellings falls below the European average in several respects. There is a high proportion of buildings 
with structural defects and of dwellings that lack basic facilities. 
The average number of rooms in dwellings in Hungary is below the average for the old EU members, but the living 
density is comparable to that of countries that joined the EU in 2004. In other words, in terms of the number of 
rooms, people in Hungary live in smaller apartments, but in terms of the average number of rooms per person, the 
dwellings are neither more nor less crowded than they are in countries similar to Hungary.
With respect to housing integration, overall Hungary does not fare well within Europe. This is due to the indicators 
of the quality of housing mentioned above, i.e. the higher than average incidence of housing with no basic facilities 
and of buildings in need of renovation.
With respect to the availability of appliances in households, Hungarian households perform at about the level of the 
EU average in terms of the availability of colour televisions (97 per cent), telephones (92 per cent) and washing 
machines (96 per cent). This typically places Hungary at around the middle or upper middle of the range, in the 
vicinity of the former socialist new EU countries; and those do not lag substantially behind the older member 
states.
Hungary’s distance from the EU average and the relatively more affluent old member states is considerably greater 
when it comes to the penetration of computers and cars. Looking at the availability of PCs in the home, we find that, 
while over half of all European households are equipped with computers, in Hungary only four households in ten are 
in the same position, which puts Hungary towards the bottom of the European scale, in a group with Greece, Poland 
and Slovakia.
Hungary’s poor showing is even more marked with respect to cars, and this finding is reinforced by a number of 
indicators: the country brings up the rear in terms of the number of cars per thousand people (287), and only 46 per 
cent of households own a car (by contrast with an average of 73 per cent in the EU-24). The Hungarian population 
is the least likely to travel by car, and the share of train (and bus or coach) travel in the total number of passenger 
kilometres is highest in Hungary.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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AT Ausztria Österreich
BE Belgium Belgique/Belgïe
CY Cyprus Cyprus
CZ Czech Republic Czech Republic
DE Germany Deutschland
DK Denmark Danmark
EE Estonia Estonia
ES Spain España
FI Finland Suomi
FR France France
GR Greece Ellada
HU Hungary Hungary
IE Ireland Ireland
IT Italy Italia
LT Lithuania Lithuania
LU Luxembourg Luxembourg
LV Latvia Latvia
NL Netherlands Nederland
PL Poland Poland
PT Portugal Portugal
SE Sweden Sverige
SI Slovenia Slovenia
SK Slovakia Slovak Republic
UK United Kingdom United Kingdom
List of names and  
abbreviations of countries 
analysed in the study
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1.1. Introduction
This chapter reviews the relevant literature, the major indicators and the results of 
our empirical analyses concerning the demographic processes characteristic of the 
European Union. Three determinants of the demographic profile of Europe will be 
presented first: fertility, mortality and migration (Section 1.2). Next, the immediate 
and the more far-reaching consequences of these processes will be discussed and 
there will be a brief outline of some alternative options for social policy, aimed at 
alleviating or forestalling the negative consequences (Section 1.3). Demographic 
processes also have a bearing on the household structure of societies, the 
rearrangement of which may, in turn, affect – as a micro-level mediator – social, 
economic and political processes. Our next section, therefore, looks at the impact of 
macro-processes at the level of households, and compares the countries of the 
European Union from this perspective (Section 1.4). Finally, the relationship between 
household structure and income position will be investigated (Section 1.5). Our 
empirical analyses are based on the 2005 cross-section wave of the EU-SILC survey. 
Since cross-section data only allow a very limited analysis of the causes and 
consequences of demographic events, our efforts will be directed towards other 
goals. It is our aim to refine the demographic picture drawn of Europe on the basis of 
macro-level data, by including individual and household-level data in the analysis.
1.2. The demographic profile of the European 
Union – macro-processes and forecasts 
1.2.1. Fertility
Trends and forecasts
At the same time as the world’s population is steadily increasing, the population 
of the European continent is expected to decline – unless there is some radical change 
in immigration patterns – both in absolute and relative terms. The slowing in the rate 
of population growth can, to a large extent, be attributed to a recent fall in fertility 
rates over and above earlier predictions.
WE SEEK TO REFINE  
THE DEMOGRAPHIC PICTURE 
DRAWN OF EUROPE ON THE BASIS 
OF MACRO-LEVEL DATA, BY 
INCLUDING INDIVIDUAL AND 
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL DATA  
IN THE ANALYSIS.
THE POPULATION  
OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT 
WILL DECLINE IN THE NEAR  
FUTURE, BOTH IN ABSOLUTE  
AND RELATIVE TERMS.
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The development of the total fertility rate (henceforth TFR) is shown in Figure 1.1, 
where we can clearly see that the decline in fertility reached a global scale in the 
1970s, and that only on the North American continent was the trend reversed in the 
first half of the 1980s. In terms of the level of fertility and the rate of its decline, 
however, there is a considerable difference between developed and developing 
countries, and between the North and the South. The phenomenon is new to 
developing countries, while a sustained falling trend in fertility can be observed 
throughout the developed world, although the extent and the period of decline may 
differ from country to country. 
There are considerable regional and country-specific differences to be found 
lurking behind the general European trend (Figure 1.2).2 The regions can be formed 
into two major groups, according to their present status: the regions of Western and 
2 The classification used by the UN (see the note to Figure 1.2) deviates somewhat from 
the one usually applied in sociological analyses concerned with Europe and the European 
Union. 
The total fertility rate is the average number of children that would be born to 
a woman who belongs to a given cohort if the members of that cohort gave birth 
at the rate observed for the given age group in the given year. The replacement 
level of the population would be ensured by a rate of around 2.1 to 2.2, depending 
on the age composition of the female population. It must be made clear, however, 
that the indicator characterizes the fertility of an imaginary cohort, rather than of an 
actual cohort, and it captures the fertility pattern of a given calendar year.
Total cohort fertility (final number of children) stands for the number of children 
born to a woman throughout her lifetime. It is typically applied to the period of 
childbearing – between the ages of 15 and 49 years.
Figure 1.1: Total fertility rate  
by continent, 1950–2050
Source: UN Population Division 
(2006)
Note: Predicted values for the 
period between 2000 and 2050, 
based on medium variant (see 
source). South America includes 
the Caribbean.
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Northern Europe form a cluster with relatively high fertility, while Southern and 
Eastern Europe form another cluster with comparatively low fertility.
This current situation has arisen in a variety of ways, however. While the regions 
of Northern and Western Europe display very similar patterns, the curves that describe 
Southern and Eastern Europe differ both from those patterns and from one another. 
In the wake of the roller-coaster curve of the baby boom and the baby bust (the 
period of the second demographic transition3), the patterns describing the countries 
of Western and Northern Europe diverged: in Western Europe, the eighties were 
characterized by decline, while a period of general stagnation described Northern 
Europe at this time. In the countries of Western Europe, the fertility rate had stabilized 
by the mid-1990s, and this was followed by a period of increase up to 2005. The 
region of Northern Europe, by contrast, saw a slow decline throughout the nineties. 
While, at the start of the period under analysis, the regions of Southern and 
Eastern Europe had higher fertility rates than the countries of Northern and Western 
Europe, by the end of the period the situation had been reversed. An effectively 
unbroken declining trend is to be observed for both groups of countries, but their 
curves only meet at the start and at the end of the period, while in between we see 
divergent trends. The countries of Eastern Europe, with their state-socialist regimes, 
displayed a relatively stable fertility pattern in the period from the late sixties to the 
late eighties, and this was followed by an exceptionally steep fall in the decade after 
the political and economic regime change. By contrast, the generally equivalent 
decline in fertility in the countries of Southern Europe was the result of a long steady 
trend.
3 Lesthaeghe (1983), van de Kaa (2001).
THE COUNTRIES OF THE EU FORM 
TWO MAJOR CLUSTERS: A HIGHER-
FERTILITY GROUP, COMPRISING  
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN 
AND NORTHERN EUROPEAN 
REGIONS, AND A LOWER-FERTILITY 
GROUP, COMPRISING  
THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHERN  
AND EASTERN EUROPE. THIS HAS 
NOT ALWAYS BEEN SO.
Figure 1.2: Total fertility rate by 
region in Europe, 1950–2050
Source: UN Population Division 
(2006)
Regional grouping: Northern 
Europe – Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, United 
Kingdom; Western Europe – 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland; Southern Europe – 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Montenegro, Portugal, Serbia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Macedonia; 
Eastern Europe – Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Ukraine.
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Eastern and Southern Europe have TFRs of around 1.3, while the TFRs of Northern 
and Western Europe hover around 1.6 (where TFR is expressed as the average of the 
countries of each region). Notwithstanding the observed differences, we may 
conclude that the simple replacement of the population is not ensured in any of the 
EU countries. The medium variant of the UN projections predicts a convergence in 
fertility trends in the countries of Europe by 2050, at a TFR of around 1.6. The average 
fertility of Eastern European countries is expected to fall somewhat below that level. 
The demographic forecasts estimated by Eurostat largely accord with the UN 
projections (EC, 2007a).
An examination of the country-level data behind the trends displayed in Figure 
1.2 reveals that, over the period from 1950 to 2005, the highest TFR is to be found in 
Ireland, with values that never fall below 1.9. High total fertility rates – with greater or 
lesser fluctuations – are also to be observed in France, Denmark and Sweden. The 
TFR there remained at over 1.6 throughout the period (with the exception of Denmark 
in the first half of the 1980s). Taking the average values of recent years, the lowest 
levels of fertility are experienced by the Czech Republic (1.18), Slovakia (1.22), Latvia 
(1.25), Greece (1.28), Italy and Spain (1.29 each). 
In Hungary, the TFR was over 2.5 in the first half of the 1950s, thanks primarily to 
the surge in childbearing at the time of the Ratko population policy. The declining 
trend was halted by another rise in the mid-seventies. As in the other formerly state-
socialist countries, the decline in fertility accelerated in the years following the regime 
change, and recently stabilized at around 1.3. This places Hungary among the 
countries of low fertility.
The determinants of fertility trends
Childbearing trends develop under the influence of a complex set of factors. The 
direct, typically demographic causes (such as cohabitation patterns and the timing of 
childbirth) essentially reflect the costs involved in having a child and raising a family. 
These costs – as suggested by theories of economic science (e.g. Willis, 1973, 1979; 
Becker, 1981; Easterlin, 1968) – are determined by the social and economic processes 
of recent decades, such as the development of welfare systems based on 
intergenerational solidarity, the considerable increase in the value of human capital 
and the rise in women’s real wages, and, related to that, the increase in the number 
of working women. Since the scope of our study does not permit discussion of all 
these factors, we shall focus on the effects that the age of childbearing and women’s 
labour supply have on fertility.4
The age of childbearing. In 2005, the European Union had an average TFR of 
around 1.5. This figure collapses together two groups of countries that differ in their 
yearly indicators, but the general conclusion that childbearing propensity falls below 
the threshold rate of 2.1 needed for population replacement holds for both groups. 
The first group comprises countries with TFRs of around 1.6 to 1.9 (predominantly the 
4 A detailed analysis of these processes is given in comprehensive demographic studies, see 
RAND Europe (2004), SSO (2005), EC (2007a).
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countries of Northern and Western Europe), while the value of the indicator remains 
below 1.5 in the countries of the other group (the Mediterranean region and the 
former state-socialist countries) (EC, 2007a). Some researchers believe that the actual 
situation with respect to fertility is better than might be suggested by the currently 
observed period fertility rates.5 The trend towards delaying the age of first childbirth 
began in 1980 and is with us to this day. The overall average age of childbearing is 
also on the increase (Figure 1.3). As well as affecting the mean age of childbearing 
(tempo effect), this has an impact on the number of births (quantum effect), and it 
may influence the period fertility rate in two opposing directions. With the delayed 
age of childbirth, a rapid decline in the period fertility rates does not necessarily mean 
a reduction in the total number of births. It could be that the delay only affects the 
timing of childbirth within the propagative period. This assumption is one of the 
factors justifying the increasing fertility trend used for the medium variant of 
population projections mentioned above. 
We get the opposite result if the changes in the age of childbirth are expected to 
have an effect on the total number of births. It is easy to see that the longer the age 
of first childbirth is delayed, the less time will be left for further births. This assumption 
is supported by Frejka and Calot (2001), who compare the cohort fertility rates of 
women born in the 1930s and 1960s in countries with low fertility rates. Lutz, Skirbekk 
and Testa (2005) work with a similar hypothesis in formulating their theory of the low 
fertility trap. This theory states that there is more than one mechanism that can result 
in the currently observed low fertility rate leading to a further decline in childbearing 
propensity or to stagnation at this low level.
5 The debate was started by Bongaarts and Feeney’s (1998) study. Total fertility rate is 
considered to be a period fertility indicator in this context.
... BUT IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT, AS 
THE BIRTH OF THE FIRST CHILD IS 
DELAYED, LESS TIME WILL BE LEFT 
FOR FURTHER BIRTHS.
Figure 1.3: Average age at 
childbirth in the European Union, 
by country (years)
Source: EC, 2007a
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The issue can only be decided by examining total cohort fertility rates. The 
analysis, however, comes up against the problem that the total number of births is 
only known for women aged at least 40, and not, for obvious reasons, for younger 
women. We can therefore state that the EU-25 mean total cohort fertility rate of 
women born in the mid-1960s is substantially lower than that of women born shortly 
after World War II, but we have no knowledge of the average number of children 
born to younger generations by the end of their fertile years.
The indicators of total cohort fertility available in Hungary do not show the kind 
of variability observed for period fertility. The lowest currently available total cohort 
fertility rate is observed among women born in the 1940s (around 1.87); the equiva-
lent indicators for women born later show a (very slowly) increasing trend. The analy-
sis, however, cannot extend to the generation of women born later than the early 
1960s, and it remains to be seen whether younger generations will have a similarly 
high number of children at the end of their fertile period.
Labour supply and childbearing. The most significant item in the costs of 
childbearing and child rearing is the loss of the mother’s labour income (opportunity 
cost), the size of which is determined by the employment rate and the labour wages 
of women. In recent literature, however, there has been some debate as to whether 
the relationship between women’s employment and fertility is positive or negative. 
Some researchers argue – on the basis of correlation analyses of cross-section and 
macro-level data – that since the late 1980s the negative relationship predicted by 
the theory has been reversed (Ahn and Mira, 2002; Rindfuss, Guzzo and Morgan, 
2003; Billari et al., 2002; Del Boca et al., 2003; d’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005). This is 
often interpreted as evidence of a cause and effect relationship between the two 
factors. Other empirical studies come to the conclusion – through time-series analyses 
of aggregate data and analysis of individual-level data – that the relationship 
continues to be negative but has become weaker over the period in question 
(Engelhardt, Kögel and Prskawetz, 2001; Engelhardt and Prskawetz, 2002; Kögel, 
2004, 2006). This phenomenon is largely attributed to public programmes, and 
especially to developments in the sphere of maternity leave, the expansion of 
childcare facilities outside the home and the flexibility of labour markets. An increase 
in the labour market participation of women, therefore, can hardly be expected in 
itself to lead to an increase in fertility; but the introduction of a third factor does 
appear to make it possible for them to grow concurrently. This factor would include 
the availability of childcare facilities outside the home – so long as the cost of such 
childcare remains lower than the real income gain attainable by women workers, or if 
public funds are used to reduce the cost. 
The potential influence of public programmes on fertility 
The countries of the European Union do not traditionally employ government 
measures to influence childbearing decisions. Some countries (e.g. France, Sweden 
and the former state-socialist countries) did exploit the potential of financial and non-
financial incentives for a long time (and some continue to do so), but very few of 
these were targeted specifically at encouraging fertility (although almost all the 
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countries maintain an institution system that can have this effect). In recent years, this 
attitude of non-intervention appears to have shifted, and even EU-wide options are 
being sought with increasing openness to reverse or slow the negative trend in 
fertility – in part as a form of public investment in human capital (EC, 2007a). The 
question that must be asked is whether public programmes are a suitable means by 
which to influence decisions of fertility and, if so, what combinations of policies are 
the most efficient.
The theoretical framework for investigating the effects of public programmes on 
fertility is provided by models of economics. In the economics literature, children 
typically appear in models of childbearing decisions in either of two ways: as 
consumption goods (Becker, 1960, 1981) or as capital goods (Willis, 1979; Cigno, 
1993). While econometric studies investigating the effects of family support 
programmes on fertility use the consumption model, the capital model is typically 
used as the framework for analyses of the effects of the pension system on fertility. 
The results of empirical studies using econometric models to investigate the 
fertility effects of public programmes related to child rearing indicate that approaches 
based on micro-level, rational decision processes appear to make the right predictions 
with regard to the positive effects. The variables capturing the cash provision 
programmes of family support systems invariably have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the factors of fertility behaviour in most of the cases. The 
empirical literature is summarized in Gauthier and Hatzius (1997), Sleebos (2003), Del 
Boca et al. (2003), d’Addio and d’Ercole (2005), and Björklund (2007). The results 
further indicate that the impact of cash benefits is not particularly strong. The 
redistribution of incomes – directly or indirectly – targeting families in the developed 
world is only one of several factors contributing to childbirth, and it offers governments 
only a relatively limited option in their efforts to influence fertility.
As we mentioned above, micro-economic theory projects a negative relationship 
between women’s labour market participation and fertility. Assuming that labour 
market participation affects childbearing decisions, the negative relationship is 
primarily attributed to the fact that the mother’s labour supply prior to childbirth 
substantially raises the costs of child rearing due to the loss of labour income and the 
decline in human capital caused by the mother’s subsequent absence from the labour 
market.
For this reason, a programme that helps resolve the work–family conflict and 
achieve a work–life balance is one of the main objectives of policy making. The most 
frequently recommended policy combinations in this context echo the practices of 
the Scandinavian countries: the development of childcare facilities outside the home, 
the encouragement of flexible working conditions and the development of a well-
designed parental leave system (e.g. Del Boca et al., 2003). 
An analysis of data from Hungary was carried out by Gábos, Gál and Kézdi (2005). 
The results reveal that over the past five decades the effect on fertility of cash benefits 
to support families in Hungary has been positive. Bálint and Köllő (2008) find that the 
elements of the Hungarian family support system that are related to maternity 
(childbirth leave, cash benefits to mothers) act as a major disincentive to mothers’ 
labour market participation. As a result, while the employment rate among Hungarian 
women roughly corresponds to the OECD average, the activity rate among mothers 
with young children is one of the lowest. 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES REVEAL THAT 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAMMES 
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1.2.2. Mortality
Trends and forecasts
In the decades following the war, mortality trends diverged across the regions of 
Europe. There were pronounced differences in life expectancy at birth between the 
relatively highly developed countries of Northern Europe and the less highly developed 
countries of Southern and Eastern Europe, though the differences were substantially 
reduced in the course of the 1950s and 1960s. The improving trend in mortality came 
to a halt in the sixties, but resumed in the seventies. Some of the Western and 
Southern European countries closed the gap on Northern Europe in this period. 
Mortality trends in Eastern Europe, however, showed a different pattern. From the 
seventies onwards, life expectancy at birth stagnated or decreased in most of the 
countries with state-socialist regimes, including Hungary (Meslé, 1996).
In Hungary, the rise in life expectancy at birth experienced in the late 1960s came 
to a halt in the early 1970s, as was the case with most other state-socialist countries. 
The improving trend in mortality among the female population appeared to end, and 
mortality among men showed a clear deterioration. From then on, the gap between 
Hungary and the more highly developed countries (and countries with a developed 
health awareness) gradually widened with respect to life expectancy (Józan, 2002). 
The life prospects of the Hungarian population started improving again in the mid-
1990s.
Across the EU countries, the average life expectancy at birth among men rose 
from 69.8 years in 1980 to 75.3 years in 2004 (Figure 1.4). The corresponding indicator 
for women shows an increase from 76.8 to 81.5 years over the same period (Figure 
1.5). The difference between the average life expectancy of men and women fell 
somewhat in the same period (from 7 to 6.2 years). Life expectancy at birth continues 
to be substantially higher in the old member states of the EU (76.4 years for men and 
82.2 years for women) than in the countries that joined in 2004. At the time of their 
birth, men can expect to live for 70.1 years and women for 78.3 years in the EU-10. 
The difference between the life expectancies of the two sexes is even more 
pronounced in this group than among the old EU members (8 years compared to 5.8 
years). 
In 2004, the population (men and women) of the Baltic states had the lowest 
average life expectancy at birth of all the EU countries. Among men, the figures for 
Latvia (64.9 years), Estonia (65.5 years) and Hungary (68.5 years) are the lowest, while 
the highest average life expectancies at birth are to be found in Sweden (78.1 years) 
and Spain (76.6 years). Women have the lowest life expectancies in Latvia (76.2 years), 
Hungary (76.8 years) and Estonia (76.9 years) and the highest life expectancies in 
Spain (83.4 years), France (83.4 years), Italy (83.2 years) and Sweden (82.4 years).
A further increase in life expectancy at birth is forecast until 2050. There is no 
agreement among demographers, however, as to the rate and extent of the increase. 
Some experts predict a continuing rate of two years’ increase per decade in life 
expectancy at birth, while others argue that the improvement in life expectancy at 
birth will slow down when a biological limit has been reached (EC, 2007a). 
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH 
CONTINUES TO BE LOWER  
IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES  
OF THE EU THAN IN THE OLD 
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Nevertheless, the differences between the EU countries – as well as a comparison 
with non-EU countries – suggest that there is room for improvement. Past projections 
issued by official sources have tended to underestimate the increase in life expectancy, 
which is a risk that must be taken into consideration when interpreting current 
estimates (EC, 2006a).
Eurostat forecasts put men’s average life expectancy at birth 6.4 years higher, at 
81.8 years in 2050; and the corresponding estimate for women sees an increase of 
5.4 years to 86.9 years. However, significant differences are predicted between the 
various EU countries in terms of the expected improvement in longevity. Forecasts 
project that the greatest improvement will be in the new member states among both 
men and women. In the countries of the EU-15, men and women born in 2050 can 
expect to live respectively 5.9 and 5.2 years longer than those born in 2004. The 
corresponding figures are 8.6 and 5.9 years in the new EU countries. The greatest 
increase in men’s life expectancy is projected for Hungary (9.6 years) and the Baltic 
states (9–9.4 years), while women’s life expectancy is predicted to show the most 
improvement in Hungary (6.6 years). The gap between the new and the old EU 
countries is consequently expected to narrow by 2050, though it will not be 
completely closed. 
From the point of view of economic policy, it is important to note that the 
projected increase in life expectancy up to 2050 is largely attributable to improving 
old-age mortality. This can be seen in the rising life expectancy in old age. In the 
countries of the EU-25, 65-year-old men can expect to live for a further 15.9 years, 
and women of the same age have a life expectancy of 19.5 years (data from 2004). 
The gap between the life expectancies of men and women is clearly greater at birth 
due to differences in mortality rates at a young age (infant mortality is well known to 
be higher among boys). 
Differences between the old and the new EU members can also be observed in 
life expectancy at the age of 65. In the new EU countries, 65-year-old men have an 
Figure 1.4: Life expectancy at 
birth in the European Union  
by country, men (years)
Source: Eurostat
Note: The data projected for 2050 
are provided by Europop 2004, 
Baseline. The abbreviation MT 
refers to Malta.
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average life expectancy of 13.5 years, and the corresponding figure is 17.2 years for 
women. In the EU-15, their life expectancies are 16.3 and 19.9 years, respectively. In 
2004, men of this age could expect the shortest life spans in Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia 
and Hungary (13.1 years) and the longest life spans in France, Spain, Italy and Sweden. 
Women aged 65 years have the worst prospects in Slovakia, Latvia and Hungary (16.7 
years) and the best prospects in France, Spain and Italy.
The forecasts for 2050 suggest an increase of 4.6 years in the average life 
expectancy of 65-year-old men and an increase of 4.4 years for 65-year-old women 
in the EU. This means that in 2050 men and women of this age can expect to live for 
a further 20.5 and 23.9 years, respectively. The gap between the two sexes is 
predicted to be smaller at this age, compared to life expectancies at birth. The 
expected rate of improvement in the longevity of the 65-year-old population varies 
from country to country. In the countries of the EU-10, men can expect a greater 
improvement (5 years) than in the countries of the EU-15 (4.4 years), while the reverse 
is predicted for women. Compared to 2004, an increase of 4.4 years is projected for 
women aged 65 in the EU-15 group, and a rise of 4.1 years in the EU-10.
An important issue to consider is the portion of the expected life span that is 
spent in good health. The length of this period determines whether older populations 
have the capacity to remain active in the labour market. Depending on how ‘good’ 
health is defined, the measure of a healthy life span can be established in a variety of 
ways (Eurostat and the World Health Organization approach this issue in different 
ways). According to the Eurostat data for 2003, men in the old EU countries can 
expect to have 65 and women 66 healthy years of life.6 The longest period of good 
health among men is measured in Italy (71 years). Hungarian men, by contrast, can 
6 The figures represent the values of the HLY (Healthy Life Expectancy) structural indicator, 
which are based on the measurement of health-related limitations in everyday activities. 
Figure 1.5: Life expectancy at 
birth in the European Union  
by country, women (years)
Source: Eurostat
Note: The data projected for 2050 
are provided by Europop 2004, 
Baseline.
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only expect to have 54 healthy years.7 The indicators for women show the best 
quality of life in Italy (74 years), Spain, Cyprus and Austria (70 years), and the worst in 
Finland (57 years), Hungary (58 years) and the Netherlands (59 years).8
The determinants of mortality trends 
We have shown that a wide gap can be observed between the old and the new 
EU member states in terms of life expectancy at birth. As is noted in a report by the 
European Commission, a substantial part of this difference is attributable to prevent-
able or treatable mortality. The report labels as preventable mortality those causes of 
death that can be avoided by effective intervention (e.g. lifestyle factors and acci-
dents), while treatable mortality covers cases for which effective medical treatments 
are available (EC, 2007a). 
There are considerable differences between the various socio-demographic 
groups with respect to life expectancy. As is indicated by the data presented above, 
the difference between the life expectancies of men and women is striking. The male 
population born in 2004 can expect to live for 6 years less than the female population, 
but it is predicted that the gap between the sexes will have narrowed by 2050. The 
lower mortality risk for women is, however, accompanied by a higher risk of old-age 
disability (EC, 2007a).
Life expectancy at birth is also related to educational attainment. The UN reports 
that, in the developed world, educational attainment is a good predictor of the 
morbidity and mortality figures that apply to individuals (and their households) (UN, 
2003). The data further indicate that, in the countries of Europe, the number of years 
of schooling does not affect the mortality figures for the two sexes to the same 
extent as in the United States of America. The returns to education measured in years 
of life are higher for men than for women. The gains – in years of life – to staying at 
school longer show significant differences between the sexes in Denmark, Hungary 
and Sweden (SSO, 2005). 
Klinger’s (2001) study reveals that differences in mortality attributed to educational 
attainment have increased over the past 30 years among the population of Hungary. 
The excess mortality among people with less than 8 years of schooling has displayed 
an especially strong increase, while the relative position of people with higher 
education has improved significantly. Both trends have been observed for both sexes, 
but the effect is substantially stronger for men.
7 Note that Hungary is the only former socialist country for which data are available. 
8 www.euphix.org/object_ class/euph _ health _ expectancy.html
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1.2.3. Migration
The third important determinant of demographic change is international 
migration. A number of European countries that were formerly sources of migration 
became host countries in the second half of the 20th century. The exact number of 
migrants in Europe is unknown, in part because the statistical records of several 
countries register nationality rather than the place of birth (country), thus making it 
impossible to identify first-generation immigrants once they have obtained citizenship 
(EC, 2007a).
For the year 2005, the UN has estimated that there are approximately 40 million 
migrants in the EU-27 member states.9 Around 3 per cent of migrants are estimated 
to be refugees. Migrants make up 8.3 per cent of the total population of the European 
Union. In 10 of the member states, the proportion of people born abroad exceeds 
10 per cent. The highest concentrations are found in Luxembourg (37.4 per cent), 
Latvia (19.5 per cent), Estonia (15.2 per cent), Austria (15.1 per cent) and Ireland (14.1 
per cent) (EC, 2007a).
Most of the international migration flow to the European Union targets the 
countries of the EU-15. All of the 15 old EU member states have now become host 
countries, including Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain, which were typically the origins 
of migration flows before (Monnier, 2004). The new member states attract 
considerably fewer migrants. The EU-10, therefore, is overall characterized as a source 
region. Among the new member states, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia had 
a negative annual migration balance in 2004. 
The EU is expected to remain a significant target for migration over the next few 
decades. Eurostat forecasts10 estimate the cumulative rate of net migration to be 
around 40 million people over the period between 2004 and 2050 (EC, 2006a). It 
should be noted, however, that migration forecasts are to be treated with some 
caution. 
The number of immigrants living in Hungary was estimated to be 316,000 in 
2005. These immigrants typically come from the Hungarian-populated regions of 
neighbouring countries, and the great majority of them are of Hungarian ethnicity. 
Annual net migration amounted to around 15,000 in 2005 (EC, 2006a). Assuming 
a similar migration rate projected up to the year 2030, and a net positive migration 
balance of around 20,000 after 2030, the cumulative net immigration figure will reach 
800,000 in the period between 2004 and 2050 (EC, 2006a).
9 The number of immigrants is insignificant in Romania and Bulgaria.
10 According to the scenario put forward by the Ageing Working Group (AWG) working with 
the European Policy Committee of the European Commission.
DUE TO CONSTRAINTS REGARDING 
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WITH REGARD TO MIGRATION,  
THE EU IS CONSIDERED TO BE  
A ‘HOST’ OVERALL. WITHIN  
THE EU, THE OLD MEMBER STATES 
HAVE A POSITIVE IMMIGRATION 
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1.3. The socio-economic consequences  
of demographic processes 
1.3.1. Population decline and population ageing 
As a result of the trends detailed above (sustained low, sub-replacement fertility, 
increasing life expectancy), the population of the EU is expected to decline and 
become significantly older. That is, the share of relatively old cohorts in the population 
is predicted to grow, and the average age to rise. As well as presenting the trends of 
population decline and ageing, we will discuss the constraints and the options 
available to migration policy in its efforts to alleviate the negative effects. 
The population of the EU (formerly EEC) has increased in the 50 years since its 
foundation. This population growth is primarily a result of successive expansions (the 
admittance of new member states), while demographic processes (fertility, mortality 
and migration) have had a substantially weaker contribution (Monnier, 2004). In the 
past, population growth was mainly driven by natural growth (the difference between 
the number of births and deaths), while nowadays the main cause is immigration 
(Monnier, 2004). Several EU countries (Germany, Greece, Italy) experienced an increase 
in their population in 2004 purely due to immigration (net immigration flow was 
greater than natural decline). Among member states, only France, the Netherlands, 
Finland and Ireland have natural growth rates that exceed net migration rates (SSO, 
2005). 
The population of the EU is expected to grow from 457 million people in 2004 to 
470 million in 2025, and this is then expected to be followed by a decreasing trend, 
leading to a population of 454 million people in 2050, which amounts to a decline of 
1 per cent over the whole of the period. The Eurostat forecast predicts population 
growth in some member states and significant decline in others. The greatest increase 
is projected for Luxembourg (42 per cent) and Ireland (36 per cent). A less marked 
growth (8–13 per cent) is expected in Sweden, the United Kingdom, France and the 
Netherlands. The projections indicate a substantial decline in the population of 
Germany, Greece, Italy and Portugal among the old member states. While the 
population of the countries of the EU-15 is expected to have grown by 1 per cent by 
2050, that of the new member states is predicted to decrease by 12 per cent (EC, 
2006a). Each of the former socialist countries is expected to experience a significant 
decline in population. 
In Hungary, a greater number of deaths than births have been registered in every 
year since 1981. The natural decline amounted to 31,700 people in 2006. However, 
owing to the country’s positive migration balance, the overall decline in population 
was smaller than that. Eurostat projects a 12 per cent decline in the population of 
Hungary over the period between 2004 and 2050, with an anticipated population of 
8.9 million people at the end of the period. A similar rate of population decline is 
predicted for some other former socialist countries, including Slovakia, Poland and 
the Czech Republic. 
WHILE, IN THE PAST, POPULATION 
GROWTH WAS MAINLY DRIVEN BY 
NATURAL GROWTH, IMMIGRATION 
IS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR 
AT PRESENT.
A SLIGHT DECLINE IS PROJECTED  
IN THE POPULATION OF THE EU BY 
2050. WHILE THE POPULATION  
OF THE EU-15 COUNTRIES IS 
PREDICTED TO REMAIN STATIC, 
THAT OF THE NEW MEMBER STATES 
IS EXPECTED TO DECLINE BY  
12 PER CENT BY THE YEAR 2050.
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Trends in population ageing
The expected shift in the age composition of the population will have a 
significantly greater effect on the economy than will population decline. The 
decreasing trend in fertility and the continuing rise in average life expectancy at birth 
result in population ageing. This trend is a feature of every member state, although 
there are differences in degree. 
Let us start by looking at the age pyramids of the EU population. The pyramids 
reveal the development of demographic processes over time, as well as the 
composition of the population by sex and age. The pyramids of both old and new 
member states characteristically taper towards the bottom, i.e. the size of the 
youngest cohorts is strikingly small. This is a consequence of the fall in fertility. The 
age structure of the old and the new member states differs in that, while the age 
pyramid of the old member states widens at a single age group (specifically the group 
of people born at the time of the baby boom following World War II), where a large 
cohort is to be found, the age pyramid of the new member states bulges in two 
places – for people born in the periods from 1946 to 1955 and from 1972 to 1990 
(SSO, 2005). Demographic projections suggest that the age structure of the EU in 
2050 will most resemble an upside-down pyramid, reflecting the baby boom 
generation entering retirement age, the rise in life expectancy and the persistently 
low fertility rate. 
The new member states have a considerably younger population than the EU-15 
countries. The median age is 40.3 years in the old EU countries – i.e. half of the 
population is aged over 40.3 years – as opposed to 37.4 years in the new member 
states. The ‘oldest’ countries in the European Union are Italy and Germany, while 
Ireland, Cyprus, Slovakia and Poland are among the ‘youngest’ states. Across the 
whole of the EU, the median age is expected to rise from 39 years in 2004 to 49 
years in 2050. The current age advantage of the new member states is expected to 
persist until 2035 (SSO, 2005).
The dependency ratio of the old-age population – the ratio of the inactive 
population aged 65 and over to the working-age (15–64-year-old) population – 
stood at 24.5 per cent for the EU in 2004. This means that there are currently four 
active-age people to every person of 65 years and over. The highest old-age 
dependency ratios are observed in Italy (28.9 per cent), Germany (26.8 per cent), 
Sweden (26.4 per cent) and Belgium (26.1 per cent), while the lowest ratios are found 
in Slovakia (16.3 per cent), Ireland (16.4 per cent) and Cyprus (17.5 per cent). This 
indicator also reveals a significant difference between the EU-15 (25.5 per cent) and 
the EU-10 (19.6 per cent) countries. 
The old-age dependency ratio in the EU is projected11 to have doubled to 51.4 per 
cent by 2050, meaning that there will be only two active-age people, rather than the 
current four, to every individual aged 65 and over. The forecasts predict a deterioration 
in the dependency ratio of each of the member states, although differences are 
expected in the degree of change. Spain and Ireland are expected to experience the 
highest rate of increase in the ratio between 2004 and 2050, and Sweden and 
Luxembourg the lowest rate. The gap that is currently to be observed between the 
11 AWG scenario. 
POPULATION AGEING IS A FEATURE 
OF EVERY EU MEMBER STATE, 
ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES 
OF SCALE.
THE POPULATIONS OF THE NEW 
MEMBER STATES ARE YOUNGER 
THAN THOSE OF THE OLD MEMBER 
STATES, AND THIS AGE ADVANTAGE 
IS PREDICTED TO REMAIN UNTIL 
2035.
THE CURRENT OLD-AGE 
DEPENDENCY RATIO OF 24.5 PER 
CENT IS EXPECTED TO HAVE 
DOUBLED BY 2050 IN THE EU.
TÁRKI EUROPEAN SOCIAL REPORT
291. DEMOGRAPHIC PROCESSES
countries of the EU-15 and those of the EU-10 is predicted to have effectively 
disappeared by 2050: the former group can expect an old-age dependency ratio of 
51.6 per cent, and the corresponding figure is predicted to be 50.4 per cent for the 
latter group (EC, 2005). 
Let us take a closer look at the development of the size of major age cohorts. The 
forecasts predict a decline in the young (0–14-year-old) population and a significant 
increase in the population of an advanced age (65 years and over). The size of the 
working-age population (aged 15–64 years) will increase up to 2010, and this will be 
followed by a downwards trend. 
The young population (14 years and under) of the whole of the EU is expected to 
decline by 18 per cent from 2004 to 2050. A decrease of 15 per cent is projected for 
the old member states, compared to a decrease of 30 per cent for the new member 
states. The dependency ratio of young people – the ratio of the young population to 
the working-age population – is predicted to rise slightly from the current 24 per 
cent to 26 per cent in the countries of the EU-25. The child dependency ratios are 
expected to show greater variation among the new member states than among the 
EU-15 countries, but the figures for the former will remain lower than those for the 
latter through to 2050. 
The predicted declining trend in the working-age (15–64 years) population is 
expected to start around 2010. The extent of the decline between 2004 and 2050 
is estimated to amount to 16 per cent. Those countries that have recently joined the 
EU can expect a greater decline (27 per cent) than the old member states (13 per 
cent). According to the forecasts, the population of working-age people will have 
fallen by a quarter by 2050. 
A dramatic spike is expected in the number of people aged 65 and over in the 
period to 2050. The size of this age cohort will increase by 77 per cent in the EU-25, 
75 per cent in the EU-15 and 88 per cent in the EU-10 from 2004 to the middle of the 
century. The population of people aged 80 and over will display the steepest rise: the 
size of this group will be 174 per cent greater than it is at present. The growth is 
expected to reach 172 per cent in the old member states of the EU and 193 per cent 
in the new member states. 
In Hungary, the old-age dependency ratio has been on the increase since the 
1990s, i.e. the ratio of the population aged 65 and over to the working-age population 
is steadily rising. The old-age dependency ratio was 22.6 per cent in 2004 and is 
projected to reach 48.3 per cent by the middle of the century. 
The options for migration policy in mitigating negative 
effects 
The negative trends presented above may be counteracted by migration to the 
member states from outside the European Union. Since immigrants are generally 
assumed to be younger than the population of the host country, immigration flows 
can have a favourable impact on the age structure of the population: an increase in 
the number of working-age people improves the dependency ratio. In fact, as long 
as the retirement age remains unchanged, immigration flow may be the only means 
THE SIZE OF THE YOUNG 
POPULATION (AGED UNDER 14)  
OF THE EU IS PREDICTED TO HAVE 
FALLEN BY 18 PER CENT BY  
THE YEAR 2050, WHILE THE 
NUMBER OF OLD PEOPLE (AGED  
65 AND OVER) IS EXPECTED  
TO HAVE RISEN BY 77 PER CENT.
MIGRATION ORIGINATING OUTSIDE 
THE EU IS THOUGHT TO SLOW 
DOWN THE PROCESS OF 
POPULATION AGEING AND DAMPEN 
ITS ADVERSE EFFECTS.
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of improving the dependency ratio in the short to medium term. Also, immigration 
may have an impact on the future dynamics of population growth, as it is a feature 
of migrants that they have different (typically higher) fertility rates than the population 
of the host country (RAND Europe, 2004).
There is some disagreement among experts, however, on the supposed positive 
effects of migration. Some researchers argue that an unprecedented degree of mi-
gration flow would be needed to counterbalance the ageing of the population 
(Lesthaeghe, Page and Surkyn, 1988). And ours is an age when immigration policies 
are typically aimed at curtailing the number of new immigrants into Europe. 
A number of studies have further shown that immigration flows only have a minor 
effect on the age composition of the host country (see e.g. Mitra, 1990; Le Bras, 
1991). Immigrant populations have lower rates of employment than are typical of the 
host country. Economically active immigrants eventually grow old and gain pension 
entitlement (EC, 2006a). Thus, even if the large-scale migration of working-age 
groups was viable, it is debatable whether this would not simply defer the problem 
of population ageing to a later time (RAND Europe, 2004). Migration from outside 
the EU is likely to be a partial – and temporary – solution to the problem of counter-
balancing the effects of low fertility and rising life expectancy on the age structure 
of the population. The effectiveness of migration as a strategy against population 
ageing is, nevertheless, highly dependent on the success of national governments in 
delivering appropriate immigration policies (RAND Europe, 2004).
Polónyi and Timár (2002) estimate that the current positive migration balance of 
14–15,000 people would need to increase to about 20,000 from the year 2000 to 
2050 in order to satisfy the labour demand of the Hungarian labour market. With 
a positive migration balance of this size, the ratio of the economically active population 
would increase by around 6 to 7 percentage points (approximately 600,000 people) 
by the end of the next decade.
1.3.2. Social and economic consequences 
Consequences for the labour market 
The adverse effects of population ageing on the labour market are expected by 
the European Commission and the Economic Policy Committee to surface in the 
countries of the EU in 2018. The decline in the working-age population is expected to 
start earlier (from about 2010), when the baby boom generation enters retirement. 
The effects of the decline will be delayed, however, by the expected increase in 
employment rates. The employment rate in the EU-25 is projected to rise from 63 per 
cent in 2004 to 67 per cent in 2010 and 70 per cent in 2020. The EU will thus achieve 
the Lisbon target for the employment rate in 2020. The projected overall increase in 
employment is attributable to two major factors: the trend towards having more 
women in the workplace is the primary cause, and the trend towards having more 
elderly people in employment is the secondary cause.
A GREAT VOLUME OF MIGRATION 
FLOWS WOULD BE NEEDED TO 
COUNTERBALANCE POPULATION 
AGEING, AND EVEN THAT COULD 
ONLY CONSTITUTE A PARTIAL – 
AND TEMPORARY – SOLUTION  
TO THE PROBLEM OF POPULATION 
AGEING.
THE NEGATIVE LABOUR MARKET 
EFFECTS OF POPULATION AGEING 
ARE PREDICTED TO BE TEMPORARILY 
COUNTERACTED BY AN EXPECTED 
EXPANSION IN EMPLOYMENT, 
WHICH WILL RESULT FROM  
AN INCREASE IN WOMEN’S 
EMPLOYMENT AND IN 
EMPLOYMENT AMONG OLDER 
PEOPLE.
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The employment rate among women is expected to rise from 55 per cent in 
2004 to 65 per cent in 2025, due to a tendency for the population of older women 
with a low rate of employment to be gradually replaced by a more highly educated 
generation of younger women. The trend is expected to mean that the Lisbon target 
of an employment rate of 60 per cent among women by 2010 will be met. 
The second factor that will contribute to the projected overall increase in em-
ployment is that the employment rate among the elderly is predicted to increase 
from the 40 per cent measured in 2004 to 47 per cent in 2010 and then 59 per cent 
in 2025. (If the projection is correct, the Lisbon target of 50 per cent will be achieved 
in 2013.) The rising trend in employment among older people (aged 55–64) – which 
started in 2000 – signals a reversal of the decades-long trend of early retirement 
from the labour market. Older workers are currently responsible for three-quarters of 
the increase in the employment rate of the EU. About half of the projected growth in 
employment can be attributed to the positive effects of the pension system reforms 
introduced thus far, which have tightened up on early retirement and provided 
incentives for old-age workers to remain in the labour market (EC, 2007a). 
Three phases of future development can be distinguished with regard to the 
effects of population ageing on the labour market. First, in the period up to 2011, the 
size of the working-age population is expected to grow and employment rates are 
expected to rise, which is good for economic growth. This favourable period opens 
up the way to structural reforms. The expansion of employment can counterbalance 
the decline in the working-age population brought about by the retirement of the 
baby boom generation, which will be replaced by the much smaller population of the 
next generations. Thus second, the total number of people in employment will 
continue to increase, albeit at a slower rate. An increase of about 20 million is 
projected in the number of people in employment over the period from 2004 to 
2017. Third, this is expected to be followed by a phase when the ageing of the 
population is the dominant factor. The overall employment rate will start falling. It is 
predicted that the total number of people in employment will have fallen by about 
30 million by the end of the period from 2017 to 2050 (EC, 2007a). 
Productivity and economic growth 
The fact that older workers make up an increasingly large share of the labour 
force does not necessarily give rise to lower productivity. The available data do not 
support the hypothesis that older workers are less productive or less innovative. 
Physical and mental capacities do not start declining until a more advanced age, and 
anyway the decline is gradual, shows considerable variation across individuals, and 
can be slowed with the help of preventive health programmes. The general 
improvement in educational attainment has a major impact on productivity, which 
can, in the long term, compensate for reduced productivity due to ageing (EC, 
2007a). 
An improvement of 1.3 per cent is expected in labour productivity between 2004 
and 2010, 1.8 per cent between 2011 and 2030, and 1.7 per cent between 2031 and 
2050 in the countries of the EU-15. In the EU-10, the level of improvement is predicted 
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN 
EMPLOYMENT IS EXPECTED TO 
START DECLINING AROUND 2017.
IMPROVEMENTS IN EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT CAN COMPENSATE 
FOR THE PRODUCTIVITY-REDUCING 
EFFECTS OF POPULATION AGEING  
IN THE LONG TERM.
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to be higher: 3.6 per cent on average for the period between 2004 and 2010, 3.1 per 
cent for the years between 2011 and 2030, and 1.9 per cent between 2031 and 2050.
Taking account of the above trends in employment and the assumptions 
concerning productivity, a decline is to be expected in the potential GDP growth rate. 
Forecasts by the Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission predict 
that the annual average potential GDP growth rate of 2.4 per cent over the period 
between 2004 and 2010 will drop to 1.2 per cent between 2031 and 2050, assuming 
no changes in current trends and policies. In the old member states, the annual 
average potential GDP growth rate of 2.2 per cent in the period from 2004 to 2010 is 
projected to decrease to 1.3 per cent for the period between 2031 and 2050. 
A considerably steeper drop – from 4.3 to 0.9 per cent – is expected in the EU-10 
countries, partly on account of their less favourable demographic prospects.
The sources of economic growth will be drastically restructured. As the increase 
in the level of employment stops, the enhancement of productivity will become the 
primary source of GDP growth. If the future development of productivity and the 
employment rate fail to correspond to the forecasts, the potential GDP growth rate 
may plunge to a level even lower than predicted (EC, 2006a). 
The effects of future demographic changes on economic growth have recently 
been estimated in growth models, too (Prskawetz et al., 2006). The researchers 
investigated the following five separate scenarios: 1) the baseline scenario; 2) the 
baseline scenario focusing on the effects of migration, with zero migration assumed; 
3) the scenario analysing high fertility; 4) the scenario with a maximized number of 
young people, assuming low life expectancy; 5) the scenario with a maximized 
number of old people, assuming low fertility and high life expectancy. The outcome 
of the model estimations can be summarized briefly as follows. The general long-
term trend shows a decrease in growth rates, primarily due to the ageing of the 
population. The high fertility variant (Scenario 3) indicates a growth rate after 2030 
that is 0.2 per cent greater than that of the baseline scenario. The scenario with the 
maximum number of young people (Scenario 4) results in a growth rate that is 0.3 
per cent higher. The variant of zero migration (Scenario 2) leads to 0.4 per cent lower 
growth rate. Finally, Scenario 5, with the maximum number of old people, effects 
a reduction of 0.5 per cent in the growth rate compared to the baseline. In general, 
the negative effects of ageing and/or of less migration on GDP growth are greater 
than the positive effects of higher fertility and younger age structure (EC, 2007a).
Welfare spending 
Long-term forecasts suggest that population ageing – with current policies left as 
they are – will lead to a substantial increase in public expenditure by 2050 in most EU 
countries. A large proportion of the expected increase is made up of pensions, health 
and long-term care costs. The effects of ageing on public expenditure will be clearly 
felt in most member states from 2010 onwards. The most significant increase in 
public spending is projected to occur in the period between 2020 and 2040. 
There may be considerable variation from country to country in terms of the 
costs of population ageing. Public expenditure is expected to rise by about 4 
THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF 
POPULATION AGEING AND/OR 
REDUCED MIGRATION FLOWS  
ON GDP GROWTH ARE GREATER 
THAN THE POSITIVE EFFECTS  
OF HIGHER FERTILITY AND  
A YOUNGER AGE STRUCTURE.
POPULATION AGEING RESULTS  
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TO HAVE THE GREATEST IMPACT 
BETWEEN 2020 AND 2040.
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percentage points between 2004 and 2050 in the EU-15 countries and in the entire 
Eurozone. A smaller, 1.5 percentage-point, increase is projected for the states of the 
EU-10, but this is primarily because a drastic reduction is expected in the pension 
expenditure of Poland, following pension reform. With Poland excluded, the public 
costs of population ageing will increase by more than 5 percentage points of GDP 
in the EU-10.
Public pension expenditure is predicted to rise in each of the EU-15 countries – 
with the exception of Austria, where a reform process was initiated in 2000. Italy and 
Sweden can expect a slight increase in the cost of pensions; the majority of EU 
member states are likely to experience a relatively modest rise (1.5 to 3.5 percentage 
points); while Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg and Portugal are predicted to see a much 
greater increase – of 6.4 to 9.7 percentage points. 
In the EU-10 countries, public spending on pensions is expected to fall by 1 per 
cent of GDP between 2004 and 2030. This will be followed by an increase of 1.3 
percentage points, resulting in a total average increase of 0.3 percentage points from 
2004 to 2050. The various countries, however, are expected to display fairly divergent 
trends. While Poland is likely to experience a decrease of 5.9 percentage points of 
GDP, an increase of 6.7 percentage points is projected for Hungary, 7.3 percentage 
points for Slovenia and 12.9 percentage points for Cyprus. These figures class Cyprus, 
Slovenia and Hungary with the EU countries expected to face the greatest challenge 
(EC, 2006a).
It is a highly complex task to project the healthcare expenditure of the central 
budget in the long term, partly because it is difficult to predict the development of 
major demographic and non-demographic factors with reasonable confidence. It 
seems clear, however, that the advancing age of the population will put more pressure 
on the healthcare budget and will increase costs. The forecasts12 suggest that 
healthcare expenditure will increase by 1 to 2 per cent of GDP by 2050 in most 
member states. The estimates further indicate that the health of the elderly will have 
a major impact on the development of costs. If the rise in age-specific life expectancy 
is accompanied by a corresponding increase in the number of healthy years individuals 
enjoy, the increase in age-related spending could be reduced by as much as 50 per 
cent. It must also be noted that the estimates of healthcare expenditure are highly 
sensitive to the income elasticity of demand and to assumptions regarding the 
development of unit costs (EC, 2006a). 
Similarly, an increase is expected in the public costs of long-term care following 
the steep rise in the size of the population over 80 years of age. Assuming no changes 
in current policies, the forecasts project an increase of 0.1 to 1.8 percentage points of 
GDP in public spending by 2050. Public costs are highly sensitive to the incidence of 
disability among the elderly (EC, 2006a).
12 AWG scenario.
POPULATION AGEING IS 
MANIFESTED IN THE RISING COSTS 
OF PENSIONS, HEALTHCARE AND 
LONG-TERM CARE.
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1.4. The mediators of demographic changes: 
household structure 
Processes of population mobility (fertility, mortality and migration), changes in 
age structure and other demographic processes, such as marriage, cohabitation or 
divorce all have an impact on household size and household structure (RAND Europe, 
2004). In the following sections, micro-level data will be presented in an effort to 
explore the major features of households of various sizes in the countries of the EU-
24. Then we look at households with different generation structures, and finally we 
examine families with children.
1.4.1. Household size
The total number of households in the EU-15 countries had increased from just 
over 100 million in 1960 to 190 million in 2001, which clearly shows that the rise in 
household number (90 per cent) was much faster than the growth in the population 
(30 per cent). The figures thus indicate that the average size of households follows 
a declining trend. The average household size of 3.2 people measured in 1960 in the 
EU-15 had dropped to 2.4 people by 2001 (SSO, 2005).
The falling trend in the number of households is characteristic of each of the EU-
15 countries, though significant differences do remain between individual member 
states in terms of household size. The average number of people living in a household 
continues to be higher in the countries where the decline in fertility started later, 
including in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Greece and Italy. Differences 
in household size suggest that young people leave the family home at different ages 
in the various member states, and that there is variation in the living arrangements of 
old people left by themselves after the loss of a spouse (SSO, 2005). 
Single-person households are on the rise. An increasing number of people live 
alone, although some of them for only a relatively brief period. Young people often 
live by themselves after leaving the parental home until they start a cohabiting 
relationship. When a cohabiting relationship or marriage breaks up, the result is 
single-person households – or lone-parent households if there are children. Since 
women typically live longer than men and typically marry older partners, the majority 
of single-person households are composed of lone women. 
The proportion of single-person households in the EU-15 countries rose from 16 
per cent in 1960 to 28 per cent in 2001. This household type constituted 15 to 40 per 
cent of all households in 2001. The highest proportion was observed in Sweden, 
followed by Denmark and Finland, while the lowest proportions were measured in 
Portugal and Spain. The rising number of people living by themselves, together with 
the decline in the average household size, means that the average size of households 
with two persons or more will also decrease. This trend can be seen right across the 
THE AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE OF 
3.2 PEOPLE MEASURED IN 1960  
IN THE EU-15 COUNTRIES HAD 
FALLEN TO 2.4 BY 2001.  
THE DECLINING TREND IN 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE IS OBSERVED  
IN EACH OF THE COUNTRIES, BUT 
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN 
BETWEEN THEM.
THE SHARE OF SINGLE-PERSON 
HOUSEHOLDS IN THE EU-15 
COUNTRIES GREW FROM 16 PER 
CENT IN 1960 TO 28 PER CENT  
IN 2001. AT THE SAME TIME,  
THE PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH FIVE OR MORE MEMBERS IS 
ON THE WANE.
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EU-15: the share of households with five or more people is shrinking in almost every 
member state. 
Household structure is greatly dependent on marriage and childbearing trends. 
While, in the past, marriage was a precondition of having children, the recent rise in 
the number of children being born outside marriage indicates that the relationship 
between marriage and childbearing is looser than it used to be. There is nothing 
exceptional today about a couple choosing not to marry when they have children – 
or even later. This is especially true of Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, where the average age of women is in fact lower 
at their first childbirth than at their first marriage. Relatively late first marriages (at the 
age of 27 or over) are frequent in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden. By contrast, relatively early marriage (at the age of 
24 or younger) is the standard in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland (SSO, 2005).
The results of the EU-SILC survey show an average household size of 2.4 people 
for the year 2004. The highest sizes were observed in Cyprus, Slovakia, Poland, 
Slovenia and, among the old member states, in Ireland and Spain (2.8–3 people) (see 
Figure 1.6). At the other end of the scale we find Denmark, Sweden, Germany and 
Finland (with average household sizes of 2–2.2 people).
The EU-SILC data reveal that the average proportion of single-person house-
holds stands at 30 per cent in the European Union. This average figure, however, 
conceals considerable cross-country variation. Somewhat over four households in 
ten have one member in Denmark and Sweden. At the other end of the spectrum 
come Cyprus, Spain and Portugal, where the figure is only about 16 per cent (see 
Figure 1.7). 
THE AGE OF MARRIAGE AND 
CHILDBIRTH SHOWS DIFFERENT 
PATTERNS AMONG THE EU 
MEMBER STATES. WHILE  
IN THE MAJORITY OF THE EU-15 
COUNTRIES, LATE MARRIAGE IS  
THE DOMINANT PATTERN, IN SOME 
OF THE FORMER SOCIALIST 
COUNTRIES, EARLY MARRIAGE 
CONTINUES BE PREVALENT.
THE AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
WAS 2.4 PEOPLE IN 2004  
IN THE EU.
Figure 1.6: Average household 
size in the European Union,  
by country (people)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on the EU-SILC (2005) data
THE PROPORTION OF SINGLE-
PERSON HOUSEHOLDS RANGES 
FROM 16 TO 43 PER CENT  
IN THE EU.
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Large households with at least five members make up less than 7 per cent of all 
households in the European Union. This type of household is to be found in Poland 
and Slovakia with far higher than average frequency (14–15 per cent). The likelihood 
of one, two or more generations living together in large households is discussed in 
the next section.
Hungary had an average household size of 3.1 people in 1960 and 2.6 in 1990. 
The EU-SILC data put the household size at only 2.5 people in 2004. Single-person 
households amount to 29 per cent of all households (1,167,000 households). Barely 
8 per cent (approximately 315,000) of households have five members or more.
As the survey results show, 59 per cent of all single-person households in the EU 
are made up of women. The figures for individual countries vary from 50 per cent 
(Ireland) to 78 per cent (Slovakia). The new members of the EU have higher than 
average proportions of women in single-person households (Figure 1.8). One 
explanation is that the gap between the average life expectancy at birth of men and 
of women is greater here than in the old member states (8 years as opposed to 5.8 
years).
THE PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH AT LEAST FIVE MEMBERS IS 
UNDER 7 PER CENT IN THE EU.
Figure 1.7: Household size 
composition in the European 
Union, by country (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
SOME 59 PER CENT OF ALL SINGLE-
PERSON HOUSEHOLDS IN THE EU 
ARE MADE UP OF WOMEN.
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The elderly (aged 65 and over) account for the largest proportion (about 43 per 
cent) of single-person households. Once again, there are considerable differences 
between the countries: the figures for the member states vary between 33 and 67 
per cent. We can see that, in some countries, it is not the older cohorts that form the 
greatest proportion of single-person households: in Denmark, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands we find more 25–49-year-olds living in a single-person household than 
people aged 65 and over (Figure 1.9). Portugal is at the other extreme, with elderly 
people making up two-thirds of single-person households. There is a higher than 
average proportion of elderly people among single-person households in each of the 
new member states.
The age distribution of single-person households is, of course, correlated with 
their labour market status. On average, 40 per cent of lone people are employed in 
the EU. Not surprisingly, this figure is higher in Denmark, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, where the majority of lone people are of an active age. The proportion 
of lone people in employment is, in contrast, very low in Slovakia and Slovenia. In 
these countries, the majority of single-person households are composed of pensioners 
or people in early retirement (77 per cent in Slovakia and 71 per cent in Slovenia). 
There is a markedly high proportion of other inactive people in the Netherlands and 
Ireland (39 and 37 per cent, respectively, compared to the EU average of 13 per cent). 
Figure 1.8: The gender 
composition of single-person 
households in the European 
Union, by country (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
THE ELDERLY ACCOUNT FOR 
BETWEEN 33 AND 67 PER CENT  
OF SINGLE-PERSON HOUSEHOLDS  
IN THE EU.
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The distribution of people living in single-person households in terms of their 
marital status is very varied in the individual member states (Figure 1.10). Two main 
groups of countries emerge from the data. In one group, singles (those who have 
never been married) constitute the largest share of the population of people living 
alone. This group comprises Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. In the countries belonging to the 
second group, widows and widowers make up the largest share of people living 
alone. This class comprises the new member states, Greece, Portugal and, to a lesser 
extent, Spain and Italy as well. The United Kingdom is in the unique position of having 
as many divorced or separated people13 represented in the figures as single people. 
The divorced and the separated also form a higher than average share of single-
person households in Germany and Latvia.
The socio-demographic features of single-person households were also analysed 
separately for men and women. While the greatest share of lone men (45 per cent) 
belong to the age group of 25–49 years, most lone women (54 per cent) are 65 and 
over. These figures of course reflect the difference between the sexes in terms of life 
expectancy at birth. In line with the age differences, women living alone are far less 
likely to be employed than are lone men. As regards marital status, most men living 
alone (55 per cent) have never been married, while lone women are more likely to be 
widowed (42 per cent) than single (31 per cent). 
In Hungary, women make up 65 per cent of single-person households. As with 
the other former socialist countries, 65 and over is the most common age group (49 
per cent) among people living in single-person households. As regards marital status, 
the largest proportion of those living alone (49 per cent) are widowed.
13 The survey offered the categories of ‘divorced’ and ‘separated’ as separate response 
options. However, as none of the respondents chose ‘separated’ in some of the member 
states, the two categories are collapsed together in our analysis. 
Figure 1.9: Age composition of 
single-person households  
in the European Union,  
by country (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
THE DISTRIBUTION OF SINGLE-
PERSON HOUSEHOLDS BY MARITAL 
STATUS APPEARS TO DIVIDE  
THE COUNTRIES INTO TWO 
GROUPS. SINGLE PEOPLE DOMINATE 
IN ONE GROUP, WHILE WIDOWED 
PEOPLE FORM THE LARGEST SHARE 
IN THE OTHER.
THE LARGEST SHARE OF LONE MEN 
BELONG IN THE AGE GROUP  
25–49 YEARS AND HAVE NEVER 
BEEN MARRIED, WHILE THE LARGEST 
SHARE OF LONE WOMEN ARE OLD 
(65 AND OVER) AND WIDOWED.
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1.4.2. Generations (not) living together 
The transition between traditional and modern societies is accompanied by 
a process whereby the large family model, i.e. households with several generations 
living together, is replaced by (nuclear) families of one or two generations. This 
process is driven by young adults typically leaving the parental home early, even 
before embarking on a cohabiting relationship. They thus create an independent 
household either on their own or in a formal or informal cohabiting relationship. 
The result will be, as was noted in Section 1.3.1, an increase in the overall number of 
households, and specifically, a higher incidence of single-person and two-person 
households. A further factor leading to an increased proportion of one-generation 
households is population ageing, the growing share of old and very old people and 
their households. The countries of Europe, and the EU member states within them, 
however, display – at times substantial – differences with respect to the number of 
generations sharing a household. 
Our analysis makes use of a variable (formed using the labels identifying the father 
and the mother of each household member)14 which shows whether one, two or 
more generations live in a given household. As can be seen in Figure 1.11, one-
generation households account for between 40 and 70 per cent of all households 
across the 24 EU countries under analysis in 2004. There is a marked difference 
between the new and the old member states: in the former group, the share of one-
14 The variable classes a household as having one generation if none of its members share 
the household with their parents. Two-generation households are those where one parent 
or a parent couple live with children, and a household has more than two generations if at 
least two hierarchical levels of parents live together. 
Figure 1.10: The marital status  
of people in one-person 
households in the European 
Union, by country (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
THE TRANSITION BETWEEN 
TRADITIONAL AND MODERN 
SOCIETIES IS ACCOMPANIED BY  
A PROCESS WHEREBY THE LARGE 
FAMILY MODEL, I.E. HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH SEVERAL GENERATIONS 
LIVING TOGETHER, IS REPLACED BY 
(NUCLEAR) FAMILIES OF ONE OR 
TWO GENERATIONS.
THE SHARE OF ONE-GENERATION 
HOUSEHOLDS RANGED FROM  
40 TO 70 PER CENT...
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generation households does not significantly go above 50 per cent; it is lowest in 
Slovenia and Slovakia (40 per cent) and highest in the Czech Republic, Estonia (50 per 
cent each) and Hungary (51 per cent). Among the EU-15 countries, the share of this 
household type remains below 50 per cent in the Southern European countries and 
Ireland only, while the figure is well above 60 per cent in Germany, Finland, Sweden 
and Denmark. Two-generation households are in the majority in Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Portugal, Cyprus, Ireland and Greece. 
Multi-generation households do not exceed 10 per cent likelihood in any of the 
countries: they account for around 10 per cent in Latvia, 9 per cent in Poland and 
6 per cent in Slovenia and Slovakia. The frequency with which this type of household 
occurs varies greatly between the old and the new member states. Households with 
three or more generations make up less than 1 per cent of all households in France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and the Northern states.
There are differences in the age composition of households with different num-
bers of generations. Our analysis reveals a median age of about 60 years for the 
members of one-generation households, with relatively little variation across mem-
ber states (Tárki–UniCredit, 2008, Figure F1.1). The highest median age is estimated for 
Greece, Portugal and Slovenia (65 years) and the lowest for Denmark, Finland and the 
Netherlands (57 years). The lower median value of age is explained by the relatively 
large share of young one-generation households in the latter group of countries. The 
data show greater variation for households with two or more generations. In two-
generation households, the median age ranges from 24 years (Sweden) to 35 years 
(Italy, Spain and Greece). The corresponding indicator is even more extended for mul-
ti-generation households: 24 years in Denmark but 43 years in Spain.
... WHILE THE SHARE OF 
HOUSEHOLDS WITH THREE OR 
MORE GENERATIONS WAS ABOUT 
10 PER CENT OR LESS IN THE EU 
COUNTRIES IN 2004.
Figure 1.11: Household 
composition as a function  
of number of generations  
in the European Union,  
by country (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
PEOPLE LIVING IN ONE-GENERATION 
HOUSEHOLDS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY 
OLDER THAN THOSE LIVING  
IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH MORE 
GENERATIONS.
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Figure 1.12 displays the age distribution of children living with their parents in the 
countries of the EU.15 Children of an active age, i.e. over 16 years, are most likely to live 
with their parents in the new member states and in the Mediterranean countries, 
where they account for over half of all households with two or more generations. 
This ratio is highest in Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Latvia (60–63 per cent), and 
lowest in Denmark and Sweden (24 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively).
In Hungary, one generation lives in about half of all households (51 per cent), two 
generations share a further 45 per cent of households, and only the remaining 4 per 
cent of households have members of three or more generations. People living in 
one-generation households in Hungary have a median age of 61 years, those in two-
generation households have a median age of 32 years, and the figure is 34 years for 
multi-generation households. The age distribution of children living with their parents 
is similar to the pattern observed in Eastern and Southern Europe.
1.4.3. Households with children 
The highest frequencies of households with children (40–45 per cent) are to be 
found in the new member states (Cyprus, Slovakia, Poland, Latvia), Portugal and 
Ireland, which typically coincide with high frequencies of multi-generation households 
(Figure 1.13). Correspondingly, the lowest indicators (25–30 per cent) are observed in 
the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden), Finland and 
15 In this analysis, the definition of child is, for obvious reasons, based on family relationships 
rather than age. It also follows that only two- and multi-generation households are 
included in the analysis here. 
THE SHARE OF CHILDREN OVER  
THE AGE OF 16 LIVING WITH  
THEIR PARENTS IS HIGHEST  
IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES AND 
THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES.
Figure 1.12: Age distribution  
of children living with their 
parents in the European Union, 
by country (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
THE SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH 
CHILDREN IS TYPICALLY HIGHEST  
IN COUNTRIES WITH A LARGE 
PROPORTION OF MULTI-
GENERATION HOUSEHOLDS...
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Germany, where one-generation households have the largest share. In Hungary, 
a third of all households have members under the age of 18.
Figure 1.13 reveals a U-shaped relationship: the average number of children is 
highest in the countries where the ratio of households with children is either very 
small or very large. In Cyprus, Ireland, Slovakia and Poland, a high or relatively high 
number of children is coupled with a large proportion of households with children, 
while in the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, it is 
coupled with a small proportion of this household type. 
Households with children have an average number of 1.5 to 2.0 children. The 
highest average numbers of children are observed in Ireland (1.97 children per 
household), Belgium (1.89), the Netherlands (1.85), Cyprus (1.86), Luxembourg (1.83) 
and Finland (1.82); and the lowest for Portugal (1.51), Latvia (1.57) and Greece (1.58). 
The EU-SILC data put the average number of children in households with children in 
Hungary at 1.68.
Looking at household composition by household type in the EU member states 
(Table 1.1) we can see that the categories of ‘two adults with one child’ and ‘two 
adults with two children’ dominate within the one-third of all households that have 
children: on average, the two types together account for 62 per cent of all households 
with children. Lone-parent households represent a further 13 per cent, families with 
three or more children 10 per cent, and other household types with dependent 
children 15 per cent. 
...WHILE THE AVERAGE NUMBER  
OF CHILDREN IS HIGHEST IN 
COUNTRIES WITH EITHER A VERY 
SMALL OR A VERY LARGE SHARE  
OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN.
Figure 1.13: Proportion  
of households with children (%) 
and average number of children 
in the European Union,  
by country (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF 
CHILDREN IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH 
CHILDREN RANGES FROM 1.5 TO 
2.0.
THE MOST FREQUENT TYPES OF 
HOUSEHOLD WITH CHILDREN ARE 
‘TWO ADULTS WITH ONE CHILD’ 
AND ‘TWO ADULTS WITH TWO 
CHILDREN’: THE TWO TYPES 
TOGETHER MAKE UP ON AVERAGE 
62 PER CENT OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH CHILDREN.
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Country
Lone-
parent 
household
2 adults 
with 1 
dependent 
child
2 adults 
with 2 
dependent 
children
2 adults 
with 3+ 
dependent 
children
Other 
household 
type with 
dependent 
child(ren)
Total
AT 11.5 29.3 29.9 11.8 17.5 100.0
BE 17.3 27.2 27.8 17.5 10.2 100.0
CY 6.3 20.2 41.3 12.5 19.6 100.0
CZ 12.0 28.3 37.6 6.5 15.4 100.0
DE 17.0 32.2 32.6 11.0 7.2 100.0
DK 19.7 27.1 35.7 14.0 3.5 100.0
EE 19.4 31.9 22.4 8.3 18.1 100.0
ES 5.1 31.2 32.6 6.8 24.3 100.0
FI 15.3 30.5 31.8 17.1 5.4 100.0
FR 15.2 29.4 36.6 11.8 7.0 100.0
GR 4.9 28.2 48.2 2.7 16.0 100.0
HU 14.4 28.1 26.1 10.7 20.8 100.0
IE 17.5 19.8 25.7 18.1 18.8 100.0
IT 7.6 31.5 34.3 7.5 19.2 100.0
LT 14.4 32.1 27.3 8.1 18.0 100.0
LU 8.6 27.9 32.5 16.5 14.4 100.0
LV 16.1 30.2 20.4 5.8 27.5 100.0
NL 10.3 26.3 37.2 17.8 8.4 100.0
PL 6.8 27.5 24.8 10.3 30.6 100.0
PT 7.2 37.0 25.9 5.5 24.5 100.0
SE 21.7 24.7 33.5 15.1 5.0 100.0
SI 9.4 24.4 32.8 7.7 25.7 100.0
SK 6.9 22.0 31.0 11.7 28.4 100.0
UK 25.8 25.7 28.2 10.6 9.6 100.0
Overall 13.3 29.4 32.2 10.3 14.8 100.0
Looking at the composition of households with children by country, the following 
observations can be made.
The share of lone-parent households ranges from 5 per cent to 22 per cent. The 
highest share is measured in the United Kingdom (26 per cent), Sweden (22 per 
cent), Denmark (20 per cent), Estonia (19 per cent), Ireland (18 per cent) and Belgium 
(17 per cent). In Greece and Spain, by contrast, the frequency is around 5 per cent, 
and it still remains under 7 per cent in Cyprus, Poland and Slovakia. 
Households with two adults and a child are represented in a proportion that is 
significantly higher than average in Portugal (37 per cent). This category is also 
above the average of the 24 states under consideration in Germany, Lithuania and 
Estonia (32 per cent each). In Ireland, Cyprus and Slovakia, by contrast, it makes up 
only 20–22 per cent of households with children.
Households with two adults and two children are represented in higher than 
average proportions in Greece (48 per cent), Cyprus (41 per cent), the Czech 
Republic (38 per cent), France and the Netherlands (37 per cent each) and Denmark 
(36 per cent). The share of such households is substantially below average in 
Lithuania (20 per cent) and Estonia (22 per cent). 
•
•
•
Table 1.1: Distribution of 
households with children  
by household type in each 
country in the European Union 
(%) 
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
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Across all the countries under consideration, at most one household in five has 
three or more children. The share of such households approaches 20 per cent in 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium (18 per cent each), Finland and Luxembourg, 
while they account for less than 3 per cent of households with children in Greece 
and less than 6 per cent in Portugal.
In addition to the share of households with children in the population and their 
internal structure, our analysis also extends to a more specific subject – that of the 
youngest group of children (Figure 1.14). The overall figures for the 24 countries 
included in our study reveal that a third of all women caring for children aged 0–2 
years have at least a higher education degree. This ratio is 15 per cent higher than the 
corresponding figure for all women aged 25–49 years. Taking this difference as our 
baseline for a comparison of the EU countries, we find that the indicator value is 
significantly above 15 per cent in Slovenia (69 per cent), the Czech Republic (51 per 
cent), Luxembourg (29 per cent), Italy (24 per cent) and France (23 per cent). This 
contrasts with countries where the proportion of women with higher education 
among women caring for children aged 0–2 is lower than or equal to the proportion 
among all women aged 25–49 years: Latvia (84 per cent of the figure for all women 
aged 25–49 years), the United Kingdom (96 per cent), Estonia (98 per cent), Lithuania, 
Slovakia and Finland (100 per cent each). 
We also find that, in the first few years of the 21st century, women typically gave 
birth at the age of 28–33 years; taking all the countries into consideration, the median 
age was 32 years. The age range was not especially wide across the countries. The 
lowest median age was observed in Latvia and Lithuania (28 years each) and the 
highest in Germany, Spain, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands (33 years). 
In Hungary, one-third of households have members under the age of 18. Lone-
parent households and those that fall into the category of ‘other type of household 
with dependent children’ occur more frequently than the average for the EU, and 
households with two adults and one or two children occur less frequently than the 
average. The share of families with three or more children corresponds to the average 
for the 24 countries under analysis. The ratio of women with higher education among 
mothers caring for children aged 0–2 years is 5 per cent higher than the corresponding 
figure for women aged 25–49 years. Women caring for infants have a median age of 
30 years in Hungary.
•
TAKING THE AVERAGE  
OF THE COUNTRIES STUDIED, THOSE 
MOTHERS WITH CHILDREN AGED 
0–2 YEARS ARE TWICE AS LIKELY 
TO HAVE A HIGHER EDUCATION 
DEGREE AS ARE ALL WOMEN AGED 
25–49.
NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES  
ARE OBSERVED BETWEEN  
THE COUNTRIES IN THE AVERAGE 
AGE OF MOTHERS WITH YOUNG 
CHILDREN.
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1.5. Household composition and income
In this section, we seek to present a descriptive analysis of the income positions 
of individual age cohorts and of a selection of household types. The analysis involves 
households of different sizes; single-person households of different sexes and ages, 
lone-parent households and households with a couple and children are examined 
separately.
The indicator of income position. The relative income positions of household 
types are captured by the following indicator. The equivalent household incomes 
calculated on the basis of OECD Scale II are grouped into five categories:
1. less than half the median income
2. 50–80 per cent of the median income
3. 80–120 per cent of the median income
4. 120–200 per cent of the median income
5. more than twice the median income.
For each household type, its distribution across the five income categories was ob-
served in each of the countries. To allow us to determine the position of a given 
household type in the income structure by means of a single indicator, the next step 
was to calculate the ratio of households in the top two and the bottom two catego-
ries. This step was also carried out for all households combined, in each individual 
country. Finally, for each country, the figure for the position of a given household type 
was divided by the figure calculated for all households combined. The resulting indi-
cator is used in every figure in Section 1.5 to describe the relative income positions of 
individual household types. The mean value – a value of 1.0 by definition – is always 
marked.
Figure 1.14: Some features  
of children aged 0–2 years  
by country: mother’s level  
of education (proportion of 
mothers with higher education 
relative to the average of the 24 
countries) and median age
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
Note: The columns (left axis) 
represent the number of mothers 
with higher education caring  
for children aged 0–2  
in proportion to the female 
population aged 25–49 years  
in the given country.
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THE RELATIVE INCOME POSITION  
OF SINGLE-PERSON HOUSEHOLDS IS 
WORSE THAN AVERAGE IN EVERY 
COUNTRY. HOUSEHOLDS WITH 
TWO TO FOUR MEMBERS HAVE  
THE BEST STANDING.
Figure 1.15: Household size 
(people) and income position  
in the European Union,  
by country
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
AMONG SINGLE-PERSON 
HOUSEHOLDS, WOMEN AGED  
65 AND OVER ARE IN THE WORST 
POSITION IN TERMS OF INCOME.
Household size. Analysis of the relative income positions of households of 
different sizes in the countries that were studied reveals the following (Figure 1.15).
The relative income position of single-person households, which are becoming 
increasingly frequent due to population ageing, is below average in each of the 
member states under consideration. Households with two to four members, i.e. 
those with at most two generations, caring for a small number of children, have 
the best standing.
In most of the countries, households with three members are in the best position 
in terms of income. In some countries (France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands), two-member households enjoy the best income position relative to 
all households, while in others (Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia), this is true of four-
member households. In Sweden, both two-member and four-member households 
have better positions than do households with three members. 
In none of the member states do one- and six-person households enjoy a position 
that is better than average, and five-member households are positioned slightly 
above the average only in Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia. 
Single-person households by age and gender. As we saw in our analysis of 
household size, single-person households overall are in a disadvantaged position. It 
was shown in Section 1.3.1 that there is great variation among these households, 
and we therefore resolved to look more closely at the relative income positions of 
the different age groups and sexes that go to make up single-person households 
(Figure 1.16). 
Only in a handful of countries do single-person households (of whatever type) 
occupy a position that is above average. They include Mediterranean countries 
(Spain, Greece, Italy,), Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In 
Luxembourg, every type of single-person household we looked at is ranked close 
to the average. People living alone do not have an above-average standard of 
living in terms of income in any of the new member states, excepting men aged 
over 65 in Poland.
•
•
•
•
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Women aged 65 and over clearly rank worst: only in Luxembourg does their 
income reach the average level, and the only other country where the indicator 
that captures their relative income position has a value of more than half the 
average is Poland. 
People under the age of 65 are typically in a better position than are the elderly; 
only Luxembourg and Poland deviate from this pattern. The position of the 
younger group is above average in Spain, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg, while 
Luxembourg is the only country where this holds for people aged 65 and over.
Looking at the figures for men and women irrespective of age, we can see that 
everywhere men are in a better position than women. The size of the gap between 
men and women living alone is smallest in Poland.
Men are in a better income position than women within the group of elderly lone 
people in each of the countries, with the exception of Luxembourg. This is clearly 
attributable to pension differences that reflect the length of labour-market career 
and the level of life-course income. 
In Hungary, the income position of every type of single-person household is below 
the average. The overall gap between men and women is not particularly large, 
but the difference does become significant if we look at people aged 65 and over: 
the indicator value for old men is three times that for old women.
 
Lone-parent households. The results of the relevant empirical literature largely 
concur in classing lone-parent households as that part of the population that is most 
disadvantaged in terms of income and thus at greatest risk of poverty. In such 
households, the presence of children and the fact that there is a lone parent who is 
typically female combine to produce at least the possibility that there is a relatively 
disadvantaged labour-market and labour wage position. The following paragraphs 
summarize our observations concerning the income positions of various types of 
lone-parent households (Figure 1.17).
The EU-SILC data reveal that lone-parent households do not even approach the 
average income position in any of the 24 EU countries under consideration. Only 
•
•
•
•
•
•
Figure 1.16: Single-person 
household income positions  
in the European Union,  
by country
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
LONE-PARENT HOUSEHOLDS DO 
NOT EVEN APPROACH THE AVERAGE 
INCOME POSITION; THE INCOME 
POSITION OF A CHILD LIVING WITH 
A HIGHLY EDUCATED PARENT IS, 
HOWEVER, AT OR ABOVE  
THE AVERAGE LEVEL IN SOME 
COUNTRIES.
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in Portugal does the indicator used here reach half the average value. The overall 
indicator values for all types of lone-parent household are lowest in the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands (under 0.1) and highest in Portugal 
(0.67), Poland (0.44), Latvia (0.41) and Luxembourg (0.39).
If we consider the sex of the parent, those children who live with their fathers are 
in a better position than those who live with their mothers in every country, with 
the exception of Poland.
The parent’s educational attainment16 has a major impact on the income position 
of households of this type (as well). The income position of children living with 
a relatively well-educated parent is better than or equal to the average level in 
a number of countries, including Poland, Slovenia, Greece, Hungary, Spain, Luxem-
bourg, Italy, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Hungary appears in the mid-range of the country ranking with respect to the 
position of lone-parent households, with an indicator value of only one-third of 
the average for all households. Whether the parent is a man or a woman does 
have a slight impact on the position of these households. As was mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, in Hungary the figures differ greatly depending on the 
parent’s level of education: the indicator value is almost 18 times higher for well-
educated parents than for less well-educated parents.
Households with two adults and children. Although the definition of this category 
covers all households with two adults and children, the vast majority are composed 
of parents plus their children. The paragraphs below describe the income positions of 
couples with one, two and three or more children, and the last of these groups will 
16 Two categories of education level are used in this part of the analysis: the lower category 
comprises those with eight years of elementary education or vocational secondary 
schooling, while the higher category comprises people with upper secondary education or 
higher education. 
•
•
•
Figure 1.17: Lone-parent 
household income positions  
in the European Union,  
by country
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
THE RELATIVE INCOME POSITION  
OF HOUSEHOLDS COMPRISING TWO 
ADULTS AND CHILDREN DECLINES 
AS THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
GROWS.
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be further broken down according to the educational attainment of the head of the 
household (Figure 1.18). 
Among nuclear families of two parents plus their children, households with a 
single child are in the best position in each of the 24 EU countries under 
consideration. The income standing of families with one child is better than 
average in every country, with the exception of Hungary. The indicator shows a 
value of above 2.0 in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.
Within the household type under examination, income position declines as the 
number of children grows. Families with two children still occupy an above-average 
relative position in half the countries, while households with three or more children 
do not reach the average in any of the states; in fact, they are positioned far 
below. The values of the indicator show very little variation across the countries 
within this group.
Those families with three or more children in which the head of the household is 
relatively well educated are in a significantly better position than are those with 
a less well-educated household head. Households of the former type have an 
even better than average income position in Belgium, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal.
The position of Hungary is unusual, in that two adults living with one child do not 
have an above-average income position. We also find, however, that households 
with one child and those with two children show barely any difference in terms of 
relative income positions. The educational level of the household head is decisive 
with regard to the position of households with three or more children in Hungary 
as well, but the size of the effect does not compare to that observed among lone-
parent households.
•
•
•
•
Figure 1.18: ‘Two adults with 
children’ household income 
positions in the European Union, 
by country
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005) data
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2.1. Introduction
Globalization and demographic and environmental changes present Europe with 
a challenge in terms of competitiveness, flexibility and sustainability. While the 
economies of the countries of the European Union are independent of each other in 
several respects, they do remain in close contact. If, therefore, the response to the 
challenges requires political intervention, it is expedient for the individual member 
states to harmonize their policies. The European Commission developed the so-called 
Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs in March 2000 in this spirit. Although the 
objectives of the strategy were too complex and wide-ranging in themselves to 
succeed, their importance is undeniable. Thus the 2005 revision of the programme 
set only two main targets to be attained by 2010: an employment rate of 70 per 
cent; and 3 per cent of Europe’s GDP to be invested in research and development. To 
encourage implementation of the programme, operational targets and methods are 
specified individually for each member state at every review stage (EC, 2007b).
This chapter discusses questions related to the objective of improved employment. 
The growth of employment is of paramount importance – both with respect to the 
standard of living and in connection with matters of social insurance for the ageing 
population of Europe. Closely related to this is the cost of labour, which is one of the 
fundamental determinants of competitiveness. The latter subject will receive relatively 
little attention in our study, as our focus will be on labour supply (activity) and on the 
population favoured by the labour demand for employment. The Lisbon Strategy 
emphasizes the need – with special reference to Hungary – to encourage the growth 
of labour supply, i.e. to develop policies that involve more people in the labour 
market. Policies of this kind, aimed at expanding the employable population, include 
education and training, as well as other active labour market programmes.17 Only 
a limited improvement in employability can be achieved without them, since lower 
labour taxes or an increased number of job opportunities offered by companies are 
of little use if there is no trained labour force to employ. For this reason, in Hungary 
and elsewhere, expansion of activity among the employable population is an essential 
condition for any increase in the level of employment. The EU-SILC population survey 
provides a good opportunity to draw conclusions concerning the factors determining 
activity: the willingness and ability to work (or, in other words, employability) and, 
closely related to it, education.
The level of employment (and work intensity, i.e. the amount of work people 
and households do) cannot, of course, be disregarded. Although this equilibrium 
aggregate is influenced by demand (business and market trend) factors as well, the 
friction-prone nature of the labour market is evidenced by the observation that, 
given a satisfactory level of activity but a low level of employment, the 
unemployment rate will be high. This is a situation where people want to work but 
there is insufficient labour demand, or the demand is for a different kind of 
workforce (e.g. better trained or with different skills). Frictions of this kind can thus 
17 A different means to this goal (one that does not target employability) is, of course, 
to raise the age of retirement and tighten the conditions on other welfare and social 
insurance services (e.g. family support systems, disability pension). 
THE LISBON STRATEGY FOR 
GROWTH AND JOBS, DEVELOPED 
BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
AIMS FOR 70 PER CENT 
EMPLOYMENT BY THE YEAR 2010.
TO MEET THE LISBON TARGET, 
BOTH THE FACTORS OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYABILITY 
NEED TO BE IN THE FOCUS  
OF ATTENTION.
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be revealing when it comes to issues of employability. If the labour force has the 
wrong level or type of training, the result will often be an under-supply and an 
over-supply of labour at one and the same time. This is a characteristic problem in 
transitional economies such as Hungary’s.
Our overview of the labour market starts in Section 2.2 with a discussion of the 
basic processes of economic activity and employment, based on the data of the Eu-
rostat European Labour Force Survey and keeping the Lisbon objective in mind. Next, 
the effects of gender, age, education and labour market experience on the probabil-
ity of activity and employment are investigated for each of the countries, based on 
individual-level data from the EU-SILC survey. Section 2.3 looks at the work intensity 
of households and the hours worked by individuals, also based on EU-SILC data. 
While in Section 2.4, educational attainment and education inequalities between the 
countries are investigated. We look into the relationship between labour market fac-
tors (activity and employment rates) and educational differences, and we describe 
the groups of countries that emerge from the relationship analysis. 
2.2. Activity, employment and unemployment 
2.2.1. Labour market trends 
The main indicators used in this section are the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) definitions of labour market status.
The recommendations of the International Labour Organization (ILO) define labour market sta-
tus among the population aged 15–74 years and available to work. The definitions state that:
• economically active people are those who are present on the labour market as workers 
or job seekers, i.e. the employed and the unemployed;
• employed people are those who did at least one hour of work for wages in the refer-
ence week (one-hour criterion) or were only temporarily absent from their regular em-
ployment;
• finally, unemployed people are those who did not work in the reference week and do 
not have a job from which they could be temporarily absent; were actively seeking 
employment over the four weeks preceding the interview; could start work within two 
weeks if they found an appropriate job (availability).
The Hungarian Statistical Office (KSH) adopts these definitions in its publications of the Hungar-
ian data of the standardized Labour Force Survey (LFS), used to collect data in several countries 
of the world. The EU’s Eurostat, however, publishes data for the population aged 15–64 years. 
To allow a comparison to be made between these data and the results of the EU-SILC survey, this 
study uses the definitions given above but applied to a narrower age band of the population: 
people aged 15–64 years. Our chapter discusses long-term unemployment as well. Based on a 
similar ILO recommendation, the long-term unemployed are those who are classed as actively 
seeking employment for the past 12 months or longer (and meet the other two criteria of un-
employment).
THIS LABOUR MARKET OVERVIEW 
INVESTIGATES THE LABOUR 
MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AT THE LEVEL OF HOUSEHOLDS, 
INDIVIDUALS, COUNTRIES AND 
COUNTRY GROUPS.
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In light of the definitions, and as revealed in Figures 2.1–2.3, both the level of 
activity and the level of employment show an overall upwards trend in the European 
Union: the activity rate rose by 1 per cent and the employment rate by 1.3 per cent in 
2006. It is also evident, however, that the old (more developed) member states 
experienced a somewhat faster rate of increase than did the new members, and thus 
the gap between the EU-15 and the EU-25 figures has widened slightly over the past 
few years. The unemployment rate has hovered around 8 per cent for the past 6–8 
years, and now remains consistently below the magic 10 per cent figure typical of the 
mid-1990s. This indicator shows a smaller difference between the old and the new 
member states (roughly half a per cent in 2006) and the gap appears to be shrinking. 
These results suggest that, although the 70 per cent employment target set by the 
Lisbon Strategy is not unrealistic, the employment level in the EU-25 would need to 
increase by over 5 per cent in three years if the target is to be hit. Considering what 
has happened over the past 10 years, it seems unlikely that the objective will be met. 
The average employment level in the EU-15, however, may well approach the target 
of 70 per cent, although no substantial decrease in unemployment can be projected 
for the future. That is, labour reserves appear to be available in the European economy 
as a whole, and this could be the starting point for growth. The rise in employment, 
however, only slightly surpasses the increase in activity, i.e. at an aggregate level, 
newly active people appear to enter employment immediately, while the 
unemployment rate remains constant. This suggests that the friction characterizing 
the labour market has not reduced with the increase in employment.18 
The small differences between the EU-15 and the EU-25 and the smooth curves 
of the individual indicators, however, conceal significant differences between the 
countries, even in the trends they display. It is clear from the figures that there is 
substantial heterogeneity among both the old and the new member states. The 
countries that are important reference points for a comparison with Hungary are 
represented in Figures 2.1–2.3, where we seek to keep the diversity of possible 
courses clearly visible.
18 It may be that unemployment reflects the tightness/slackness of the labour market rather 
than friction. If this was a significant factor, a wage decline would be expected until 
unemployment is resolved according to the textbook scenario. We do not see a decrease 
in (real) wages, however. The phenomenon could, of course, also be the result of other 
inflexibilities displayed by labour market institutions. 
SLOWLY MOVING TOWARDS  
THE LISBON TARGET: MODERATELY 
EXPANDING PARTICIPATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT IN BOTH THE NEW 
AND THE OLD MEMBER STATES.
THE HOMOGENEOUS PICTURE HIDES 
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
THE COUNTRIES.
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As regards the labour market aggregates, various clusters of welfare states are 
clearly distinguishable. The highest activity and employment rates (as well as the low-
est unemployment rates) are to be observed in the Scandinavian countries and the 
United Kingdom (with an activity rate of about 75–80 per cent and an employment 
rate of about 70 per cent). These are followed by one group of continental states 
(the Netherlands, Germany and Austria) plus a group of new member states (Cyprus, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states); some of the countries of Southern 
Europe are at a similar level to another group of continental countries (France, Bel-
gium and Luxembourg), while the remaining Southern countries are at the level of 
Poland, Hungary and Slovakia.19
For reference, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 reveal that Spain and Ireland started out at 
about the same level as Hungary and Italy, but all three of their indicators have caught 
up with the EU average over the past 10 years. That is why, when the Hungarian 
indicators showed a spectacular improvement in the second half of the 1990s, the 
Irish model was held up for the Hungarian labour market as a possible scenario for 
progress. However, a more negative scenario has also reared its head recently: the 
example of Portugal. At the outset, Portugal had an activity and an employment rate 
above the EU average, and it achieved a further increase up to 2000/01. At this point, 
however, the rising trend in employment was reversed, while both unemployment 
and activity increased.20 
19 Although Slovakia has shown a robust increase since 2004.
20 The example of Portugal is even more relevant to Hungary in that it faces great economic 
challenges that are comparable to those characteristic of the Hungarian economy (slow 
growth, rising unemployment, current balance of payment and budget deficit); for more 
details, see Blanchard (2007). 
Figure 2.1: Activity rate among 
people aged 15–64 years  
in the European Union,  
1995–2006 (%)
Source: Eurostat
VARIOUS CLUSTERS OF WELFARE 
STATES ARE CLEARLY 
DISTINGUISHABLE IN TERMS  
OF THE LABOUR MARKET 
AGGREGATES.
HOW WILL HUNGARY CLOSE  
THE GAP: THE IRISH OR  
THE PORTUGUESE EXAMPLE?
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The differences between the Visegrad countries are usually attributed to differ-
ences in the privatization processes during the transition period and in the subse-
quent intervention policies. One still discernible consequence is that, while the level of 
employment and activity did not decline dramatically with privatization in the Czech 
Republic, Poland did experience a rapid fall in the second half of the 1990s, which it 
allowed to be absorbed into unemployment (recovery did not start until the next 
decade, and activity continues to follow a declining trend, albeit at a slower rate). In 
Hungary, roughly every fourth person lost his or her job as early as the start of the 
1990s as a result of the abrupt rationalization and privatization process. The easy 
availability of early retirement and the slack conditions on disability pension meant 
that a great number of those who were left without work chose to become inactive 
rather than unemployed, and kept their inactive status on a permanent basis. The 
recovery of activity and employment began soon after, around 1997–98, but to this 
day Hungary continues to have the lowest activity rate in Europe.21
Overall, we may conclude that the level of activity shows a gentle upwards trend 
in the working-age (15–64 years) population. With the data broken down into age 
groups and sex, we can also reveal which are the groups that enhance growth and 
which are those that impede it. In less developed countries (in most of the Visegrad 
states and the countries of Southern Europe – with the exception of Spain), it is only 
now that the expansion in education is really starting to build up to sizeable 
proportions. We can see that there has been a much bigger decrease in activity 
among young people since 1995 in these countries than in others. Nevertheless, the 
21 As the inactive population with its devalued human capital grows old and its place is 
taken by more active and better educated cohorts with modern skills, the level of activity 
may steadily increase. As long as the eligibility conditions on (especially early and disability) 
pensions fail to be tightened, however, the desired rate of increase will not be achieved.  
A decomposition of the growth trend of activity is published in MNB (2006) for the period 
between 1993 and 2004, where the incentive effects of certain social transfers (e.g. family 
support programmes and pension systems) are clearly demonstrated. 
Figure 2.2: Employment rate 
among people aged 15–64 
years in the European Union, 
1995–2006 (%)
Source: Eurostat
THE EFFECTS OF THE REGIME 
CHANGE ARE STILL BEING FELT  
IN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES.
THE INCREASE IN THE LEVEL  
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observable growth can be attributed to women, on the one hand, and to the oldest 
age group (55–64 years), on the other. Interestingly, while the increase tends to be 
strongest among older women in the new member states, it is women aged 25–54 
years who dominate growth in the continental states and the countries of Southern 
Europe. A labour force expansion is also to be observed among men in the 55–64 
year age group both in those continental welfare states that have been forced to cut 
back on welfare provision (Germany, Austria, France, Belgium) and in some of the 
new member states (e.g. Hungary), where this is probably on account of the increased 
age of retirement. Whatever the reason, the fact that, in the above-mentioned old 
member states, the dominant increase is among women aged 25–54 years, while in 
the new member states it is an increase among older people that is decisive suggests 
that, in Hungary, positive changes are primarily to be expected from tightened 
regulations on retirement, rather than from intervention policies aimed at enhancing 
employability.22 
The overall level of employment shows a gently increasing trend, somewhat 
slower than the rise in activity. The barely rising employment curve that characterizes 
Hungary is the second lowest in Europe (after Poland) and has shown an increase of 
about 4 per cent over the past three or four years. The most successful new member 
state in this respect – as in the activity rate – is Cyprus. Decomposition of the data 
into age groups and sex reveals similar trends to those observed for activity: the 
employment level is raised by the participation of women (in the new and the 
continental member states) and particularly by the participation of older people. 
Among young people, by contrast, a marked decline can be observed in the new 
member states and stagnation elsewhere. What is surprising, and a bad omen, is that 
the employment rate among men aged 25–54 years, those in their prime, at an age 
that is assumed to be the most productive, is on the decrease in every new member 
state (with the exception of the Baltic states), as well as in the continental countries, 
Sweden, Finland and Ireland, while it remains stagnant everywhere else. It would be 
an interesting research topic to explore the causes of this emerging trend. 
We have mentioned before that the overall unemployment rate (Figure 2.3) is 
static; falling trends can only be observed in the Baltic states, Poland and Slovakia (the 
last of which had an exceptionally high starting point), and to a lesser extent in the 
countries of Southern Europe, with the exception of Portugal (Tárki–UniCredit, 2008, 
Figure F2.3). No gender differences can be seen here. Looking at the age groups, 
however, we find an interesting and troubling process. Although unemployment 
among the population aged 15–24 years is static across the countries, there are 
significant country-specific differences: where unemployment falls, it falls steeply and 
drags the indicator for the total population downwards (see the countries mentioned 
before). In Sweden, the continental countries, Portugal and Hungary, by contrast, the 
past few years have seen a substantial increase, which implies unsettling processes: 
a growing share of the economically active (i.e. typically moderately educated) 
22 The example of the continental countries may imply the decline of the welfare state rather 
than the success of policies, i.e. the pruned-back welfare system may have led to a shift 
from a family model of one earner towards one or two earners, and thus to more labour 
supply among women. 
THE LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT 
AMONG MEN AGED 25–54 YEARS 
HAS REMAINED STATIC FOR  
THE PAST FEW YEARS.
RISING UNEMPLOYMENT RATES  
ARE OBSERVED AMONG YOUNG 
PEOPLE IN AN INCREASING NUMBER  
OF COUNTRIES.
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15–24-year-old population is unemployed in these countries. This requires training 
programmes for uneducated young people as a priority of public policy.
Macro-level labour market processes are characterized by another important in-
dicator: long-term unemployment. Looking at the size of the population classed as 
unemployed for 12 months or more, the aggregate curve for all (age and gender) 
groups shows stagnation, with only slight differences between countries and no sys-
tematic patterns dividing countries into groups (Figure 2.4). An examination of the 
individual age groups is, however, revealing: the indicator has followed a decreasing 
trend among young people for quite some time, while the figures for older people 
have increased by about 5 per cent over the past three or four years, in both the old 
and the new member states.23
23 This finding could suggest a faster rate of skill devaluation, i.e. that older people who have 
lost their jobs in recent years are statistically more likely to remain unemployed for longer, 
since their skills are less usable and less renewable. If this is the case, we have found an 
additional priority for public policy: the need to provide further training and retraining for 
older working-age populations. 
Figure 2.3: Unemployment rate 
among people aged 15–64 
years in the European Union, 
1995–2006 (%)
Source: Eurostat
LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT IS 
STATIC, BUT IT SHOWS A DECLINE 
AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE
58 2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LABOUR MARKET
TÁRKI EUROPEAN SOCIAL REPORT
2.2.2. Activity and employment probability
We now leave the Eurostat aggregates and turn to individual-level data from the 
EU-SILC survey of 2005 to investigate – in line with the ILO definitions given above – 
the effects of gender, educational attainment and labour market experience on the 
activity and employment probabilities among the population aged 15–64 years in 
the various countries. Differences between the old and the new member states will 
also be examined in terms of the effects of these factors.24 A cross-sectional non-
linear probability model (probit) is built with a binary variable as our dependent 
variable, which takes a value of 1 if the given individual is active (employed) and 
a value of 0 if he or she is not. It must be noted that we use the term ‘effect’ for the 
sake of easier interpretation, but strictly speaking we can only reveal correlations 
rather than cause and effect relationships due to endogeneity problems caused by 
measurement errors and omitted variables.25
24 Our results must be consistent with the aggregate Eurostat data discussed in Section 2.1, 
since the activity, employment and unemployment aggregates reconstructed from the  
EU-SILC database roughly concur with the Eurostat results. For comparative graphs of the 
two databases , see Tárki–UniCredit, 2008, Figures F2.1–F2.3.
25 These are variables omitted from the model which also affect the dependent variables but 
correlate with other explanatory variables in the model – this means that the effects of 
an explanatory variable involved in the model include the effects of any omitted variables 
correlating with it. Omitted variables of this kind may include, in our case, the number 
of children (which may distort the effects of gender, since women with young children 
are less likely to be active), place of residence (which may be negatively related to both 
educational attainment and labour market status) and up-to-date skills (which may be 
correlated with age). 
Figure 2.4: Long-term  
(12 months or more) 
unemployment among people 
aged 15–64 years in the 
European Union, 1995–2006 (%)
Source: Eurostat
A PROBABILITY MODEL WAS BUILT 
TO ESTIMATE ACTIVITY AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROBABILITIES.
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As is shown in Figures 2.5a–e, the explanatory variables selected tend to have 
a significant effect on activity and employment probabilities. These effects almost 
invariably shift the two dependent variables in the same direction, and the two 
outcomes are very closely related in the case of gender and labour market experience 
(correlation coefficients: 91.6 per cent and 81.9 per cent, respectively). 
We take Hungary as our example in presenting the results of the model. With all 
other explanatory variables held constant, women in Hungary are significantly – 
about 4 per cent – less likely to be active or employed than are men. Similarly, with 
the other explanatory variables held constant, a Hungarian individual one year older 
than the average age (about 40 years) is roughly 1.7 per cent less likely to be active 
and 0.4 per cent less likely to be employed than someone of average age (about 40 
years), but otherwise the two individuals have the same parameters (in terms of 
education and labour market experience). Those with close to 27 years of labour 
market experience are about half a per cent more likely to be active than those who 
have close to 26 years of labour market experience, but are similar in every other 
respect.26 Looking at educational attainment, we find that those with upper 
secondary education are 7 per cent more likely to be active and 35 per cent more 
likely to be employed than other people with the same status in terms of all other 
explanatory variables, while those with higher education are 12 per cent and 42 per 
cent, respectively, more likely to be active and employed. 
26 As no data on labour market experience are available for any of the respondents in 
employment, the correlation between this explanatory variable and employment cannot 
be analysed. 
THE RESULTS ARE PRESENTED USING 
HUNGARY AS AN EXAMPLE.
Figure 2.5: The effects of gender, 
age, labour market experience, 
upper secondary education and 
higher education on activity and 
employment probabilities in the 
European Union (%)
a) Gender differences
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d) The effects of upper 
secondary education
e) The effects of higher 
education
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Notes: The figures show the results 
of unweighted probit models 
estimated with robust standard 
errors. The effects of gender and 
age are not statistically significant 
for Denmark, and the effects  
of upper secondary education are 
not statistically significant for 
Austria, Cyprus, Germany, France, 
Greece or the United Kingdom.  
In the estimations of activity 
probability, the effects of upper 
secondary education are not 
significant for Denmark, Poland 
and for the total of new EU 
member states. Labour market 
experience is not available for 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden 
or the United Kingdom. None of 
the respondents stating their 
labour market experience are 
employed in Hungary, thus the 
effects of labour market 
experience on employment cannot 
be estimated here.
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Looking at the effects of gender (Figure 2.5a), we find that there are relatively 
small differences between men and women both in activity and in employment. In 
this respect, women in the two Anglo-Saxon countries are most disadvantaged and, 
surprisingly, the countries do not pattern into groups (even though we would expect 
there to be smaller differences between the Scandinavian countries and greater 
differences between the continental countries). 
Age (Figure 2.5b) has a weaker effect in the Anglo-Saxon and the Scandinavian 
countries (the effects are in fact positive, although not to any significant extent), while 
the results appear to reflect the empirical fact observed several times in the context 
of wage levels that, in the former socialist countries, age has a negative effect (at the 
average age, which is about 40 years) and its absolute value is generally large in 
international terms. That is, those older than the average age are significantly less 
likely to be active or employed, which could be related to the fact that their human 
capital is more likely to be regarded as obsolete in transitional economies. Compared 
to the other new member states, in Hungary the difference is small in terms of 
employment probability, but is of average size in terms of activity probability – i.e. at 
the average age, the obsolescence of human capital has no consequences (either 
with respect to an individual’s life course, or presumably in an aggregate time series) 
in Hungary. Labour market experience (at the average level), by contrast, appears to 
have the greatest (positive) benefits for employment in the former socialist countries 
(Figure 2.5c).
The positive effects of upper secondary and higher education – relative to the 
category of those with less than upper secondary education – on employment 
probability prove to be strongest in Hungary (Figures 2.5d and 2.5e).27 While the 
return to secondary education in employment probability is admittedly rather small 
in the new member states compared to the old member states (barely exceeds 0.28) 
the benefits of higher education surpass those observed in the Western countries. 
Education brings especially great benefits in Ireland, for instance, and typically little 
advantage in Cyprus among the new member states, and in some of the old member 
states such as the United Kingdom, France and Greece.
27 They are even stronger in Slovakia, where the value of the increase in probability is over 
90 per cent. Slovakia is thus not represented in the figures for expository reasons and 
because of some doubt as to the data. 
28 This result could be an indication of the troubling hypothesis investigated in Hungary by 
Kertesi and Köllő (2006), whose results showed no support for it, that people with higher 
education leave no jobs for those with only secondary education (see also Footnote 40). 
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2.3. The work intensity of households and 
individuals 
After estimating activity and employment probability with the help of binary 
variables, we now turn to a more continuous variable, reflecting the balance between 
labour demand and labour supply: work intensity. Two indicators of work intensity 
are used here. One is the household-level Laeken indicator. The total number of 
months actually worked by the members of a given household is divided by the total 
number of months the working-age members of the household could work in 
principle (the number of working-age people multiplied by 12) and the results are 
sorted to gain a categorical variable. We use this categorical variable to reveal what 
proportion of the population live in households where no one works (jobless 
households); next, the Laeken indicator of work intensity is examined. Although work 
intensity – like employment rate – reflects some kind of labour market demand and 
supply equilibrium, this household-level indicator is well suited to approximating the 
labour supply decisions and labour readiness of households. This is because people 
sharing a household may share labour market work and household work among 
them, and thus the amount of work falling to each person may be less than that of 
an individual in a one-person household. This, however, may not hold for the 
regression model based on individual-level data, where the average number of hours 
actually worked each week is analysed relative to the statutory full-time hours of 
work, although the decisions of an individual sharing a household with others are 
probably not entirely autonomous, individual decisions (we will return to this issue 
later).
2.3.1. Jobless households
Our analysis of the EU-SILC data of 2005, which cover all members of a household 
(not only the working-age members), finds that 10.33 per cent of the total population 
of the 24 countries under consideration live in households where none of the 
working-age members work (Figure 2.6). The average value of the indicator is about 
one percentage point higher than this for the new member states and somewhat 
lower for the old member states. Hungary falls in the mid-range, irrespective of 
whether we consider all the countries studied or only the countries of its region (9.8 
per cent of the population of Hungary live in jobless households).
THE WORK INTENSITY INDICATOR 
REPRESENTS THE READINESS  
OF THE HOUSEHOLD TO WORK.
ABOUT 10 PER CENT  
OF THE POPULATION IN EUROPE 
LIVE IN JOBLESS HOUSEHOLDS.
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Breaking down the data into individual household types, we find that the 
proportion of people living in jobless households is only exceptionally high among 
old people with no children, while it is lower than the average of either the new 
member states or the EU-15 in families with children (Figure 2.7). Nevertheless, in the 
whole of the European Union, parents raising their children alone are the most likely 
to live in jobless households, and they are followed by a series of different childless 
household types. The same pattern can be observed for the new member states as 
a group. 
Figure 2.6: Proportion of people 
living in jobless households  
by country in the European 
Union (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
THE PROPORTION OF PEOPLE LIVING 
IN JOBLESS HOUSEHOLDS IS 
HIGHEST AMONG LONE PARENTS 
WITH CHILDREN AND AMONG 
HOUSEHOLDS WITH ELDERLY 
PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE NEW 
MEMBER STATES.
Figure 2.7: Proportion of people 
living in jobless households  
in the European Union,  
by household type (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
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Household types especially susceptible to poverty29 are examined by country in 
Figures 2.8a, b and c.
29 Although the results of the indicator shown in Figure 2.7 do not suggest that families with 
several children are highly susceptible to poverty. 
Figure 2.8: Number of people in 
each of three household types 
living in jobless households in 
proportion to the population of 
the given household type in the 
European Union, by country (%)
a) Two childless adults, at least 
one aged 65 and over
b) Parent raising children alone
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Looking at Figures 2.7 and 2.8a–c, it is clear that the average for the new member 
states is strikingly high for households with some older members and for those with 
several children. While no other patterns can be observed among the countries, there 
are enormous differences between them. In some cases, people in the highest 
ranking country are six or seven times more likely to live in jobless households than 
are people in the lowest ranking country (e.g. the Netherlands versus the United 
Kingdom in Figure 2.8b or the Czech Republic versus Cyprus in Figure 2.8c).
It should be noted that the figures probably underestimate the number of people 
living in jobless households, since our method only classes a household as jobless if 
none of its working-age members worked a single (!) month in the period studied. 
There is likely to be a far greater number of households where practically no one 
works. 
c) Two parents with at least 
three children
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
THERE IS CONSIDERABLE  
VARIATION BETWEEN COUNTRIES  
IN THE PROPORTION OF PEOPLE 
LIVING IN JOBLESS HOUSEHOLDS.
THE INDICATOR MAY 
UNDERESTIMATE THE PROPORTION 
OF PEOPLE LIVING IN JOBLESS 
HOUSEHOLDS.
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2.3.2. The work intensity of households
The work intensity of households is quantified by a Laeken indicator. 
The Laeken indicators. The indicator system has been developed to help provide 
comparative data on income inequalities and poverty in individual member states for 
the ‘open co-ordination mechanism’, which seeks to co-ordinate social policies across 
the European Union. The Laeken indicators form a hierarchical system with three 
levels. The group of primary indicators comprises the major indicators of financial 
poverty – those which capture the major dimensions leading to social exclusion. 
They include indicators such as poverty rate, poverty rate by gender, activity status, 
household type and housing tenure status; share of income quintiles; persistent pov-
erty rate; poverty gap; regional inequalities; long-term unemployment; the share of 
jobless households; the share of early school leavers; life expectancy at birth, etc. 
The group of secondary indicators includes the robustness of the poverty rate, per-
sistent poverty, long-term unemployment share, and the share of low educational 
attainment. The Laeken system specifies a so-called tertiary level as well, but no 
specific indicators are listed here – individual countries are free to decide which indi-
cators are important for interpretation of the primary and secondary indicators in 
their own particular instances.
The indicator of work intensity used in our study was included among the Laeken 
indicators at a later state. It is intended to show how many of the theoretically avail-
able 12 months of work are spent working by the working-age (18–64 years here) 
members of a household in the income reference period. The number of months 
spent working by the working-age members of the population is divided by the 
number of months theoretically available. The final value of the Laeken indicator of 
work intensity is determined by categorizing the results: 1, 2, 3 or 4 if the active mem-
bers of the given household worked, respectively, 0, 1–49 per cent, 50–99 per cent 
or 100 per cent of the total number of working months available. The indicator takes 
a value of 1 if the household has no working member or working-age member.
Unfortunately, these households therefore cannot be distinguished from those 
where there are working-age members who should be working in theory but who 
for some reason are not.
The work intensity of the various countries is thus represented by this categorical 
variable calculated on the basis of the EU-SILC data in Figure 2.9. The bottom data 
row shows the share of households with a value of 1 and the top row displays the 
share of those with a value of 4.
THE WORK INTENSITY  
OF HOUSEHOLDS IS QUANTIFIED  
BY A LAEKEN INDICATOR. 
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The columns in the above figure are arranged in increasing size of the topmost 
data row, i.e. the share of those households where every member worked throughout 
the reference period. We can see that the majority of the new member states (the 
exceptions being Estonia and Hungary) are located in the lower half of the range, 
along with the countries of Southern Europe, Germany, Ireland and Finland, i.e. these 
are the countries with the lowest share of households in which everyone works full 
time. The United Kingdom, the other two Scandinavian countries and the rest of the 
continental states – together with Hungary and Estonia – are positioned in the higher 
section of the range, where over half of all households spend all their theoretical 
working months actually working.
If we look at the opposite end of the spectrum, i.e. the share of those households 
where no one works, we do not see a reversed order. The Mediterranean countries 
(with the exception of Italy) are once again at the lower end of the scale, but the 
majority of the continental states are among the countries with the highest share of 
jobless households. This result could, in part, be explained by the widely discussed 
observation that few part-time jobs or temporary jobs are available in these countries.30 
Hungary is located in the middle of the range, with a value somewhat closer to those 
of the continental countries. 
Leaving aside the aggregate national data, we now turn to the distribution of 
household types.31 Since childless households in the ‘other’ category (including those 
30 We must remember, however, that the results should be interpreted with caution, since 
the indicator shows the number of months worked rather than the regular working hours. 
31 Single-person households, households with two parents and one or two children and 
‘other’ households with children (e.g. those with more than two generations) are less 
frequent in the new EU member states than in the old member states. Also, in the new 
member states the share of childless households is either very high (probably due to the 
great number of households with all their members aged 65 or over, as in Hungary and 
the Czech Republic) or very low. The remaining household types (lone parent with at least 
one child, two parents with at least three children) occur with roughly equal frequencies in 
the new and the old member states. See Tárki–UniCredit, 2008, Figure F2.4.
Figure 2.9: The distribution  
of the work intensity  
of households in the European 
Union, by country (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Explanation: Work intensity is  
the ratio of the total number  
of months worked by the adult 
members of the household  
to the number of theoretically 
available working months  
(0%, 1–49%, 50–99%, 100%).
THE PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS 
WHERE EVERY WORKING-AGE 
MEMBER WORKS IS RELATIVELY 
LOW IN THE MAJORITY  
OF THE NEW MEMBER STATES  
AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES.
HOUSEHOLDS WITH PART-TIME 
EMPLOYMENT ARE RELATIVELY 
INFREQUENT IN THE CONTINENTAL 
STATES.
HOUSEHOLDS WITH ELDERLY 
MEMBERS, THOSE WITH SEVERAL 
CHILDREN AND THOSE WITH LONE 
PARENTS RECEIVE SPECIAL 
ATTENTION IN OUR STUDY.
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with two adults aged 65 and over), lone-parent households and households with 
several children are highly susceptible to poverty, the following discussion places 
special emphasis on their work intensity figures.
Let us first examine the work intensities of the various household types in the old 
and the new member states, as shown in Figure 2.10.
We can see that the work intensity patterns across the different household types 
are fairly similar in the old and the new member states: the respective shares of 
households with no work, ‘part-time’ work activity and ‘full-time’ work activity are 
roughly equal in the majority of household types. It should be noted, however, that 
the share of jobless households is slightly (but consistently) higher in every household 
type in the new states. This difference is largest for single-person households, but is 
also noticeable for childless households with two adults under 65 and for the 
category of other households with children. A further interesting result is that there is 
a higher share of workers using their full working capacity among childless households 
in the EU-15 countries, but the advantage of this group of countries disappears when 
we look at households with children, and in fact the EU-9 group fares better as 
regards households with three or more children. A general pattern characterizing 
both groups of countries is that two-parent households with children spend the 
highest portion of their theoretical working months working at least some time. They 
are followed by other childless households, childless couples under 65, lone-parent 
households, single-person households and finally, not surprisingly, childless 
households with two adults, at least one of whom is aged 65 or over, which includes 
pensioner households. The share of households where all available working months 
are used for work is greatest among lone parents, two parents and single-person 
households, and lowest among other households with children and other childless 
households. The latter two household types, however, have the highest share of 
workers using only part of their working months.
THE WORK INTENSITIES  
OF THE DIFFERENT HOUSEHOLD 
TYPES ARE SIMILAR IN THE NEW 
AND THE OLD MEMBER STATES.
Figure 2.10: The work intensity  
of household types in the old 
and new member states  
of the European Union (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Explanation: Work intensity is  
the ratio of the total number  
of months worked by the adult 
members of the household  
to the number of theoretically 
available working months  
(0%, 1–49%, 50–99%, 100%).
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We now examine the country-level data for the three household types most 
susceptible to poverty. Figure 2.11 reveals that Hungary is among the countries where 
the proportion of jobless households remains low among those households that are 
most susceptible to poverty, and indeed the work intensity values for households 
with several children are among the best in the new member states. We further find 
that the share of jobless households is robustly low in the United Kingdom and 
Sweden, in both of which countries a high proportion of households use their full 
labour capacity. By contrast, we find several of the continental states among the 
countries where there is a relatively high proportion of jobless households. 
Furthermore, among families with several children, we find that the relatively high 
frequency of jobless households is coupled with a noticeably lower proportion of 
households working at full intensity – that is, there is a high proportion of households 
working ‘part time’. Families with several children display a similar pattern in the 
Mediterranean countries, which suggests that households may follow a traditional 
family model where there is one earner.
IN NEW MEMBER STATES  
THE PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH MANY CHILDREN OR WITH 
ELDERLY MEMBERS IS HIGH.
Figure 2.11: The distribution  
of the work intensity of 
households in three household 
types in the countries  
of the European Union (%)
a) Two childless adults, at least 
one aged 65 or over
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b) Parent raising children alone
c) Two parents with at least 
three children
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Explanation: Work intensity is  
the ratio of the total number  
of months worked by the adult 
members of the household  
to the number of theoretically 
available working months  
(0%, 1–49%, 50–99%, 100%).
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2.3.3. Hours of work – individual work intensity
Leaving the work intensity of households, we now return to individual-level data 
and look at the work intensity of individuals on the basis of their hours of work. This 
is more difficult to interpret as a continuous labour supply decision, since people 
usually either work full time or do not work at all. In some developed countries, 
however, part-time work is becoming more common, and people may have more 
than one job if they wish and are able to.
The following paragraphs thus present a regression analysis involving individual-
level data on the total working-age (15–64 years, again) population.32 We use the 
average weekly number of hours of work in proportion to the statutory weekly 
working hours33 as our dependent variable. This includes the hours worked in both 
full-time and part-time jobs; for irregular working hours, the weekly average is taken. 
Our explanatory variables are those used in the activity and employment estimations, 
and an additional variable of household type (single-person, other childless, lone 
parent, couple with one or two children, couple with several children, other household 
with children). To reveal how much of our results is explained by complete joblessness 
(0 hours of work), a control regression analysis is carried out among the population 
with jobs. The results are displayed in Figure 2.12.
32 Since we would like to approximate some kind of labour supply decision, the total 
working-age population, including those currently not working, is included in the analysis, 
rather than just the employed population alone. 
33 The length of the working week is 35 hours in France and 40 hours in all other EU-SILC 
countries. 
INDIVIDUAL WORK INTENSITY IS 
CAPTURED BY AN ESTIMATION 
PROCEDURE BASED ON HOURS  
OF WORK.
Figure 2.12: Country-specific 
differences in hours of work 
ratios in the European Union (%)
a) Gender differences
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b) The effects of age
c) The effects of labour market 
experience
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d) The effects of upper 
secondary education
e) The effects of higher 
education
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Notes: The figures show partial 
effects in an unweighted linear 
regression model. The first, light-
coloured data bar shows  
the results of the analysis involving 
the total working-age (15–64 
years) population, while the 
second, darker data bar (E) displays 
the results for the model run  
on the employed population.  
Reference group for educational 
attainment: people with less than 
upper secondary education.  
(The estimations were also carried 
out in a left-censored tobit model 
(censored in 0); the results were 
both qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar with respect 
to the average of the continuous 
variables and the 0 values  
of the dummy variables.) 
Hours of work ratio: the total 
number of hours worked in  
a week in full-time and part-time 
jobs divided by the number  
of theoretically compulsory 
working hours (35 hours in France, 
40 hours elsewhere).
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Once again, we use Hungary as an example to present the results of our analysis. 
Figure 2.12a shows the effects of gender: women work significantly shorter hours in 
each of the countries. This effect is strongest in the continental states; it is somewhat 
weaker in the new member states, but the difference is not striking. Hungary is 
located in the mid-range of the countries. Looking at the results for the group of 
employed people, however, we find considerable differences between men and 
women in an international comparison.34 In Hungary, among the total working-age 
population, women work on average 6 hours a week less, while the corresponding 
figure is 8 hours among the employed population. In the Netherlands, however, 
where part-time work is well known to be common, there is a difference of 14 hours 
between the sexes in the weekly hours of work among both the employed and the 
total population, i.e. the gap cannot be attributed to differences in employment 
probability.35 These results indicate that, among the total population, the labour 
market differences between men and women in Hungary are smaller than the 
European average. This could be explained by Hungarian women’s labour supply 
preferences, but it could equally well be the case that their financial circumstances 
leave them with less choice, or that part-time jobs are less widely available to them 
than to women in other (continental) countries. The fact that we find a relatively 
large gap in terms of hours of work between men and women in the employed 
population of Hungary suggests that women experience relatively strong segregation 
in terms of job types: they are more likely to have jobs with shorter working hours, 
and possibly lower wages (e.g. teacher or low-ranking employee) than are women in 
countries where we do not find such a large gap between employed men and 
women.36 
Leaving to one side the minor differences between the sexes, we now turn to 
the effects of age. In this dimension, as Figure 2.12b shows, the new member states 
are in the lead: with every other factor held constant, a one-year increase in age is 
accompanied by a one-hour reduction in the weekly hours of work on average. Hun-
gary is the only exception among the new member states: the effect is close to 0, 
although it is still significant. In the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon countries, by 
contrast, age has a positive effect: an extra year of life is accompanied by a statisti-
cally significant (though slight) increase in weekly work. These differences (in contrast 
with gender differences) are, however, almost fully explained by employment status 
– to a lesser extent in the continental states, and to a greater extent in the new 
member states, where the level of employment is significantly lower among older 
people (see Section 2.2.2). Similar observations can be made with respect to the 
34 However, with certain employment parameters (whether in management, whether doing 
manual labour) controlled for, Hungary is among the European countries with the smallest 
gender gap in terms of hours of work (and also activity and employment probabilities). 
35 And this difference (as with the other continental countries) is barely reduced with the 
two employment parameters mentioned above (whether in management, whether doing 
manual labour) controlled for. 
36 There are no good examples among the 24 countries under consideration; as shown in 
Figure 2.12a, Portugal is the country with the smallest gap. 
THE GAP BETWEEN MEN’S AND 
WOMEN’S HOURS OF WORK 
IMPLIES EMPLOYMENT 
SEGREGATION, ESPECIALLY  
IN HUNGARY.
AN EXTRA YEAR OF LIFE GOES 
TOGETHER WITH SHORTER HOURS 
OF WORK, AND AN EXTRA YEAR 
OF LABOUR MARKET EXPERIENCE IS 
ACCOMPANIED BY LONGER HOURS 
OF WORK; THESE EFFECTS ARE 
CONSISTENTLY STRONGER  
IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES.
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 effects of labour market experience (Figure 2.12c),37 but with the opposite sign: an 
extra year in the labour market is accompanied by longer hours of work per week, 
and the effect is somewhat stronger in the new member states (almost 1 hour vs. 45 
minutes), although the difference is almost entirely down to the employed.
People with upper secondary education work more on average than do people 
with lower educational attainment, and this gap is substantially greater in the old 
member states: 1.7 hours more, as opposed to 0.6 hours in the new member states 
(Figure 2.12d). No effect is observed among the employed population (it is significantly 
0). Second only to Slovakia, Hungary has the largest difference between the average 
hours worked by people with upper secondary education and people with lower 
educational attainment. In Slovakia, however, the enormous gap disappears among 
the employed population (i.e. it is the result of differences in employment probability), 
while in Hungary, the difference persists. That is, in Hungary people with upper 
secondary education are more likely (as we have seen in Section 2.2.2) to find 
employment with longer hours of work (and possibly higher wages); although these 
people are also more likely to find jobs in Slovakia, their jobs are not significantly 
different in terms of working hours. If we look at the effects of higher education 
relative to lower secondary education (Figure 2.12e), we find a similar pattern 
emerging, though overall the effects are stronger than was the case for upper 
secondary education. This pattern is quite similar to the ranking observed for the 
effects of higher education on employment probability (see Section 2.2.2). This 
outcome suggests that in the majority of countries (with the exception of Hungary, 
Germany and, to a lesser extent, some other countries), differences in hours of work 
are explained by differences in level of employment. 
These findings indicate that labour supply tends to be a binary decision at the 
level of the individual (both on the part of the worker and on the part of the 
employer), and part-time work is generally infrequent (in terms of either availability or 
choice). That is, it is more fruitful to study work intensity at a household level (as we 
did in the previous section), because individuals appear to be able to optimize their 
working hours at the level of the household. We conjecture, however, that 
optimization leaves its mark at the level of the individual: people take their household 
type into consideration in making their labour supply decisions, i.e. it should have an 
effect on hours of work (Figure 2.13).
37 No data on labour market experience are available for the Scandinavian or the Anglo-
Saxon countries.
DIFFERENCES IN HOURS OF WORK 
AS A FUNCTION OF EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT ARE MOST LIKELY 
EXPLAINED BY DIFFERENCES  
IN EMPLOYMENT PROBABILITY.
LABOUR SUPPLY APPEARS TO BE  
A HOUSEHOLD DECISION RATHER 
THAN AN INDIVIDUAL ONE.
TÁRKI EUROPEAN SOCIAL REPORT
772. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LABOUR MARKET
As Figure 2.13a shows, Hungary’s behaviour is qualitatively different from the 
average behaviour of the new member states and shows more similarity with the 
average of the old member states: people living in different types of family with chil-
dren work 3–11 hours less on average than people living in single-person households. 
The corresponding value comes to about 2 hours in the old member states, while the 
Figure 2.13: Differences in hours 
of work ratios in the European 
Union, by household type (%)
a) Differences relative to single-
person households
b) Gender differences in various 
household types relative to 
single-person households
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Notes: The figures show partial 
effects in an unweighted linear 
regression model relative  
to people living alone as  
the reference group. In each 
category, the first group of bars 
shows the results of the analysis 
involving the total working-age 
(15–64 years) population, while 
the second group (E) displays  
the results for the model run  
on the employed population. 
THE LOWER AVERAGE NUMBER  
OF HOURS OF WORK IN FAMILIES 
WITH CHILDREN IS EXPLAINED BY  
A LOWER RATE OF FORMAL 
EMPLOYMENT AMONG WOMEN 
CARING FOR CHILDREN.
78 2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LABOUR MARKET
TÁRKI EUROPEAN SOCIAL REPORT
effect has a small positive value in the new member states. That is, the lower individ-
ual ‘work intensity’ (in terms of hours of work) of families with children may be 
 related to the overall shorter working hours of women and to the greater likelihood 
of women staying at home, and this difference remains impressive when only the 
employed population is considered.
Although our results may reveal important relationships, we must be careful in 
interpreting them – just as with the estimation results in Section 2.2.2. Due to various 
problems of endogeneity, the effects found here simply show correlations and do 
not signal cause and effect relationships.
2.4. Education and the labour market
Leaving the variables that can be regarded as equilibrium variables in some re-
spects (employment, number of hours of work), in this section we turn to the educa-
tional attainment of the working-age (15–64 years) population. This factor is often 
considered to be a barrier to both labour demand and labour supply – the reason 
being that, willing though companies may be to expand their workforce, they cannot 
do so if there are no suitable (suitably qualified) workers in the labour market. By the 
same token, if a skilled worker, say, is looking for work but finds that there is no 
 demand for his or her skills, s/he will stop looking after a while. Education, therefore, 
may lower or raise the probability of employability (activity, in our interpretation) as 
well as the probability of employment. Studies of economic science have shown time 
and again that labour market inequalities can often be traced back to such factors as 
educational differences, which are good predictors – well before they enter the la-
bour market – of certain differences in productivity, which in turn have an impact on 
activity and employment probability, as well as on wages.38 The investigation of edu-
cational attainment and education inequalities can thus lead to very important con-
clusions and objectives for education policy.
In what follows, some potential indicators of education and training inequalities 
are presented for the 24 EU member states included in the EU-SILC database, and the 
relationships that exist between them and labour market aggregates (activity, 
employment and unemployment rates) are discussed.
38 On this subject, through the example of inequalities between black and white people, 
see Neal and Johnson (1996).
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
IDENTIFIED FACTORS AND 
INDIVIDUAL WORK INTENSITY IS 
NOT CAUSAL BUT CORRELATIONAL.
LABOUR MARKET INEQUALITIES 
MAY HAVE THEIR ROOTS IN 
EDUCATION.
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2.4.1. Educational attainment and education inequalities 
The simplest indicator of educational attainment by country is the average level 
of education and the average number of years of schooling. These two cannot be 
distinguished here, as only the highest level of education attained is given in the EU-
SILC database, classified according to the OECD ISCED-97 categories39 (see OECD, 
1999 for the manual of classification). In our study, the data are recoded into the 
number of school years, based on the OECD manual, to allow us to investigate the 
average figures for the countries (Figure 2.14). The indicator is not particularly 
informative: the country that fares worst is Portugal, and the new member state with 
the poorest value is Slovenia; Germany and the United Kingdom show the highest 
average number of school years of all the countries, and Lithuania and Estonia lead 
the new member states. The old and the new member states do not cluster 
separately: new member states can be found in both the first and the second half of 
the countries ranked according to the average number of school years of their 
population. An interesting pattern emerges, however, within the group of old 
member states: the countries of Southern Europe and those continental countries 
with a poor performance in the dimension of labour market aggregates (Belgium, 
Luxembourg, France) are to be found among the countries with relatively small 
average numbers of school years, while the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, as well as those of the continental countries that fare better in the labour 
market, are among the countries with high average levels of schooling. Hungary falls 
in the lower half of the range, where the only other Visegrad country is Poland. The 
results of this simple indicator appear to accord with our hypothesis: lower levels of 
education are accompanied by lower labour market performance.
Though suitable for a cross-country comparison, the average number of school 
years is not a good indicator of inequality, because it is not at all sensitive to 
inequalities within a given country. The simplest indicator to use in any analysis of this 
latter is the standard deviation of school years and its ratio to the mean number of 
school years (Figure 2.14).
The figure reveals a moderately strong, negative correlation between the average 
number of school years and their standard deviations (correlation coefficient: –0.55). 
That is, where the average number of school years is high, their standard deviations 
tend to be small. In other words: in countries where people are relatively highly 
educated, education inequalities tend to be smaller. The correlations do not seem to 
be perfectly linear, but two groups are clearly distinguishable: countries with low 
means and high standard deviations (from Portugal to Cyprus in the figure) and 
39 And whether an individual is currently at school and, if so, what category of school it is 
according to the ISCED-97 system.  
The number of school years does not tell us how long someone took to attain a given 
level of education; it is simply an unambiguous way of establishing the average number  
of school years needed to attain a given level of education in a given country.  
The average number of school years may, in principle, distort education data if a given 
level of training requires different average numbers of years in different countries. 
COUNTRIES WITH POOR LABOUR 
MARKET PERFORMANCE ARE 
CHARACTERIZED BY LOWER 
AVERAGE NUMBERS OF YEARS  
IN EDUCATION.
THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF SCHOOL 
YEARS IS AN INADEQUATE INDICATOR 
OF INEQUALITIES, BUT THEIR 
STANDARD DEVIATION IS REVEALING.
COUNTRIES WITH A HIGHER 
AVERAGE LEVEL OF EDUCATION 
AMONG THE POPULATION SHOW 
LESS EDUCATION INEQUALITY.
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countries with high means and low standard deviations (from Austria to Germany in 
the figure). 
The indicators used to analyse the human capital of a country – such as the 
proportion of the population with low educational attainment and the proportion 
with higher education – can also give at least some indication of education 
inequalities. The group of people with low educational attainment comprises those 
with less than upper secondary education in the Hungarian system, and the 
population with higher education comprises those with a college or university degree. 
Looking at these two figures in combination, an interesting pattern emerges among 
the countries (Figure 2.15).
Figure 2.14: Average years of 
schooling and their standard 
deviation in the European Union, 
by country
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
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Taking the EU-24 average as our standard of comparison, four clear groups can 
be distinguished among the countries: in one group, both low educational attainment 
and higher education occur with about the average EU-24 frequency (Cyprus, 
Denmark, the Netherlands); in the second group, the proportion of people with low 
educational attainment is substantially higher than the average (the countries of 
Southern Europe, Ireland and Luxembourg); in the third group, the proportion of 
people with low educational attainment is lower than average, while people with 
higher education occur with higher than average frequency (Belgium, the United 
Kingdom, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden); in the last group, although the 
share of people with low educational attainment is smaller than average, the same 
observation holds for the population with higher education (the majority of the new 
member states and Austria). Hungary is characterized by an average proportion of 
people with low educational attainment and a smaller than average proportion of 
the population that is highly educated. The new member states therefore typically 
have a large share of people with secondary education, which suggests that there 
are relatively mild education inequalities in these countries. This conclusion is 
supported by the observation that in the new member states (and in countries with a 
large share of higher education and a small share of low educational attainment) 
educational attainment typically has a small standard deviation (Tárki–UniCredit, 
2008, Figure F2.6).
Returning to the indicator based on the number of school years: the Gini 
coefficient of human capital is defined in the population aged 15–64 in accordance 
with the methods of Castello and Domenech (2002) as an indicator of within-country 
education inequalities. As with the usual Gini coefficient for income distribution: an 
indicator value closer to 0 means less inequality in the given country; the highest 
possible value is 1, which signals perfect inequality (i.e. that 100 per cent of the total 
Figure 2.15: The share of people 
with low educational attainment 
and those with higher education 
among the working-age 
population in the European 
Union, by country (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Notes: People with low 
educational attainment are those 
with less than upper secondary 
education; people with higher 
education are those with a college 
or university degree.
THE GINI COEFFICIENT OF HUMAN 
CAPITAL IS A GOOD INDICATOR  
OF INEQUALITIES.
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school years completed in a country were completed by a single person). Recoding 
the available education data into years once again, we get the Gini coefficient of 
human capital shown in Figure 2.16.
The only cluster visible is that of Southern European countries with a high Gini 
coefficient; the rest of the old member states and the new member states show 
a varied picture. We can also see that the average inequality is somewhat lower 
among the new member states than among the old member states (Gini coefficients 
of 0.136 vs. 0.149). Hungary falls in the middle of the range, with a Gini coefficient 
similar to the average for the new member states. 
The indicators of education inequalities discussed so far all point in the same 
direction, with strong relationships between some of them. The correlation matrix 
presented in Table 2.1 shows the strengths of the relationships.
Figure 2.16: The Gini coefficient 
of human capital in the working-
age population in the European 
Union (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
BOTH THE NEW AND THE OLD 
MEMBER STATES ARE HIGHLY 
HETEROGENEOUS WITH RESPECT  
TO EDUCATION INEQUALITIES.
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Education indicators
Average 
number  
of school years
Standard 
deviation  
of school years
Share of people 
with low 
educational 
attainment
Share of people 
with higher 
education
Standard deviation  
of school years
–0.55
Share of people with low 
educational attainment
–0.71 0.45
Share of people with  
higher education
0.54 –0.03 –0.25
Gini coefficient  
of human capital
–0.65 0.93 0.69 –0.19
With the exception of the share of people with higher education, most indicators 
show moderately high correlations with each other. This means that a higher average 
number of school years tends to co-occur with a lower standard deviation in a given 
country; a higher proportion of people with low educational attainment is 
accompanied by a smaller average number of school years and a higher standard 
deviation; and a higher Gini coefficient of human capital goes hand in hand with 
a smaller average number of school years and a larger share of people with low 
educational attainment. The two indicators of inequality in a strict sense, the standard 
deviation of school years and the Gini coefficient, are very highly (almost perfectly) 
correlated (correlation coefficient: 0.93). 
2.4.2. Education inequalities and the labour market 
After the correlations between indicators of educational attainment, we now 
 investigate whether there are correlations between those indicators and labour mar-
ket aggregates (activity, employment and unemployment). It is repeatedly observed 
in the relevant literature that educational differences account for a large share of la-
bour market inequalities. Although researchers may hold qualitative rather than 
quantitative differences responsible (such as the quality of education and school en-
vironment, see e.g. Neal and Johnson, 1996 for details), the data that can be meas-
ured quantitatively and that are available in the EU-SILC database (educational attain-
ment, number of school years) also show weak or moderately strong correlations at 
an aggregate level.
Table 2.1: Correlation matrix for 
education indicators 
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
THE DIFFERENT INDICATORS  
OF INEQUALITY ARE HIGHLY 
CORRELATED.
THERE ARE WEAK MODERATE 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND 
THE AGGREGATES OF THE LABOUR 
MARKET.
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Indicator
Average 
number of 
school years
Standard 
deviation of 
school years
Share of people 
with low 
educational 
attainment
Share of people 
with higher 
education
Gini coefficient 
of human 
capital
Activity rate  
(EU-SILC) 0.29 –0.38 –0.08 0.32 –0.38
Activity rate 
(Eurostat) 0.34 –0.29 –0.14 0.49 –0.34
Employment  
rate (EU-SILC)
0.26 –0.32 –0.02 0.36 –0.31
Employment  
rate (Eurostat)
0.28 –0.20 0.00 0.48 –0.21
Unemployment 
rate (EU-SILC)
–0.01 0.00 –0.15 –0.28 –0.05
Unemployment 
rate (Eurostat)
–0.04 –0.05 –0.26 –0.26 –0.12
Table 2.2 reveals that a higher average number of schools years and a larger 
share of people with higher education are accompanied by higher activity and 
employment rates, while a larger share of people with low educational attainment is 
paired with a somewhat lower activity rate, which has an impact on unemployment. 
These results could mean that unemployed people with low educational attainment 
simply leave the labour market behind! A relatively high number of people with 
higher education is accompanied by a lower unemployment rate and – in a trend 
that mirrors this and is of the same order of magnitude – a higher unemployment 
rate is matched by a larger share of people with low educational attainment. The 
standard deviation and the Gini coefficient, as indicators of inequality, only show 
fairly strong correlations with activity and employment, but not with unemployment.
Those of the above relationships that show fairly strong correlations and also 
divide the countries into groups of some kind are displayed graphically in Figure 2.17.
Figure 2.17a reveals that the majority of the new member states have unemploy-
ment rates above the EU average and relatively low proportions of people with high-
er education and of people with low educational attainment. The countries of South-
ern Europe form a relatively homogeneous group, with average unemployment rates 
and high proportions both of people with higher education and of people with low 
educational attainment. In the Netherlands, the Scandinavian states and the Anglo-
Saxon countries, average-level unemployment rates are accompanied by high pro-
portions of people with higher education. The continental countries show far less 
uniformity.
Looking at the relationship between education inequalities and employment 
(Figure 2.17b), we find several of the new member states in a relatively homogeneous 
group: low education inequalities are accompanied by low employment rates. This is 
no cause for celebration. As was suggested before, there is a very high proportion of 
people with secondary education in these countries, and this, in combination with 
Table 2.2: Correlation matrix  
for labour market aggregates 
and indicators of educational 
attainment 
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Note: Correlation coefficients  
are shown for the labour market 
aggregates calculated from  
the EU-SILC data and those 
downloaded from the Eurostat 
database. 
EMPLOYMENT LEVEL IS CORRELATED 
WITH BOTH EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT AND THE INEQUALITY 
INDICATORS.
PATTERNS IN EDUCATION AND 
LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE
NEW MEMBER STATES: LOW LEVEL 
OF EMPLOYMENT – LOW 
EDUCATION INEQUALITIES.
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this latest finding, implies a relatively low level of employment40 not only among 
people with low educational attainment, but also among the population with 
secondary education in countries like Hungary.41 
Two more fairly homogeneous groups emerge in the figures illustrating the 
relationship between education inequalities and employment: the Mediterranean 
countries (with the exception of Portugal, where an employment rate above the EU 
average appears side by side with exceptionally high inequalities), where employment 
rates are lower than average but education inequalities are higher than average; and 
the successful group of the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon and continental countries 
(Austria, Finland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark), 
where we find high employment rates and moderate education inequalities relative 
to the average for the old member states. It must be noted, however, that this ‘low’ 
education inequality is, in fact, higher than that measured in the region of Central 
Europe (which is shown by the fact that the EU-15 average is higher than the average 
for the new member states).
40 One possible reason for the relatively low employment rate among people with 
secondary education is that workers with high human capital (educational attainment) 
gradually pushed people with secondary or lower education out of jobs. Kertesi and Köllő 
(2006), however, argue that this hypothesis is not supported by the data in Hungary. While 
it is true that jobs that used to require secondary training in the past are more and more 
likely to be taken by workers with higher qualifications, it is also the case that people with 
secondary education take the places of those with lower educational attainment, and thus 
their employment probabilities do not show the negative effects of exclusion. 
41 The position of Hungary is deceptive in the figures – the EU-SILC data estimate higher 
activity and employment rates than do the Eurostat figures; this is why the employment 
rate appears close to the EU average. 
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES: LOW 
LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT – HIGH 
EDUCATION INEQUALITIES; 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: HIGH LEVEL 
OF EMPLOYMENT – LOW 
EDUCATION INEQUALITIES.
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Figure 2.17: Employment, 
unemployment and education 
a) Educational attainment and 
unemployment
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b) Education inequality and 
employment
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Notes: Denmark does not appear 
in Figure 2.17b, as its employment 
rate data given in the EU-SILC 
database appear to be 
unreasonably high. 
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FIRST REFLECTIONS ON THE BASIS OF EU-SILC 2005
TÁRKI EUROPEAN SOCIAL REPORT
893. INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
3.1. Introduction
The first part of this chapter presents comparative estimates of income inequality 
based on data from the 2005 EU-SILC (‘Community Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions’). The aim of the chapter is to describe inter-country differences in income 
inequality across the European Union.42
The second part of the chapter (Section 3.4) investigates inter-country differences 
in the effect of age, education and employment on the distribution of household 
incomes by applying static and dynamic decomposition analysis. The main aim is to 
provide a cross-country comparison of the overall effect of age, education and 
employment on the distribution of household incomes. Section 3.4.1 describes the 
methodology of the analysis, and Section 3.4.2 presents the main results.
3.2. Description of inequality and poverty:  
data and methods
During the European Council meeting held in Laeken in December 2001, the 
member states adopted an indicator system for monitoring social inclusion processes, 
elaborated by Atkinson et al. (2002).
We use the methodological framework of the Laeken indicators for the 
description of inequality and poverty in the EU. When working on empirical studies 
about inequality and poverty, researchers have to make a number of decisions 
regarding the methodology of the analysis. The first decision concerns the definition 
of household income. Researchers have to decide whether it is the disposable net 
income or the gross income of households that is of interest, and then they have to 
decide whether to use monthly or yearly income. The second decision researchers 
must make has to do with calculating individual well-being based on data about 
income measured at the household level. This decision involves the choice of an 
equivalence scale. A third decision involves choosing indices for the measurement of 
inequality and poverty.
The income concept adopted in this analysis is – following the methodology of 
the Laeken indicators – annual net household disposable income, including any social 
transfers received and excluding direct taxes and social contributions. In inequality 
and poverty analysis, equivalence scales are used to calculate measures of an 
individual’s income situation from information about household income. 
Equivalence scales are used in inequality research to adjust household incomes 
for differences in household size, taking into account economies of scale in 
consumption and differences in household composition. Unfortunately, equivalence 
42 The analysis of income distribution is partly based on: Income Distribution in EU Member 
States: First Reflections on EU-SILC data, Chapter 1 of the Annual Monitoring Report 2007 
of the Network on Social Inclusion and Income Distribution, European Observatory on the 
Social Situation, December 2007. (See SSO 2007 in the bibliography.)
OUR AIM IS TO DESCRIBE 
DIFFERENCES IN INCOME 
INEQUALITY AND POVERTY ACROSS 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TO 
INVESTIGATE INTER-COUNTRY 
DIFFERENCES IN THE EFFECT OF AGE, 
EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT  
ON THE DISTRIBUTION  
OF HOUSEHOLD INCOMES.
OUR ANALYSIS FOLLOWS  
THE METHODOLOGICAL  
FRAMEWORK OF THE EU LAEKEN 
INDICATORS.
THE GINI INDEX IS USED  
TO MEASURE INCOME INEQUALITY, 
AND THE RELATIVE POVERTY RATE 
IS USED TO MEASURE THE EXTENT 
OF POVERTY.
90 3. INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
TÁRKI EUROPEAN SOCIAL REPORT
scales cannot easily be estimated by observing household consumption behaviour, 
and research studies on inequality or poverty invariably adopt some widely used 
equivalence scale, such as the scales advocated by the OECD. In this analysis, we use 
the so-called modified OECD, or OECD II, scale, which assigns a value of 1 to the first 
adult in the household, 0.5 to additional members above the age of 14, and 0.3 to 
children under 14. The incomes of all the household members and any other 
household income are summed, and total household disposable income is adjusted 
for differences in household size and composition by use of an equivalence scale. The 
equivalized income thus calculated is then assigned to each household member. The 
inequality indices reported here are estimated on the basis of these figures.
The Laeken indicators suggest the use of two inequality indicators. One is the 
S80/S20 index, which is the ratio of the share in total income of those in the top 
quintile to those in the bottom quintile of the distribution. The other inequality index 
is the Gini coefficient43 of income inequality. The Gini index can take values from 0 to 
1. The Gini index equals 0 when the distribution of incomes is equal in the society, 
and thus everyone has the same income. The value of the index rises as inequality 
gets higher, and equals the maximal value of 1 when all incomes are in the hands of 
one single person. In the case of poverty, the most important index is the relative 
poverty rate, which shows the proportion of individuals who have less than 60 per 
cent of the median income. The analysis is based on data from the 2005 EU-SILC.44 
The database covers all member states, except Malta. The data relate to the 
population living in private households in the country in question at the time of the 
43 Gini = (1/2n((n – 1))Σi=1,…,nΣj=1,…,n|yi – yj|, where yi are individual incomes, n is sample size.
44 The present analysis takes into account changes that Eurostat carried out on the EU-SILC 
2005 User Database version 1 released on 01/06/07. These changes affect the results on 
income inequality and poverty for Portugal and Germany.
Standard error of estimates. In order to draw policy conclusions from inequality 
and poverty data, it is essential to take account of the fact that the data are derived 
from surveys of a sample of households, and inevitably, therefore, they involve 
some margin of error. The incomes observed are not those of all households, but 
only of those belonging to the selected sample, which nevertheless is intended to 
be representative of the total. In order to make meaningful comparisons between 
countries or over time, it is necessary to allow for the margin of error that arises 
from the fact of sampling, which can be done by calculating the standard error of 
the estimates and taking confidence intervals around this. Such standard errors 
might be based on asymptotic theory or on simulation methods such as the boot-
strap. In this analysis, bootstrap standard errors of the Gini coefficient are exam-
ined. Confidence intervals are reported on the basis of the ‘percentile method’, 
which divides the estimated sample distribution into 100ths, with the lower bound 
being the 2.5th percentile and the higher bound the 97.5th percentile. (The confi-
dence interval estimates are based on 1,000 replications, and those reported are 
also corrected for estimation bias.)
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survey. Those living in collective households and institutions were, therefore, generally 
excluded. The reference period is the year 2004, except for Ireland, where it is the 12-
month period before the date of the interview.45
3.3. Description of inequality and poverty: 
results
3.3.1. Inequality in the EU
We first present countries’ rankings according to the Gini coefficient of inequality, 
and the results regarding changes in inequality in the early years of this decade. 
Gini rankings and inequality change
Figure 3.1 shows the rankings of countries according to the Gini index, as well as 
the 95 per cent confidence intervals around the estimates. Portugal is clearly the 
country with the highest inequality, with a Gini index of 38 per cent. The new member 
states of Lithuania, Latvia and Poland form a second group of countries, with Gini 
coefficients of around 35–36 per cent. A third cluster of relatively high-inequality 
countries comprises the Southern European countries of Spain, Greece and Italy, the 
Anglo-Saxon countries of the UK and Ireland and the new member state of Estonia. 
These countries have Gini indices of above 30 per cent but below 35 per cent. The 
four Southern European countries, the two Anglo-Saxon countries and the three 
Baltic states, together with Poland, have relatively high levels of inequality in the EU.
At the other end of the spectrum, countries with the lowest inequality by this 
measure include Sweden, Denmark and Slovenia, with Gini indices of below 25 per 
cent. Between the low- and the high-inequality countries is a large number of 
countries with Gini indices of above 25 per cent but below 30 per cent. Differences in 
the indices between countries in this group are often very small, and in many cases 
the confidence intervals of the estimates overlap. At the lower end of the group 
45 Non-positive income values – which result from the way that the income of the self-
employed is defined, i.e. essentially in terms of net trading profits – have been excluded 
from the analysis. In order to tackle the problem of ‘outliers’ (i.e. extreme levels of 
income reported), a bottom and top coding procedure (or ‘winsorizing’) was carried out. 
(Specifically, income values at the bottom of the ranking of less than the 0.1 percentile 
were replaced by the value of the 0.1 percentile, while at the top of the ranking, values 
greater than the 99.95 percentile were replaced by the value of this percentile.)
PORTUGAL IS THE MOST UNEQUAL 
COUNTRY IN THE EU.  
THE GROUP OF RELATIVELY HIGH 
INEQUALITY COUNTRIES CONSISTS 
OF THE BALTIC STATES, SOUTHERN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND 
ANGLO-SAXON COUNTRIES.
THE COUNTRIES WITH THE LOWEST 
INEQUALITY ARE SWEDEN, 
DENMARK AND SLOVENIA. 
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come the Nordic countries, such as Finland, together with the Netherlands. At the 
higher end of the group are Hungary, France and Cyprus.
Since the high-inequality countries in Europe are mainly the relatively low-
income transition countries (the Baltic states and Poland) or the Southern European 
countries (Portugal, Greece), while the low-inequality countries (for example the 
Nordic countries or Luxembourg) are countries with high incomes, it is not surprising 
that there is a negative relationship between the level of income and inequality 
(Figure 3.2). 
If we compare Gini coefficients in 2004 with their values at the start of the dec-
ade (Figure 3.3) we can see important (more than 10 per cent) increases in Italy, 
 Poland, Lithuania and Ireland. In other countries – such as the UK, Hungary, Latvia, 
Slovenia, Austria and Germany – inequality increased by a few percentage points. In 
Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg, Estonia, Spain and the Netherlands, we observe 
a decrease of a few percentage points in the Gini index. In the remaining countries 
there was no significant inequality change. The ranking of countries according to the 
Figure 3.1: Gini indices and 
bootstrapped 95 per cent 
confidence intervals
Note: Bootstrap confidence 
intervals were obtained by 1,000 
replications.
Source: own calculations  
on EU SILC 2005 (2008 March  
data release).
Figure 3.2: Inequality and 
national income in 2004
Source: GDP data from Eurostat 
NewCronos database. Inequality 
figures: own calculations on  
EU SILC 2005 (2008 March  
data release).
BETWEEN 2001 AND 2004,  
AN IMPORTANT (MORE THAN  
10 PER CENT) INCREASE IN INCOME 
INEQUALITY WAS DETECTED  
IN ITALY, POLAND, LITHUANIA  
AND IRELAND.
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Gini index in 2004 shows some minor differences compared to the ranking for 2001. 
Portugal was also the most unequal country in 2001, but Poland and Lithuania had 
index values below Spain, Greece and Estonia. The least unequal countries were the 
same in 2004 as in 2001, while among countries in between the highest and the low-
est groups there are a number of smaller differences in the country rankings. It should 
be emphasized, however, that since the sources of data in the earlier year were dif-
ferent (the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for EU-15 countries, 
 national sources for others), there is need for caution in interpreting these differences 
as indicating changes over the period.
We attempted to establish a relationship between changes in inequality and the 
growth experience of countries. The following table (Table 3.1) shows inequality 
changes (shown by the colour) in countries in different categories of GDP and 
employment growth. Our expectation was that ‘jobless growth’ was likely to lead to 
an increase in inequality, since in these cases the main driving force of economic 
growth is increased productivity, which is likely to raise inequalities in earnings. Our 
table shows that it is difficult to find consistent patterns in the short-run growth and 
inequality experience of European countries. Countries where more important 
inequality increases occurred in this period had diverse growth and employment 
experiences. For example, Poland and Lithuania had similar growth experiences but 
different evolutions in employment, and both countries finally ended up with 
increasing inequalities. Growth and employment experience is likewise diverse in the 
countries where inequality decreased. For example, inequality decreased in 
Luxembourg and Spain, which both had a GDP growth rate of 10–15 per cent, but 
employment was decreasing in the former and increasing in the latter. 
Figure 3.3: Gini indices in 2001 
and 2004
Note: 2001 Gini indices are from 
NewCronos. Countries are ranked 
according to 2004 Gini indices.
Source: own calculations  
on EU SILC 2005 (2008 March  
data release).
NO CONSISTENT PATTERN EMERGED 
IN THE GROWTH–INEQUALITY 
RELATIONSHIP. COUNTRIES WITH 
IMPORTANT INEQUALITY INCREASES 
AND COUNTRIES THAT SHOWED  
A DECREASE IN INEQUALITY HAD 
DIVERSE GROWTH AND 
EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCES.
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GDP growth 
2001–04
Change in total employment rate 2001–04
Decrease  
(<-1%)
Small decrease  
(-1–0%)
Small increase
(0–+2%)
Important increase
(>+2%)
0–5% Portugal Netherlands
Germany 
Denmark Italy
5–10% Sweden Ausztria Finland
Belgium 
France 
United Kingdom
10–15% Poland Czech Republic Luxembourg
Cyprus 
Szlovenia Spain
15% felett
Hungary 
Slovakia 
Ireland
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Estonia 
Greece
Income distribution and income structure
The distribution of incomes in individual European member states is shown in 
Figure 3.4. The income distribution of the countries is represented by the average 
income of each income decile. The income values are shown in Euros at purchasing 
power parity (PPP), i.e. with cross-country price differences taken into consideration, 
allowing direct comparisons to be made. The countries are arranged in increasing 
order of average income.
 As can be seen from Figure 3.4, there are significant differences in income levels 
between the EU member states, and a substantial proportion of the income inequality 
between the citizens of the European Union can be explained by differences in 
incomes from country to country. Of the EU countries, Lithuania has the lowest 
standard of living, with an average equivalent income of 5,304 Euros, while the 
highest average income level (29,153 Euros) is measured in Luxembourg. The former 
socialist countries cluster together at the bottom of the scale, with average incomes 
of under 10,000 Euros. As we can see, people in the top decile of the former socialist 
countries’ income distribution have an average standard of living that is typical of the 
middle class in the developed Western European countries (France, Germany). There 
are three Southern European countries, Portugal, Greece and Spain, where average 
incomes fall between 10,000 and 15,000 Euros. One of the former socialist countries, 
Slovenia, is grouped with them. The largest group of European countries is 
characterized by average incomes of between 15,000 and 20,000 Euros, and, apart 
from Luxembourg, average levels in excess of 20,000 Euros are only to be found in 
the United Kingdom. The figure also gives an indication of income inequalities in the 
various countries. In countries where relatively high inequalities are a feature, the 
average incomes of the ninth and tenth deciles are substantially higher than those of 
the bottom deciles. In Portugal, for instance, the average income of the top decile is 
more than twice that of the ninth decile and more than three times overall average 
income.
Table 3.1: Interrelationships 
between growth, employment 
and inequality change
Note: Countries marked orange 
are those where the Gini index 
rose by more than 10 per cent 
between 2001 and 2004. Countries 
marked green are those where  
the Gini index rose by 3–10 per 
cent between 2001 and 2004. 
Countries marked with italics are 
those where the Gini index 
decreased by more than 3 per cent 
between 2001 and 2004. In 
countries marked black there was 
no significant change in the Gini 
index (change was less than ± 3 
per cent). Data on GDP growth 
and employment are from the 
NewCronos database.
AMONG THE EU MEMBER STATES, 
LITHUANIA AND THE FORMER 
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE  
THE LOWEST LIVING STANDARDS, 
WHILE THE HIGHEST LEVEL  
OF INCOME WAS MEASURED  
IN LUXEMBOURG.
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The income of households comes from different sources. Household members 
may have labour income or capital income from the lease of capital assets; they may 
earn income as self-employed individuals; and they may receive transfers from the 
state, civil organizations or private individuals. Households also pay tax on their 
income and provide transfers. The income types recorded in the EU-SILC database 
are classified here as follows: wages, capital income, self-employment income, public 
transfers and direct tax payments. The income composition of the average household 
is shown in Table 3.2. The countries with the highest share of earnings in the total 
income of the household are the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. In these countries, gross wages amount to over 100 per cent of the 
disposable income of the households. At the other end of the scale come Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Ireland, where gross wages make up only about three-
quarters of household income. The highest share of capital income is to be found in 
Finland (11 per cent of household income), while capital income accounts for 1 per 
cent or less in Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia. The 20 per cent share of income from 
self-employment that is observed in the Czech Republic and Ireland constitutes the 
highest among the countries; meanwhile the lowest share of this category of income, 
only 2 per cent, is found in Estonia. The share of public transfers is one-third or more 
in Sweden, Poland, the Netherlands, Hungary, Austria, Germany, France and Denmark. 
Those countries with a relatively small share of public transfers in household income 
are Cyprus, the Baltic states and the Anglo-Saxon countries. The greatest reductions 
in gross household income due to direct tax payments are observed in the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Belgium, where taxes 
reduce household income by at least 40 per cent. In Cyprus, Slovakia, the Czech 
Figure 3.4: The income 
distributions of the countries  
of the European Union ( 
Euros, PPP)
Source: EU-SILC (2005), 
recalculations from the 2008 
March data release
Note: The bottom of the data bars 
represents the first decile, the top 
represents the tenth decile  
and the marks in between show  
the average incomes  
of the individual deciles.
THE NETHERLANDS, DENMARK, 
SWEDEN AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM ARE THE COUNTRIES 
WITH THE HIGHEST SHARE  
OF EARNINGS IN HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME. THE OTHER END OF THE 
SCALE IS REPRESENTED BY CYPRUS, 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY 
AND IRELAND.
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Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Ireland, by contrast, only about 20 per cent of income 
is deducted. 
Country Labour income, %
Capital income,  
%
Self-employment 
income, %
Public transfers,  
%
Taxes, 
%
AT 81 3 13 35 – 33
BE 93 5 13 30 –41
CY 75 4 15 17 –10
CZ 76 2 20 24 –21
DE 81 5 14 35 – 35
DK 106 5 10 33 – 54
EE 97 1 2 21 –22
FI 88 11 9 32 – 39
FR 79 4 10 33 –26
HU 77 2 15 35 –29
IE 76 3 19 24 –21
LT 88 2 9 22 –21
LU 85 5 5 30 –24
NL 115 4 12 35 –66
PL 80 2 14 36 – 31
SE 105 5 5 37 – 51
SI 95 1 6 30 – 32
SK 88 0 6 27 –20
UK 100 5 15 26 –46
3.3.2. Poverty in the EU
The poverty rate used in this part of the analysis is based on the same relative 
income concept as are the inequality indices. The poverty threshold was set at 60 per 
cent of median equivalized household income (according to the methodology applied 
by Eurostat). Figure 3.5 shows poverty rates across EU countries in 2004. 
Table 3.2: Elements of household 
income in the European Union, 
by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
Note: In case of Spain, Greece, 
Portugal, Italy and Latvia only data 
on net incomes were collected; 
for this reason these countries  
do not appear in this table.  
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The countries with the highest poverty rates in Europe are from Eastern and 
Southern Europe. One-fifth of the total population is estimated to be poor in two of 
the new member states (Poland, Lithuania) and in two Mediterranean countries 
(Spain and Portugal), as well as in Ireland. The incidence of poverty is also high in 
other Eastern and Southern European countries: Latvia, Greece, Italy (19 per cent) and 
Estonia (18 per cent). The Northern European countries are to be found at the oppo-
site end of the rankings, with poverty rates of around 10 per cent: Sweden (9 per 
cent), Denmark (11 per cent). The Czech Republic (10 per cent), as an Eastern European 
country, can also be listed among the low-poverty countries, as can the Netherlands 
(10 per cent). Other countries, mainly belonging to the group of continental European 
countries have poverty rates of 12–16 per cent.
The ranking of countries according to the poverty rate is broadly similar to the 
inequality ranking as measured by the Gini index, but there are some differences. 
Low-inequality countries are usually also low-poverty countries, and in high-inequality 
countries poverty also tends to be high, but the actual position of a country within 
the two rankings can vary. The biggest difference between the inequality and the 
poverty rankings can be found in Spain. Spain has the third highest poverty rate 
among the countries studied, but it has the tenth highest inequality. Slovakia, Slovenia 
and the UK also figure higher in the poverty rankings than in the inequality rankings, 
while Estonia, Latvia and France are higher in the inequality rankings.
Certain changes occurred in both the magnitude of poverty and the standing of 
countries between 2000 and 2004; however, these must be interpreted carefully 
because of the shift in data sources already mentioned. Poverty rates were on the 
increase during this period in most European countries. The Poles (from 16 per cent 
to 20 per cent), the Germans (from 10 per cent to 14 per cent), the Lithuanians (from 
17 per cent to 20 per cent) and the Latvians (from 16 per cent to 19 per cent) 
experienced the highest growth in the poverty rate. The most eye-catching exceptions 
are France (where the poverty rate decreased from 16 per cent to 13 per cent) and 
the UK (from 19 per cent to 16 per cent). Portugal had the highest poverty rate in 
2000 (21 per cent), and the incidence of poverty was also high in Ireland (20 per cent), 
Figure 3.5: Poverty rates across 
European countries in 2000 and 
2004
Source: ECHP (2000) and EU-SILC 
(2005) recalculations from the 
2008 March data release.
Note: countries are ranked 
according to year 2004.
THE COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST 
RELATIVE POVERTY RATES  
IN EUROPE ARE FROM EASTERN 
AND SOUTHERN EUROPE, WHILE 
THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES ARE TO BE FOUND AT 
THE OPPOSITE END OF THE 
RANKINGS.
THE RANKING OF COUNTRIES 
ACCORDING TO THE POVERTY RATE 
IS BROADLY SIMILAR TO THE 
INEQUALITY RANKING AS 
MEASURED BY THE GINI INDEX.
POVERTY RATES WERE ON THE 
INCREASE BETWEEN 2000 AND 
2004 IN MOST EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES.
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Greece (20 per cent) and the UK (19 per cent). The group of countries at the bottom 
of the rankings in 2000 was very similar to the 2004 group, although in 2000 
Germany was also part of that group. 
If we compare poverty rates estimated using the OECD II scale to poverty rates 
based on the OECD I scale, we might conclude that, in most countries, there are no 
significant differences. The most eye-catching exception is the UK, where the poverty 
rate calculated using the OECD I scale is much higher than if the OECD II scale is used 
(21 per cent vs. 16 per cent). In certain other countries the opposite is true – Ireland 
(18 per cent vs. 20 per cent) and Denmark (9 per cent vs. 11 per cent). 
3.3.3. The overall distribution of income in Europe
Income inequalities and poverty within the EU may also be approached by 
regarding the member states as a single populace and investigating the position of 
individuals in the overall income distribution of this cross-European populace. Figure 
3.6 shows the income position of the populations of individual countries, relative to 
the overall European median income. 
A fifth of Europe’s populace lives on an income of less than half the European 
median income. The proportion of those who have an income of between 50 and 
80 per cent of the median income is 18 per cent, while 23 per cent of people have an 
income at about the median level. The income of 28 per cent of the European 
populace is 20 to 100 per cent higher than the overall European median income, 
while 12 per cent have an income of at least twice the median.
With the exception of Slovenia and the Czech Republic, the majority of people in 
the former socialist countries are in the bottom fifth of the European income 
Figure 3.6: The distribution  
of the population among the 
different categories  
of the overall European income 
distribution by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
A FIFTH OF EUROPE’S POPULACE 
LIVES ON AN INCOME OF LESS 
THAN HALF THE OVERALL MEDIAN 
EUROPEAN INCOME.
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distribution. Around 70 per cent of the population of the Baltic states live on incomes 
of less than half the European median, and the same is true of as many as 56 per 
cent of households in Hungary. In Luxembourg and Denmark, by contrast, the 
proportion of those with incomes of below half the overall European median income 
is under 2 per cent. The majority of people in Luxembourg have incomes more than 
double the overall European median, and a third of the UK population also belongs in 
this category.
We have also examined the poverty rates of individual countries relative to 
a common poverty threshold, which was determined with reference to the relative 
concept of poverty: specifically, the poverty threshold was set at 60 per cent of the 
overall European median income. The effects of differences in price levels between 
the individual countries were controlled for by comparing the incomes achieved in 
the different countries using the purchasing power parity recommended by 
Eurostat. 
The resulting ranking of the countries is shown in Figure 3.7. The gap between 
absolute income levels is well illustrated by the finding that poverty rates relative to 
a common poverty threshold are highest by far in the former socialist, new member 
states of the EU. Lithuania is at the top of the range, with a poverty rate of 82 per 
cent; but a further five countries (Latvia, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Estonia) can 
‘boast’ similarly high rates. The 48 per cent rate measured in the Czech Republic is 
not too far from the poverty rate in Portugal, which is the country with the highest 
rate among the old EU-15 member states. The lowest rate is observed in Luxembourg, 
where less than 3 per cent of the population live on an income below the common 
European poverty threshold. Austria and Denmark have poverty rates of about 4 or 
5 per cent, and Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands around 6 per cent.
POVERTY RATES RELATIVE TO  
A COMMON POVERTY THRESHOLD 
ARE HIGHEST BY FAR  
IN THE FORMER SOCIALIST,  
NEW MEMBER STATES OF THE EU.
Figure 3.7: Poverty rates  
relative to a common European 
relative poverty threshold  
in the European Union,  
by country (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Note: The poverty threshold is 
defined as 60 per cent  
of the median of the overall 
European income distribution.
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3.4. The role of age, education and 
employment in shaping inequalities: 
decomposition analysis
In this section, we investigate the main driving forces of inequality. As labour 
income is the most important element of household resources, we study the effect 
of being in the labour force, as well as the main determinants of earnings: age and 
education. Human capital theory states that better educated workers enjoy higher 
wages, which reflects their higher productivity. Workers also accumulate knowledge 
while working, thus experience is also rewarded with higher wages on the labour 
market. 
It is often argued that increasing inequality of earnings in developed countries is 
a result of technological change, which uniformly increases the productivity of better-
educated workers, relative to the less well educated. If, in the short run, the supply of 
educated people fails to match the increase in demand, the premium for education 
will increase. Sudden technological changes might also result in a change in the 
steepness of the age–earnings profile, in that the education of younger people may 
be better adapted to the requirements of new technology than the education and 
skills of older workers. In such cases, there will be greater demand for the well-
educated young and less demand for older people, which will result in a less steep 
age–earnings profile. We study the effect of age, education and employment by 
applying static and dynamic decomposition of inequality indices. While this 
methodology is not suited to uncovering true, causal relationships, it is a first step 
and provides intuition, which remains to be confirmed by more elaborate analysis.
3.4.1. Methodology of decomposition analysis
When decomposing income inequality, the population is divided into mutually exclu-
sive groups according to some characteristic (age, education, household composi-
tion) and we are interested in the share of inequality, which can be attributed to in-
come differences between groups. Some inequality indices are additively 
decomposable, which means that they can be written as the sum of two compo-
nents: a weighted sum of within-group inequalities and between-group inequality. 
A convenient family of additively decomposable inequality indices is the generalized 
entropy family, which comprises, among others, the mean log deviation (MLD) index. 
Based on Shorrocks (1980), the MLD index is selected here to perform the calcula-
tions. In this case, the effect of the grouping variable on inequalities can be expressed 
as the ratio of the between-group inequality to total inequality.
In addition to this static decomposition, a decomposition of intertemporal change 
in inequality was also carried out following the methodology used in Mookherjee 
and Shorrocks (1982). This method decomposes the change in inequality in three 
WE INVESTIGATED THE EFFECTS  
OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
SUCH AS AGE, EDUCATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT ON INEQUALITY.
DIFFERENCES IN EARNINGS 
ACCORDING TO EDUCATION LEVEL 
HAVE INCREASED IN DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES OVER THE PAST 
DECADES.
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components. The first is a ‘pure’ effect of inequality increase – that is, the effect 
attributable to increase in within-group inequalities. The second component is the 
effect of structural change due to change in relative population shares of the various 
subgroups, while the third component measures the effect of change in relative 
mean incomes of the various subgroups. For a clearer understanding of 
decompositions by various dimensions, it is useful to show changes in relative terms: 
the change of inequality between the two periods as a percentage of the value 
measured in period.
The data used for the dynamic decomposition analysis come from the ECHP, year 
2000, and from EU-SILC (2004). It is important to bear in mind that the two surveys 
differ to some extent in their methodologies,46 and thus results regarding changes 
should be interpreted with caution. The analysis is carried out on the distribution of 
equivalized47 household income. Variables used for grouping in the decomposition 
analysis are based on the attributes of the (assumed) head of the household in which 
respondents live. Since no household head is defined in EU-SILC, this is taken to be 
the oldest man of active age (between 18 and 64 years). If there is no active-age 
man, then the oldest active-age woman is taken as the household head instead. If 
there are no active-age members in the household, the oldest man of 65 or older is 
taken as the household head (or the oldest woman if there is no man). The same 
definition of household head has been applied to the ECHP database. For simplicity 
of analysis, the attributes of the household head are assumed to apply to all house-
hold members. The necessary provisos implied by this have been emphasized above.
3.4.2. Results of decomposition analysis
First we present the results of the static decomposition analysis; the results of 
decomposition of changes in inequality follow in the second part of the section. 
The role of age, education and employment in shaping 
inequalities
We first describe the results of static decomposition analysis for each explanatory 
factor, and then we summarize the results by reviewing the importance of the 
explanatory factors by country group. 
The role of the age of the household head. In general, age is a less important 
factor in explaining inequalities than is the education or employment of the household 
46 On the difference between the methodologies of the surveys see Eurostat (2005).
47 The OECD II equivalence scale is used. The first household member older than 14 years  
of age equals one consumption unit. Additional household members older than 14 years 
of age count as 0.5 consumption units, while household members younger than 14 equal 
0.3 consumption units.
AGE DIFFERENCES ARE MOST 
IMPORTANT IN THE NORDIC 
COUNTRIES AND CYPRUS.
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head. With the exception of five countries, age differences account for less than 5 per 
cent of total inequality, as measured using the MLD index. Age differences are most 
important in the Nordic countries and Cyprus. In Denmark, the component of 
inequality between groups defined by age is 13 per cent of the total, in Sweden it is 
10 per cent, and Finland likewise show percentages that are higher than most other 
countries. In Cyprus, age accounts for 8 per cent of total inequality. On the other 
hand, in countries such as Poland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Austria, Hungary and 
Greece, age of the household head only explains 0–2 per cent of total inequality.
Age differences might arise if the age–earnings profile is steep and so income 
differences between older and young employed people are considerable. Another 
possible source of income difference by age is related to the pension system. Low 
coverage, a low replacement rate or inadequate indexation of pensions might lead to 
the incomes of retired people lagging behind the incomes of active-age people. In 
countries with a high between-group effect of age, income differences both between 
active-age groups and between active-age people and retired people are important. 
In Denmark, the incomes of those aged 50–64 years are 41 per cent higher than of 
those aged 18–35, and 56 per cent higher than the income of the retired. Sweden 
also shows a similar pattern. In Cyprus, it is low incomes among the elderly that drive 
the results. The average income of those aged above 65 years is only 66 per cent of 
the national average income, which means that the relative income situation of the 
elderly in Cyprus is the worst among the countries surveyed in EU-SILC. The relative 
incomes of the elderly are also low in the Baltic states and in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, especially Ireland. In contrast, the elderly enjoy a relatively favourable 
income position in Austria, France and the Netherlands, where their average income 
is close to the national average or even slightly above it, as in Poland.
The role of education of the household head. In general, education is more 
important in explaining income differences than is age, but the role of education 
differs greatly among the European countries. In some of the countries, education 
accounts for less than 10 per cent of income inequality, as measured by the MLD 
index. This is the case for Nordic countries such as Denmark and Sweden, and for 
continental countries such as Austria, Germany and France. In a second group of 
countries, education accounts for 10–15 per cent of income inequality. In this group 
we find the continental countries of the Netherlands and Belgium, the Mediterranean 
countries of Italy and Spain, and the transition countries of the Czech Republic, Latvia 
and Estonia, together with Finland and the UK. The group of countries where the 
between-group effect of education is higher than 15 per cent comprises the 
Mediterranean countries of Portugal, Cyprus and Greece, and the transition countries 
of Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia and Poland, plus Luxembourg and Ireland. 
Income differences between educational groups can be important at both ends 
of the educational distribution. The relative incomes of the poorly educated are 
lowest in the UK, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic and Poland. In these 
countries, the average income of those with primary education is around 70 per cent 
of the national average. The average income of those with tertiary education is 
highest in Portugal, where the income of those with a university degree exceeds the 
national average income by 226 per cent. The relative income of those with tertiary 
education is also high in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia and Italy, where 
average income exceeds the national average by 60 per cent.
IN COUNTRIES WITH A HIGH 
BETWEEN-GROUP EFFECT OF AGE, 
INCOME DIFFERENCES BOTH 
BETWEEN ACTIVE-AGE GROUPS 
AND BETWEEN ACTIVE-AGE PEOPLE 
AND RETIRED PEOPLE ARE 
IMPORTANT.
INCOME DIFFERENCES  
BY EDUCATION LEVEL ARE  
MOST IMPORTANT IN SOME  
OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AND 
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.
THE RELATIVE INCOMES  
OF THE POORLY EDUCATED ARE 
LOWEST IN THE UK, THE BALTIC 
STATES, THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND 
POLAND.
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The role of employment status of the household head. There is also considerable 
variability in the effect of the employment status of the household head. In some 
countries, income differences according to employment status account for less than 
5 per cent of income inequality. These include continental countries such as France, 
Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, as well as Southern European countries 
such as Italy, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus. In the second group (5–10 per cent income 
inequality) we find Central European transition countries like Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Hungary,  plus Sweden, Germany and Spain. Among countries where the role of 
employment is above 10 per cent, we find the Baltic countries, the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, the Nordic countries of Finland and Denmark, as well as Belgium and the 
Czech Republic.
The greatest difference between the average income of the employed and the 
active-age inactive is to be found in the Anglo-Saxon and Baltic countries. In those 
countries, the average income of the employed exceeds the national average income 
by 16 per cent, while the income of the inactive is around 60 per cent of the overall 
mean income. The income of the employed is also relatively high in the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Denmark, Finland and Poland. We find low income among the 
inactive in the Czech Republic, Belgium and Denmark.
Summary of static decomposition analysis. In order to summarize the static 
decomposition analysis, we created six country groups and calculated the averages 
of between-group effects for each country group. The groups considered were: the 
Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland), the Mediterranean countries (Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus), the continental countries (France, Germany, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria), the Anglo-Saxon countries (United Kingdom 
and Ireland), the Central European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Hungary) and the Baltic states (Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia). The results are 
displayed in Figure 3.8.
The Anglo-Saxon and the Baltic countries show similar structures of inequality, 
with a high effect of education and employment and low effect of age. The Nordic 
countries form another distinctive group, where age, education and employment all 
have a similar effect on income inequality – around 10 per cent. Continental, Central 
European and Mediterranean countries are similar to each other, in that education is 
the most important factor in explaining inequalities. In the case of Central European 
and Mediterranean countries, the effect of education is stronger than in the case of 
continental countries. Employment is also important in the case of continental and 
Central European countries, but among Mediterranean countries the effect of 
employment status is similar to that of age – below 5 per cent.
COUNTRIES WHERE INCOME 
DIFFERENCES ACCORDING TO 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS ACCOUNT 
FOR MORE THAN 10 PER CENT OF 
INEQUALITY ARE THE BALTIC 
COUNTRIES, THE ANGLO-SAXON 
COUNTRIES, FINLAND, DENMARK, 
AS WELL AS BELGIUM AND THE 
CZECH REPUBLIC.
THE GREATEST DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN THE AVERAGE INCOME 
OF THE EMPLOYED AND THE 
ACTIVE-AGE INACTIVE IS TO BE 
FOUND IN THE ANGLO-SAXON 
AND BALTIC COUNTRIES.
THE ANGLO-SAXON AND  
THE BALTIC COUNTRIES SHOW 
SIMILAR STRUCTURE OF 
INEQUALITY, WITH A HIGH EFFECT 
OF EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
AND LOW EFFECT OF AGE. 
CONTINENTAL, CENTRAL 
EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES ARE SIMILAR TO EACH 
OTHER, IN THAT EDUCATION IS  
THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR  
IN EXPLAINING INEQUALITIES.
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The role of age, education and employment in inequality 
change
As described before, we used data from the 2000 ECHP to decompose recent 
changes in inequality. From the 2000 ECHP and the 2004 EU-SILC, we have compara-
ble data for 12 countries. The increase in inequality in the first half of this decade was 
important in Ireland and Italy. In these countries, the rise in the MLD index exceeded 
15 per cent. There was a moderate increase in Austria and Denmark, where the MLD 
index increased by 11 per cent. In contrast, there has been a moderate decrease in 
inequality in Spain, Belgium and Sweden. In these countries, the value of the MLD 
index was 11–14 per cent lower in 2004 than in 2000. In the rest of the countries for 
which we have comparative data (Luxembourg, Greece, Finland and France) there 
was no significant change in inequality. 
The results of the dynamic decomposition analysis are summarized in Table 3.3. 
As we have seen, the biggest increases in inequality were observed in Italy and 
Ireland. In Italy, important between-group effects were found in the case of education 
and age. Increasing income differences between groups defined by level of education 
account for 28 per cent of the increase in inequality, while the differences between 
groups defined by age are responsible for 18 per cent of the increase. In the case of 
employment, the between-group effect is not important, but changing population 
structure did contribute to the increase in inequality. The fraction of those living in 
households where the head is inactive increased from 11 per cent to 15 per cent, 
while the proportion of those with an employed household head decreased. This 
change in population structure accounts for 26 per cent of the increase in inequality. 
In Ireland, there is an important between-group effect in the case of employment: 
increasing income differences by employment status account for 49 per cent of the 
change in inequality. In 2000, the average income of the employed exceeded that of 
the inactive by 63 per cent, and this percentage rose to 91 per cent in 2004. Changing 
Figure 3.8: Percentage  
of inequalities explained by 
various dimensions in different 
groups in 2004
Note: Percentages are simple 
country averages.
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educational distribution was also an important driving force behind the increase in 
inequality in Ireland, where it accounts for 43 per cent of the increase in inequality. 
Countries with a moderate increase in inequality included Austria and Denmark. 
In Austria, we find important between-group effects for age and education, but in 
both cases these are inequality-reducing effects, as income differences according to 
age and education decreased during this period. In the case of age, the increase in 
inequality was mainly caused by increasing income dispersion within groups, while, in 
the case of education, changing population structure had an important inequality-
increasing effect as well. By contrast, in the case of Denmark, income differences by 
age or education widened, and this had an important inequality-increasing effect, 
accounting for 25 per cent and 71 per cent, respectively, of the increase in inequality.
Belgium, Spain and Sweden experienced falling inequality during this period. In 
the case of Belgium and Sweden, falling within-group inequality was the main factor, 
and changing income differences between groups did not contribute significantly. In 
the case of Spain, income differences by education decreased between 2000 and 
2004, and this is responsible for 44 per cent of the decrease in inequality. 
Change of inequality
Explanatory factors
Age Education Employment
Important increase (+15%)  
IE, IT IT (+) IT (+ +) IE (+ +)
Moderate increase (+5–15%)
AT, DK AT (–), DK (++) AT (– –), DK(+)
No change (-5%–+5%)
LU, GR, FR, FI, PT
Moderate decrease (-5–15%)
ES, BE, SE ES (+ +)
Important decrease (-15%)
Table 3.3: The role of between-
group components in inequality 
change
Note: meaning of signs in 
parentheses are the following: 
++/--: strong inequality-increasing/
decreasing effect of changing 
relative mean incomes 
(contribution to inequality change 
is more than 25 per cent), +/- 
moderate inequality-increasing/
decreasing effect of changing 
relative mean incomes 
(contribution to inequality change 
is 10–25 per cent).
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4.1. Introduction
This chapter investigates the housing conditions of European households and the 
availability of household durable goods. Special emphasis is placed on comparing 
Hungary to the old and the new member states of the European Union.
In our analysis of housing conditions, in Section 4.2 we discuss the financial 
burdens of sustaining a home, the quality of housing and whether crowding is 
experienced by families and households. Durable goods are the subject of Section 
4.3, where, in addition to presenting data on the availability of household appliances 
in the home (colour television, telephone, washing machine, computer), we also look 
at ownership of cars – one of the durable goods of the highest value.
4.2. Housing
4.2.1. Housing conditions – housing integration
Analysis of housing conditions is clearly important for social policy. The residential 
segregation of disadvantaged populations and the poor, and the emergence of city 
slums are subjects that are widely discussed in social research. Till (2002) investigates 
housing integration with reference to risk of homelessness. The author finds that 
different groups can be distinguished according to problems related to the 
affordability, quality and size of housing, and that the welfare systems of the various 
European countries included in the study handle the problem of those populations at 
risk of homelessness with varying degrees of efficiency. Our study also takes these 
three factors as the focus of inquiry. Our discussion centres on the position of 
Hungary, relative to the old and the new member states of the EU, with respect to 
housing conditions and integration.
Although housing integration is an uncommon notion in housing research, it has 
appeared in a number of studies since the 1960s. The concept usually appears in the 
context of the residential segregation of ethnic minorities, and is used as the opposite 
of the concept of segregation. It is used in this sense, for instance, by Phillips (2006) in 
her qualitative analysis of the housing conditions of refugees housed by local 
governments in the UK. 
The most comprehensive discussion of the concept is found in the publications of 
the EUROHOME-IMPACT project, where it is used with a slightly more general 
meaning. The research was conducted under the aegis of the EU Fifth Framework 
Programme from 2000 to 2002. Till’s paper (mentioned above) was written as part 
of the project. The researchers argue that three conditions all need to be met for 
housing integration to materialize: (1) if no problems are faced with regard to 
affordability, (2) if the housing standard is high and (3) if crowding is not experienced 
(Giorgi, 2003).
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4.2.2. Dwelling type and tenure status 
Looking at the data on dwelling type (Figure 4.1), we find a higher proportion (56 
per cent) of detached houses in Hungary, compared to the average for the old EU-15 
member states (41 per cent) or the new member states (29 per cent). Semi-detached 
and terraced houses are more frequent in the old member states (27 per cent), as are 
small apartment buildings (21 per cent). 
This is probably related to the characteristic (state-socialist) policies of industrial 
and urban development in the new member states, which are reflected in the fact 
that, in those countries, over two-fifths (43 per cent) of dwellings are to be found in 
apartment buildings containing 10 apartments or more. We should note here that 
Hungarian housing standards were found to be among the best in the former 
socialist countries at the end of the eighties and beginning of the nineties (Hegedűs 
et al., 1994). 
Hungary stands out for its exceptionally high share (86 per cent) of owner 
occupiers (Figure 4.2). The value of this indicator rose to a high level in the nineties, 
after the regime change, when the housing stock in council or local government 
ownership was privatized. The proportion of council housing did not, however, fall to 
the level (3 per cent) observed in Hungary in every former socialist country. In the 
Czech Republic, for instance, every fifth household (20 per cent) lives in rented social 
housing, and a similar percentage is to be found in Finland. Subsidized social housing 
makes up a similar share of the housing stock in France (16 per cent) and the United 
Kingdom (14 per cent). An outstandingly high share of households rent their dwellings 
at market price in the Netherlands (45 per cent), Germany (44 per cent), Denmark (42 
per cent) and Sweden (40 per cent). Other types of tenure (employer-provided 
housing, informal rent-free arrangements) are exceptionally frequent in Poland. 
Figure 4.1: Distribution  
of households according to 
dwelling type in the old  
and new member states  
of the European Union and  
in Hungary (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
THE SHARE OF SOCIAL HOUSING 
HAS NOT DROPPED TO THE LEVEL 
OBSERVED IN HUNGARY (3 PER 
CENT) IN EVERY FORMER SOCIALIST 
COUNTRY. 
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4.2.3. Affordability of housing – sustainability of dwellings
The affordability of housing and the cost of home upkeep can be captured by 
several indicators. Our analysis relies on two subjective indicators: the share of 
households able to keep their homes sufficiently warm and the share of households 
where housing costs constitute a heavy financial burden. 
Looking at the values of the former indicator in the EU-24 (Figure 4.3), we find 
that households are most likely to report being unable to keep their homes sufficiently 
warm in Portugal, Lithuania, Poland and Cyprus. Hungary is in the middle of the 
range: heating is not a problem in four out of five households, but it is a problem in 
the remaining one household. Similar figures apply to Greece, Belgium and Slovakia, 
while in the rest of the countries at most one household in ten experiences difficulties 
of this kind. 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of 
households according to tenure 
status in the old and new 
member states of the European 
Union and in Hungary (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
THE COST OF KEEPING UP THEIR 
HOME IS A HEAVY BURDEN FOR 
20–25 PER CENT OF HOUSEHOLDS 
IN HUNGARY. HOUSEHOLDS  
IN PORTUGAL, LITHUANIA, 
POLAND AND CYPRUS ARE  
THE MOST LIKELY TO REPORT THAT 
THEY ARE UNABLE TO KEEP THEIR 
HOMES SUFFICIENTLY WARM.
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The countries with the highest share of households that struggle to meet housing 
costs are Cyprus (61 per cent), Italy (51 per cent), and Poland and Estonia (45 per cent 
each). Hungary is once again in the middle of the range: housing costs are a heavy 
burden for about a quarter (24 per cent) of Hungarian households, which places the 
country in the same league as Greece, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Portugal (Figure 4.4).
4.2.4. The size of dwellings
In terms of the average number of rooms in a dwelling, Hungary (2.54 rooms) 
falls behind both the member states that joined the EU in 2004 (2.76 rooms on aver-
age) and the older member states (3.84 rooms on average).
The EU-SILC database – unfortunately – does not record data on the size of the 
living area of dwellings, and thus we only have the number of rooms to use as an 
indicator of dwelling size. We know from other data sources, however, that dwellings 
in Hungary have an average surface area of 78 m2. Average living spaces below that 
are only recorded in the following countries: Slovakia (56 m2), Latvia (57 m2), Lithuania 
Figure 4.3: Share of households 
able to keep their homes 
sufficiently warm in the 
European Union, by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
THE COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST 
SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS THAT FIND 
HOUSING COSTS TO BE A SEVERE 
PROBLEM ARE CYPRUS (61 PER 
CENT), ITALY (51 PER CENT), POLAND 
AND ESTONIA (45 PER CENT).
Figure 4.4: Share of households 
struggling to meet housing costs 
in the European Union,  
by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
THE WORST LEVEL OF CROWDING 
IS OBSERVED IN LATVIA; BELGIUM 
HAS THE LEAST OVERCROWDING.
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(60 m2), Poland (69 m2) and Finland (76 m2). The largest average living spaces in 
Europe are observed in Luxembourg (126 m2), Slovenia (114 m2) and Denmark (111 m2). 
For the sake of reference, the value of this indicator was 165 m2 for the United States 
in 2003 (UNECE, 2006).
In terms of the number of rooms per person, however, Hungary keeps up with 
the countries in its group. The average number of rooms per person in Hungary is 
1.3, as opposed to an average of 1.9 for the 24 countries under consideration. The 
indicator has a value of 2.02 for the old member states and 1.28 (equivalent to the 
Hungarian value) for the group of new member states (Figure 4.5). Crowding 
presents the greatest problem in Latvia (1.15 rooms per person) and the least problem 
in Belgium (2.64 rooms per person). The Hungarian figure therefore does not deviate 
significantly from the figures characterizing the new member states.
4.2.5. Standard of housing
With respect to the quality of residential buildings (Figure 4.6), Hungary fares 
badly compared to the majority of countries. Major structural defects in the condition 
of their building are reported by 34 per cent of households: these faults include 
a leaking roof, rotten window frames and damp walls. Similar or worse conditions 
are only recorded for Poland (42 per cent), Latvia (38 per cent) and Cyprus (36 per 
cent). Respondents in Finland, Sweden, Slovakia and Denmark report residential 
buildings to be in the best state of repair. 
Figure 4.5: Average number  
of rooms per person in the  
old and new member states  
of the European Union and  
in Hungary
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
DWELLING STANDARDS  
IN HUNGARY LAG BEHIND  
THE EUROPEAN AVERAGE IN 
SEVERAL RESPECTS. A LARGE 
PROPORTION OF BUILDINGS HAVE 
STRUCTURAL DEFECTS, AND 
DWELLINGS THAT LACK BASIC 
SANITARY AMENITIES ARE 
FREQUENT. THE HIGHEST INCIDENCE 
OF DILAPIDATED BUILDINGS WAS 
REPORTED IN POLAND, LATVIA, 
CYPRUS AND HUNGARY.
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It may come as a surprise that a low proportion (7 per cent) of households in 
Slovakia report major defects in residential buildings. As there is substantial variation 
between the countries, the figure characterizing Hungary is not significantly different 
from the average for the nine new member states (Figure 4.7). 
In terms of basic sanitary facilities, the Baltic states are in the worst position, with 
the highest proportion – over 20 per cent – of households lacking private access to 
a bath or shower (Figure 4.8) or a private flush toilet (Figure 4.9). Hungary and 
Poland, though in a far better position than the Baltic states, still lag behind the rest 
of Europe in this respect. In these two countries, about 10 per cent of households live 
in dwellings with no baths or flush toilets, while the corresponding figure is typically 
below 5 per cent in the rest of the countries of the EU.
Figure 4.6: Percentage  
of households reporting  
‘leaking roof, damp walls/floors/
foundation, or rot in window 
frames or floor’ in the European 
Union, by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
Figure 4.7: Percentage  
of households reporting  
‘leaking roof, damp walls/floors/
foundation, or rot in window 
frames or floor’ in the old  
and new member states  
of the European Union and  
in Hungary (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
WHEN IT COMES TO BASIC 
SANITARY FACILITIES, THE BALTIC 
STATES ARE IN THE WORST 
POSITION.
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In addition to the above indicators, one further measure of housing standards (of 
the many available) is discussed here: the amount of light entering the home. This 
indicator also relies on the personal assessment of household survey respondents 
(Figure 4.10). This seemingly banal, insignificant factor has an effect on the market 
value of the property, as well as on the mental well-being of the residents. 
Psychological experiments demonstrate that having insufficient light is related to the 
development of symptoms of depression, and artificial lighting can only be a limited 
substitute for the biological effects of natural light, as is shown by research into well-
being and the seasons of the year.48 
48 As with everything, there is a three-letter English acronym for this condition, which is not 
only short but – in this case – also witty. Seasonal Affective Disorder is abbreviated to 
SAD. See Rosenthal (1993).
Figure 4.8: Share of households 
living in dwellings with no  
bath/shower in the European 
Union, by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
Note: No data are available for the 
Netherlands.
Figure 4.9: Share of households 
living in dwellings with no 
private flush toilet  
in the European Union,  
by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
Note: No data are available for the 
Netherlands.
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A lack of light in the dwelling is most frequently reported in Portugal (18 per cent) 
and the Baltic states (11–15 per cent). The situation is not much better in the United 
Kingdom, Poland, Spain, Belgium or Hungary, but the indicator values characterizing 
these countries do not differ significantly from the European average (8 per cent). 
4.2.6. Degree of housing integration
If housing integration is to be captured by a single indicator, the factors considered 
above need to be mapped onto a single value, while preserving their information 
content relevant to the latent dimension under consideration – housing integration. 
This goal was achieved by factor analysis (principal components analysis). The 
following variables were included in the analysis:
Affordability: 
1. housing costs are very difficult to secure (dichotomous, 1 if yes; 0 if no);
2. there are no adequate heating facilities (dichotomous, 1 if yes; 0 if no).
Standard of dwelling:
1. there is no flush toilet (dichotomous, 1 if yes; 0 if no);
2. there is no bathroom (dichotomous, 1 if yes; 0 if no);
3. building has major faults (dichotomous, 1 if yes; 0 if no);
4. dwelling is dark (dichotomous, 1 if yes; 0 if no).
Space, crowding:
1. there are over two people to each room (dichotomous, 1 if yes; 0 if no).
The outcome of the principal components analysis of the seven variables is shown 
in Table 4.1. 
•
•
•
Figure 4.10: Proportion  
of respondents who find  
the dwelling ‘too dark, with not 
enough light’ in the European 
Union, by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
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Explanatory variable
Principal 
component 1
Principal 
component 2
No bathroom 0.82 –0.43
No flush toilet 0.81 –0.45
Crowded 0.51 0.41
Building defects 0.38 0.31
Dark dwelling 0.33 *
Costs are difficult to pay 0.24 0.63
No heating 0.43 0.49
Eigenvalue 2.09 1.31
Explained variance 29.82 18.67
The first principal component corresponds to housing integration, the latent 
dimension to be measured, since each variable has a positive factor weight here. The 
factor loadings quantify the phenomenon under investigation in a standardized 
format (expected value of 0, standard deviation of 1). Finally, the inverse values of the 
factor loadings were taken to let higher values indicate a more integrated position 
and lower values signal a lack of integration. Since our factor loadings are 
standardized, a value close to 0 signals average European housing conditions.
As Figure 4.11 shows, Lithuania and Latvia are in the worst position with respect 
to housing integration, followed by Estonia and Poland. Cyprus, Portugal and Hungary 
fare slightly worse than the European average. Among the new member states, the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia are in line with the European average. The 
states with the most highly integrated housing conditions are the Scandinavian 
countries, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Some other old member states also fare 
better than average: the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland, Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom. The values of the factor loadings capturing housing 
integration show the greatest dispersion for disadvantaged countries: the Baltic 
states, Poland and Hungary (Tárki–UniCredit, 2008, Table F4.4), which indicates that 
these countries are characterized by heterogeneity and stratification with respect to 
housing standards and problems (crowding, upkeep). 
Table 4.1: Principal components 
analysis of factors measuring 
housing integration 
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
*Note: Factor weight below 0.1. 
The factor analysis was run on 
unweighted data.
Figure 4.11: Average housing 
integration factor scores  
in the European Union,  
by country
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Note: Weighted data.
WITH RESPECT TO HOUSING 
INTEGRATION, LITHUANIA AND 
LATVIA FARE WORST, WHILE  
THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES 
COME OUT BEST.
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4.2.7. Substandard dwellings, problems of quality and 
income conditions
Investigating one of the factors of housing integration in isolation – namely, the 
distribution of substandard dwellings or dwellings in need of renovation across the 
EU countries – a highly similar picture emerges (Figure 4.12). Substandard dwellings 
are defined as dwellings with no bathrooms or flush toilets, or that are in buildings 
with major structural defects. Almost 1 per cent of households (1.82 million) in the 24 
European countries under study live in dwellings of this kind. Some 81 per cent of 
those housed in substandard dwellings (1.48 million households) live in the nine new 
member states. Among the old member states, substandard dwellings are effectively 
nonexistent in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – none 
were recorded in the survey sample.
The residents of substandard dwellings live on incomes below the average in 
each of the countries, but there is substantial variation in the income gaps that exist 
between them and households living in standard accommodation (Table 4.2). The 
gap is 20 per cent in Italy at one end of the scale, and 54 per cent in the Czech 
Republic at the other end. 
Housing that is dilapidated or in need of renovation is defined as dwellings where 
at least one of the quality problems discussed above are observed, i.e. lack of 
bathroom or toilet, or structural defects in the building. Almost one-fifth (19.1 per 
cent) of the European households that were studied live in housing of this kind. This 
proportion approaches 50 per cent in some of the countries, while it remains below 
10 per cent in others, i.e. there are substantial differences between the countries 
(Figure 4.12). The order of the countries does not change, however, compared to the 
ranking observed for housing integration and the incidence of substandard dwellings. 
In Hungary, over one-third of dwellings are dilapidated and in need of renovation.
OVER A THIRD OF DWELLINGS  
IN HUNGARY ARE IN NEED  
OF RENOVATION. THE SHARE  
OF HOUSEHOLDS LIVING  
IN SUBSTANDARD OR RUN-DOWN 
HOUSING IS HIGHEST  
IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES  
OF THE EU.
Figure 4.12: Share of households 
living in substandard or 
dilapidated housing in the 
European Union, by country (%)
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
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Country
Average annual 
equivalent 
disposable 
income, Euros
Income of 
households 
living in standard 
housing, Euros
Income of 
households living 
in substandard 
housing, Euros
Income of households 
living in substandard 
housing, % 
(households in standard 
housing = 100)
AT 20 212 20 232 10 147 50.2
BE 18 634 18 671 10 500 56.2
CY 14 653 14 747 7 910 53.6
CZ 4 747 4 772 2 188 45.8
DE 16 684 16 687 9 435 56.5
DK 22 362 22 362 n. a. n. a.
EE 3 444 3 549 2 029 57.2
ES 12 238 12 246 6 444 52.6
FI 18 704 18 714 11 482 61.4
FR 18 237 18 261 9 983 54.7
GR 10 990 11 047 5 568 50.4
HU 3 885 3 962 2 474 62.4
IE 21 387 21 418 12 244 57.2
IT 16 718 16 725 13 301 79.5
LT 2 467 2 594 1 371 52.8
LU 33 000 33 013 20 777 62.9
LV 2 649 2 812 1 535 54.6
NL 19 300 19 300 n. a. n. a.
PL 3 158 3 261 1 772 54.4
PT 9 630 9 768 4 733 48.5
SE 18 173 18 173 n. a. n. a.
SI 9 123 9 169 5 154 56.2
SK 3 041 3 049 1 920 63.0
UK 22 104 22 104 n. a. n. a.
4.3. The availability of durable goods 
The economic position of European households may be captured by the availabil-
ity of certain durable goods in the household. The position of Hungary among the 24 
countries of the European Union is analysed in our study in terms of the availability of 
cars, washing machines, colour televisions, telephones and computers.
This section looks at the ‘minimum requirements’ of living standards by examining 
the availability of widely used appliances (colour television, telephone, washing 
machine) in the household, with the aim of revealing what percentage of households 
in the individual EU member states lack these basic goods. It should be noted, 
however, that poverty may not be the only explanation for the absence of a colour 
TV, telephone or washing machine in a household, since households, even in the 
Table 4.2: Average annual 
equivalent incomes of 
households living in standard 
and substandard dwellings  
in the European Union,  
by country
Source: Authors’ computations 
based on EU-SILC (2005)
Note: Disposable income is  
the income remaining to a person 
after costs have been deducted. It 
is the portion of income available 
to spend.
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developed Western states, may, on rare occasions, choose not to use these seemingly 
basic goods for cultural rather than financial reasons: they may decide not to watch 
television, use telephones or washing machines (because they use laundry services). 
Cars and computers are assigned to a separate group of household goods in our 
analysis. Their availability introduces more variability between individual countries, as 
well as within them, and thus they are better suited to capturing differences in 
financial position between countries and households. The distinction between 
financial vs. lifestyle choices, of course, holds for this group of goods as well; that is, 
the decision to own certain kinds of equipment of high value may be influenced by 
the needs, lifestyle, skills or abilities and cultural standing of people in the household, 
in addition to their financial circumstances. At the same time, it seems self-evident 
that households in a better financial position are more likely to want and to acquire 
these goods. There may be further factors to account for the figures for car 
ownership in Hungary in comparison to the rest of Europe, which will be discussed 
briefly.
One way of measuring the financial standing of households is to look at the 
incidence of durable goods that are widely perceived to be basic components of 
everyday life and that are affordable to all but those in dire financial straits. However 
– as was mentioned above – it is also well known that there is a small section of the 
population that has a clearly high standard of living and that could easily afford to 
buy goods of relatively high value, and yet is disinclined to do so for reasons of 
lifestyle or cultural considerations. We also find goods that are genuinely beyond the 
means of a lot of households and that are not actually necessary; our analysis involves 
cars and computers in this category.
We now look at the availability of some basic household appliances – colour 
televisions, telephones and washing machines – in European households. We find 
that almost all EU households are equipped with television sets and some kind of 
phone: 97 per cent of households in the 24 EU countries under consideration have 
colour televisions, and the same percentage have landline and/or mobile phones 
(Figures 4.13 and 4.14).
The availability of colour televisions in Hungary is in line with the EU average, i.e. 
97 per cent of Hungarian households are equipped with a colour television. Hungary 
is thus located in the middle of the range, but there is very little variation between 
countries (Figure 4.13). Across Europe, only 5 percentage points (within the margin of 
sampling error and thus essentially negligible) separate the two extremes of the 
‘most advanced’ countries (where almost all households have a colour TV) and the 
‘least advanced’ (where 94 per cent have). In summary, then, at least 94 European 
households in 100 have colour televisions, and this ratio can be as high as 99 
households in 100 in some of the countries.
THE ABSENCE OF DURABLE 
HOUSEHOLD GOODS DOES NOT 
NECESSARILY IMPLY POVERTY; IT 
MAY BE EXPLAINED BY CULTURAL 
OR LIFESTYLE CHOICES.
BASIC HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES 
ARE AVAILABLE IN ALMOST ALL 
EUROPEAN HOUSEHOLDS, 
INCLUDING COLOUR TVS...
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Figure 4.13: Share of households 
with colour television sets in the 
European Union, by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
120 4. HOUSING CONDITIONS AND DURABLE GOODS IN THE HOUSEHOLD
TÁRKI EUROPEAN SOCIAL REPORT
A similar level of availability, but with more substantial cross-country differences, 
is observed with respect to the most basic communication tool, the telephone, in the 
EU-24 member states (Figure 4.14). While the telephone penetration rate reaches or 
approaches 100 per cent in some of the countries (typically relatively small and 
affluent countries and those in the Northern European region: the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Sweden and Luxembourg, plus Greece as an exception), the proportion of 
households with phones can be around 90 per cent (or even lower), mostly in the 
new member states of the Eastern and Central European region (the three Baltic 
states, Poland and the Czech Republic, plus Portugal as an exception). Hungary also 
belongs in this latter group, ranking in the lowest third of the range, with 92 per cent 
of households having a landline and/or mobile phone – 4 or 5 percentage points 
lower than the EU-24 average. 
Figure 4.14: Share of households 
with (landline and/or mobile) 
telephones in the European 
Union, by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
... LANDLINE OR MOBILE PHONES...
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The countries studied are found to have the greatest variation in the availability of 
washing machines (Figure 4.15), even though the overall EU average penetration rate 
is at the fairly high level of 94 per cent. Hungary fares slightly better than average, 
with 96 per cent of households equipped with washing machines. Similarly high 
rates, above 90 per cent, are found in the majority of EU countries, with the exception 
of the Baltic states and some of the Scandinavian countries (Sweden and Denmark), 
where only 70–80 per cent of households are equipped with washing machines. The 
latter two countries may be examples of the phenomenon whereby a section of 
households that are comparatively affluent in an EU context and live in relatively rich 
countries choose, for reasons of lifestyle or habit rather than financial considerations, 
not to have appliances (such as washing machines) that are otherwise held to be 
a basic good. 
Somewhat over half (55 per cent) of European households are equipped with 
a computer; the indicator shows a slightly poorer figure (39 per cent) for Hungarian 
households (Figure 4.16). The level of PC penetration registered in the Netherlands 
Figure 4.15: Share of households 
with washing machines  
in the European Union,  
by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
... AND WASHING MACHINES.
COMPUTERS ARE AVAILABLE  
IN EVERY SECOND EUROPEAN 
HOUSEHOLD...
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(78 per cent) is twice as high as the Hungarian figure, which places the former country 
at the head of the list. Similarly high rates are to be found in Sweden and Denmark, 
where approximately three-quarters of households have computers. Interestingly, in 
those two countries, computers occur with about the same frequency as washing 
machines.
Figure 4.16: Share of households 
with computers in the European 
Union, by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
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Information society in Hungary. The annual report of the World Internet Project 
reveals that four Hungarian households in ten had computers in 2006. However, only 
two households in ten (21 per cent) had Internet access in the home, though the major-
ity of these (71 per cent) had a broadband connection. Thus in 2006 a total of 15 per 
cent of households in Hungary could access the Internet via a broadband connection.
The infrastructure of information technology showed a substantial growth in Hungary 
in the following year: the frequency of computers in the home increased by a quarter, 
so that in 2007 every second household (49 per cent) had a computer, which led to an 
increase in Internet penetration – that same year, one-third of Hungarian households 
(35 per cent) had access to the Internet, over 80 per cent of which via broadband 
technology. That is, 29 per cent of Hungarian households now have broadband 
Internet access. With the developments of the past year, Hungary has embarked on 
the process of closing the gap with Europe in terms of home IT infrastructure. The 
data suggest that computer, and especially Internet, penetration has begun a rising 
trend, and dynamic growth is expected in the next few years  (WIP, 2007).
As Figure 4.16 shows, according to the EU-SILC survey, four households in ten in 
Hungary are equipped with a computer, which puts the country alongside the Czech 
Republic, Italy, Portugal, Estonia and Poland at the front of the last third of the 
European range. PC penetration levels lower than the Hungarian rate are only to be 
observed in the other two Baltic states, Slovakia and Greece.
Almost three-quarters (73 per cent) of households in the 24 EU countries under 
consideration own cars (Figure 4.17), but less than half (46 per cent) of households in 
Hungary are in that position, which secures for it one of the last places in the 
European rankings, alongside Estonia, Slovakia and Latvia. Luxembourg has the 
largest share of households with a car, 88 per cent, with Cyprus next in line (85 per 
cent).  Compared to Europe generally, the level of ‘motorization’ in Hungary is quite 
low – a feature that is also supported by data other than those presented above. The 
number of cars per one thousand people, for instance, is lowest in Hungary (together 
with Slovakia): in 2005, there were just 287 cars per thousand Hungarian citizens, 
which was half the EU-25 average (476 cars per thousand people) or the EU-15 
average (503 cars per thousand people) (Tárki–UniCredit, 2008, Table F4.5).
The frequency of cars in a country is obviously related to the road infrastructure 
and transport structure of that country – that is, to the standards and affordability of 
travel options offered by various forms of public transport as an alternative to car 
travel. One indicator that is suitable for capturing this complex issue is the overall use 
of major types of land transport services by the local population and the use of each 
type relative to other types. Eurostat data from 2004 reveal (EC, 2006b) that of the 
EU-25 countries, Hungary has the lowest share of car travel: 60 per cent of all 
passenger kilometres on land are travelled by car (as opposed to 84 per cent for the 
EU-25 and 83 per cent for the EU-15), while it has the highest share of train journeys 
(13 per cent) and bus and coach journeys (24 per cent).49
49 Although Cyprus and Malta are slightly ahead of Hungary with respect to the share of bus 
and coach journeys, there are no rail-based forms of transport (train, tram, underground) 
in those countries, i.e. buses and coaches are the only alternatives to car travel, which 
clearly distorts the distribution of passenger kilometres over all types of land transport 
(Tárki–UniCredit, 2008, Table F4.6).
...WHILE IN HUNGARY ONLY FOUR 
HOUSEHOLDS IN TEN HAVE  
A COMPUTER, WHICH IS ONE  
OF THE WORST RATIOS IN EUROPE.
WHILE THREE-QUARTERS  
OF EUROPEAN HOUSEHOLDS HAVE 
A CAR, ONLY HALF OF 
HUNGARIAN HOUSEHOLDS DO.
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Another notable finding, giving further evidence for the above conclusions, is that 
Hungary experienced the slowest growth in the number of passenger kilometres in 
the period 1990–2004 – an increase of just 2 per cent. Among the EU-25 countries, 
the average growth was 18 per cent over the same period. It is especially striking that 
those EU countries comparable to Hungary (in terms of their historical past, economic 
present and area and/or population size) registered increases several times greater: 
an increase of 84 per cent in Greece, 64 per cent in Portugal, and even in the Czech 
Republic, car travel increased by 24 per cent between 1990 and 2004. 
Figure 4.17: Share of households 
with cars in the European Union, 
by country (%)
Source: EU-SILC (2005)
THE LEVEL OF MOTORIZATION IS 
GENERALLY LOW IN HUNGARY 
COMPARED TO THE REST OF 
EUROPE: IT IS THE COUNTRY WITH 
THE LOWEST LEVEL OF CAR USE IN 
PROPORTION TO ALL TYPES OF 
LAND TRAVEL.
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